Saad Hafiz (@shgcci) profile picture

Saad Hafiz | Geopolitics & global security | Power, conflict, and global political risk decoded

USA
Joined April 2013
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Makkah Pact officials are in Tehran today — Munir, Khalid bin Salman, and Türkiye’s intel chief — sitting down with the Iranians. Pakistan helped get this meeting off the ground after Munir’s visit last week. Feels like Islamabad is trying to turn its mediation role into something more permanent. My take on what’s shifting: Pakistan Steps Into A Wider Role As Mecca Pact Officials Meet In Tehran – OpEd eurasiareview.com/26102026-p…
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Starving 45 Million People Is Not a Military Strategy The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is not just an energy crisis. It is becoming a global food-security emergency. Roughly one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade passes through this chokepoint. Prices are up 30%, supplies are disrupted, and farmers risk missing critical planting windows. The UN warns that, if this continues, 45 million more people could face severe acute food insecurity. Its proposed first step is simple: allow five fertilizer vessels a day through under a temporary, UN-facilitated arrangement. Five. Yet Washington and Tehran have yet to agree on even this limited humanitarian measure, despite their wider confrontation. Wars are decided by leaders. Their consequences are often paid for by people who had no say in starting them—and who cannot afford to miss a meal.
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Pakistan’s Insurgencies: Indian Support, Pakistani Failures—and the Cost of Both Who is financing the insurgencies in Balochistan and KP? There is no single answer—and blaming one foreign sponsor will not explain the whole picture. BLA and BLF networks are linked to extortion, drug trafficking, natural-resource smuggling and fundraising. Some Indian politicians openly back Baloch independence. But political support is not proof that the Indian state is funding, arming or directing these groups. Allegations need evidence, not assumptions. The TTP has its own funding networks, including donations, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and illicit trade. UN monitors have also reported financial, logistical and operational support from Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities. The human cost is devastating. Pakistan recorded 1,139 terrorism-related deaths and 1,595 injuries in 2025. Balochistan and KP accounted for over 74% of attacks and 67% of deaths. Behind those figures are disrupted lives, damaged infrastructure, lost investment, threatened CPEC projects and children whose education is interrupted. These are national figures, not deaths attributable solely to these insurgencies. Cutting off funding matters. But security operations alone will not end these conflicts. Pakistan must also confront the political exclusion, weak governance and unresolved grievances that allow militancy to persist.
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Pakistan’s Democracy: Who Holds Power—and Who Gets to Compete? For decades, citizens have been told democracy needs time to deliver. How much more time? And why keep waiting for a system that rarely opens its doors to ordinary people? A competitive National Assembly campaign has been estimated to cost Rs15–20 crore; a provincial contest around Rs10 crore. Yet the 2024 legal spending limits were Rs1 crore and Rs40 lakh, respectively. Citizens may have an equal vote, but they do not have an equal chance of entering politics. When political competition costs this much, democracy risks becoming the preserve of the wealthy. Civilian supremacy over the military is essential, but it is only the beginning. Dynastic politics, patronage and weak accountability also undermine democracy. Civilian leaders must face the same constitutional scrutiny they demand of the military. Pakistan needs credible elections, independent courts, transparent campaign financing, provincial autonomy, empowered local governments and economic opportunity. The military cannot be above elected authority. Elected authority cannot be above the law. And democracy cannot belong to a privileged few.
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China Doesn’t Need to Defeat India to Keep It in Check China sees India in three ways: as a growing US partner in the Indo-Pacific, an influential voice in the Global South, and a regional rival it cannot afford to ignore. That creates an interesting contradiction. Beijing wants cooperation with India when it serves Chinese interests, stability when tensions become costly, and greater room for its own influence across South Asia and the Indian Ocean. But India is not Washington’s chess piece, and the Global South does not automatically follow Beijing. India has its own interests and ambitions. There is another important distinction. China points to economic delivery; India points to electoral democracy. Both matter. But development does not guarantee political freedom, just as elections alone do not guarantee good government. Ultimately, both countries should be judged by what they deliver for their people—not simply by how much power they project. India does not have to choose between being China's rival and America's partner. It has to define its own place in the world.
