@shek_dev

Helping Solana Founders win @SuperteamBlack

 tmux
Joined August 2021
  • Tweets18.8K
  • Following4.8K
  • Followers10.3K
1.1KMedia
Include

Only show posts containing:

Exclude

Hide posts containing:

Time range
-
Minimum likes
Replying to @Jack______M @kirancodes
is there a recording? I would love to learn more
229
Replying to @SuperteamAE
banger video
1
64
Replying to @srijancse
And the ones that enabled them. How are we sure anything they have ever touched was aboveboard?
1
4
189
shek retweeted
Akshay@akkimanOct 23
Now Alphabet/Google is super pissed with these guys.. They even say "Social media scrutiny" are not acceptable explanations. They owe an explanation to *billions* of relying parties its mistake exposed.
Akshay@akkimanOct 22
... Look at the questions Google's Chrome team just put to the CA behind this mess. They are clearly not happy. Not trying to pile on here but these are genuinely tough questions anyone would want answered. ...
21
166
8
2,351
121,446
shek retweeted
Kiran@kirancodesOct 24
funny thing about the zeldovich paper referenced (and also in the Ant post) is the slop-specs for xv6 come out to 6000 lines. (xv6 itself is 6000 LOC C) The theorem size is EQUAL to the the entire OS. no-one read it. We're heading to a future of slop specs like never before.
the generic adequacy theorem, which proves that any property can be derived from the invariants by xv6 holds on every trace level execution according to the operational semantics depends on 795 definitions spanning 660 lines in our proofs.

ALT the generic adequacy theorem, which proves that any property can be derived from the invariants by xv6 holds on every trace level execution according to the operational semantics depends on 795 definitions spanning 660 lines in our proofs.

Peter O'Hearn@PeterOHearn12Oct 24
Replying to @kirancodes
Are we sure how they do things? Zeldovich is involved, and there is the amazing recent zeldovich-kaashoek csl/iris risc-v paper. Could export a proof-in-the-semantics without stating proof theory was used. Could be wrong, just sayin
1
3
19
1,385
Specification was always (and is especially now) the hard part of verification. This is a creative use of fuzz tests: proving (at the binary level!) that a fuzz test w/ asserts capturing functional correctness never crashes is a neat way to squeeze a lot out of an existing spec!
Anthropic
@AnthropicAIOct 22
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…

LLMs are making formal software verification feasible at a much larger scale

Claude formally proved security properties in the compiled code of 123 open-source libraries. Along the way, it found bugs that had eluded detection for years.

anthropic.com
7
10
136
7,779
The first priority of the next govt should be to nationalize all Adani assets. Watch this documentary, it will open your eyes.
This quoted post is unavailable.
Try viewing anyway · View on X
1,356
9,716
297
43,100
1,515,478
Replying to @isenditbacc
actually no, given the current market seems smart to buy after it dumps
1
1
34
Replying to @captn3m0 @UPI_NPCI
The worst part is they will scapegoat human incompetence to AI
35
3,034
complete failure of governance what happens when bureaucracy abhors free markets
Mudit Gupta
@Mudit__GuptaOct 23
India can't even make websites anymore. Make in India campaign going very strong. The only remaining Indian HTTPS certificate authority is dead. All Indian websites are now dependent on foreign certificate issuers which can facilitate foreign spying and MITM attacks.
4
1
72
2,307
The online crisis involving @eMudhra is just the tip of the iceberg for the Indians. Our entire #DigitalCircus based governance architecture can be upended by any AI model made for fun. This is NOT fear-mongering! This is a result of outsourcing governance! Read more - emudhra.com/en/post/certific…
24
416
16
987
27,624
shek retweeted
Nemo@captn3m0Oct 23
Since the entire internet cares about critical certificates today, a reminder @UPI_NPCI has been running on an expired cert since Sep 2025. Issued by IDRBT, which is now managing all of *.bank.in.
│ File in APK │ Subject │ Issuer │ Valid from │ Expires │ │ signer-erupee.crt │ CN=psosigner.npci.org.in (National Payments Corporation of India, Chennai) │ DigiCert EV RSA CA G2 │ 2023-09-01 │ 2024-10-01 23:59:59 GMT │ │ signer-upi.crt │ CN=upinpci │ IDRBT Sub CA 2022 │ 2023-09-20 │ 2025-09-19 18:29:59 GMT │

ALT │ File in APK │ Subject │ Issuer │ Valid from │ Expires │ │ signer-erupee.crt │ CN=psosigner.npci.org.in (National Payments Corporation of India, Chennai) │ DigiCert EV RSA CA G2 │ 2023-09-01 │ 2024-10-01 23:59:59 GMT │ │ signer-upi.crt │ CN=upinpci │ IDRBT Sub CA 2022 │ 2023-09-20 │ 2025-09-19 18:29:59 GMT │

49
464
29
3,076
144,421
shek retweeted
calle
@callebtcOct 22
formally verifiable software is probably the only way out
21
15
6
236
12,200
crazy how everyone is losing their minds that they chose to directly verify the binary this will continue and become the most scalable way to prove programs the actual insanity is the proof size, it’s impossible for a human expert to ready/verify the hardest last mile is reliable specification
Anthropic
@AnthropicAIOct 22
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…

LLMs are making formal software verification feasible at a much larger scale

Claude formally proved security properties in the compiled code of 123 open-source libraries. Along the way, it found bugs that had eluded detection for years.

anthropic.com
2
1
32
1,949
Why do I think this? It will be the most cost effective way to underwrite all future unknown software exploits None else has as severe incentive to be bullet proof against all sorts of attack.
82
Replying to @vasamonte
my quant
1
45
Replying to @var_epsilon
@quixja @xerefic
1
66
95% sure most COBOL era financial infra mass migrates to public blockchains
Nikita Bier
@nikitabierOct 22
If your company refers to engineers as the IT department, you have nothing to worry about. You were already breached last week.
2
10
773
see you soon mumbai!
1
1
35
975
If your company refers to engineers as the IT department, you have nothing to worry about. You were already breached last week.
354
1,327
209
25,395
701,457
Load more