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Pakistan’s elite keeps getting richer while everyone else is getting poorer. Poverty just went from 22% to 29%. Even the IMF — in a report the government itself asked for — says elite capture of procurement, SOEs, tax policy and the courts is bleeding the country. Real reforms could add 5–6.5% to GDP. NAB’s big recovery numbers are basically a rounding error compared to the actual damage. The Auditor General keeps finding trillions in irregularities. Defence procurement and military-linked commercial entities operate with almost no real civilian oversight. Transparency International score is 28/100. Every civilian government signs an IMF deal and then waters it down. The structure never actually changes. Rules are for the weak. Oversight gets switched off the moment it becomes inconvenient. Equal rules for everyone — civilian and military-linked — is the only thing that has ever worked. Transparent procurement. Open SOE books. Oversight that can’t be turned off. Everything else is just theatre.
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Kashmir Can’t Wait Forever. The Formulas Already Did. Three CRPF personnel are in hospital today after motorcycle-borne militants opened fire on their checkpoint in Kulgam. Across the LoC, people in Pakistan-administered Kashmir have taken to the streets over political engineering and local grievances—and met force and bans. A few years ago a limited cross-LoC bus let divided families meet for a few hours after decades apart. Grandparents saw grandchildren for the first time. Then security incidents and politics shut it down again. Same families, same mountains, same rivers. Decades of slogans about ownership have not stopped the checkpoints, the infiltration, the detentions, or the fear. Every grand formula has already failed. The UN plebiscite was conditional and is dead. Neither side will accept the current line as a permanent border. Independence is a non-starter. Musharraf’s four-point idea—soft LoC, real autonomy short of independence, reduced militarization, joint mechanism—came closest in the mid-2000s. Then Mumbai and politics killed it. China holds Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley the entire time, so any final map is a three-way problem no capital wants to open. What remains is narrower and less inspiring: Pakistan ends the militant pipeline first. Only then can India ease the security state and restore genuine political space. Soften the LoC enough for people and limited trade to cross—starting with the bus routes that once worked. Treat water and climate as shared problems instead of weapons. No map redrawing. No third-party theater. Nuclear neighbors, unresolved grievances, and attacks like today’s are how this escalates again. Incremental reduction of suffering is not a slogan. It is the only thing that has ever worked.
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Appreciate the discussion. If Pakistan actually ends the militant pipeline, we’ll see it in a real drop in infiltration and attacks. Same way, if India eases the security state in some districts, we’ll see fewer detentions and actual local governance coming back. Bus routes and limited trade can be turned on and off—they don’t force either side to give up its claim. So the only real reason left to reject even these small steps is that both sides still find the status quo useful.
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Trump and Vance just said what 50 years of “pressure” talk never did. For decades people have claimed the special U.S.-Israel relationship was cracking. It never did. So is this actually different, or just the latest round of noise? On Election Day Trump said the $4B annual aid ends in 2027. Netanyahu agreed. Israel doesn’t need it. Vance then said the GOP lost the midterms partly because of the Iran war and because voters want a changed relationship with Israel. Democrats took Congress. AIPAC had already dropped formal endorsements and direct donations and still took hits in high-profile races. Past “pressure” was mostly talk or one party’s fringe. This is the White House and the new Congress both treating the old unconditional package as a political liability. The consensus that used to protect it just got a lot thinner—unless Israel faces a real war.
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Obscurantism as policy in Afghanistan. The Taliban have spent years treating girls’ education and basic openness as threats. That’s obscurantism. Inside the country it has meant a state still running on foreign aid and opium, half the population kept under restriction, and people leaving whenever they can. Outside, Afghanistan is more isolated and more dependent on the same neighbours it keeps clashing with — while still claiming to stand alone. Progress would look different: girls in school, an economy that doesn’t live on aid and opium, and a government that doesn’t treat half its people as a security problem. The group has shown no interest in any of that.
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Can India, Pakistan and Bangladesh actually move toward more cooperation instead of the usual friction and nationalism? The economic logic is pretty straightforward—shared rivers, trade, climate vulnerability, better connectivity. The problem is the politics. India-Pakistan issues still freeze SAARC. India-Bangladesh relations have soured over Hasina sitting in India, the Ganges water deal running out, and the easy domestic appeal of anti-India talk, even while Dhaka quietly improves ties with Pakistan. Narrow, practical steps are still doable: better water data sharing, selective trade or transit, joint disaster work. Those don’t require a full political reset. A bigger shift would. Right now, domestic incentives in all three places still reward confrontation more than compromise, and that hasn’t really changed.
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Cooperation is still cheaper than the other options.
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Happy Diwali. 🪔
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America checked out. Pakistan’s military didn’t. Imran Khan is still in jail. The midterms confirmed the shift. Americans voted on prices and a war they rejected. Allies are already hedging because the old security role is finished. Pakistan’s Trump-era gains—tariff cuts, Munir’s White House access, mediation credit—are closing. A Democratic Congress will be colder and more India-focused. Tone changes. The balance of power does not. The hybrid system remains secure. Its mediation role in the Iran war created a practical Middle East profile that China and the Gulf already treat as useful. An inward America simply makes Washington optional rather than essential. For Imran Khan and PTI the core reality is unchanged: no one in Washington was coming to free him. That has not changed. The same shift that reduces the establishment’s external comfort can create more space for scrutiny of political cases and the distance between popular support and institutional power. It is not a path out of Adiala. It only makes the outside cover thinner. His fate is still decided at home, where the ground is now slightly less comfortable for the other side.
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Pakistan has spent 50+ years failing the same economy exam—under both military and civilian governments. Every few years it does just enough—cut a few tariffs, sell a few state firms, sign another IMF deal—to get temporary relief. Then the same protected interests reverse or dilute the changes. Boom, bust, another bailout. The pattern has held across Zia, the 1990s civilians, Musharraf, and the post-2008 elected governments. The fixes are known: broader taxes, freer trade, less state waste, real investment in people. None have been locked in because the people who benefit from the status quo still decide the outcome, regardless of who is formally in charge. On current trends, Pakistan is locked into low growth and repeated crises. The roadmap exists. The will to finish the job does not.
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India and China on the LAC: progress, not parity. China is still the heavier player. India has closed much of the old logistics gap—tunnels, all-weather roads, and troops who actually stay forward. A 1962-style outcome is now far harder. Terrain still favors the defender. That’s real progress. It is not parity. China retains clear advantages in production, sustainment, and the ability to apply pressure without domestic political cost. India has to answer questions and defend every increase in spending. That difference is not neutral. The question is whether India can turn these local gains into lasting leverage before the larger gaps reassert themselves.
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Midterm “reset”? Trump still holds the keys. World leaders are already cracking open the bubbly after Democrats flipped Congress. Reality check: Trump’s still president until 2029. He keeps the veto, the military, and the real foreign-policy power. He’s already admitted the Iran war (and the oil spike) cost his party seats—then said he’d do it again and flashed the veto. Congress can squeeze funding and push more Ukraine aid, but a full reset? That’s pure cope. A cornered Trump is more likely to go harder abroad than quieter.
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JD Vance: “The reason we lost is the war.” 2024 Trump voters turned out but flipped to Dems over the Iran conflict, high prices, “America First,” and U.S.-Israel ties. Turnout wasn’t the problem—voter preference was. Trump admits the war hurt but says he’d do it again. The regime survived, oil spiked, and China gained. Classic tactical win, strategic loss.
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US Voters Just Hit the Brakes Voters just slammed the brakes on high prices and unilateral moves—hard enough to flip places that were supposed to be locked down. Congress is back in the room. Sudden foreign-policy lurches should now require an explanation and a bill. Whether anyone in power actually wants that restraint is the open question. For 2028 it’s simple: Republicans can’t treat living costs like a side issue, and Democrats can’t coast on just not being the other side. Results or another reckoning. Choose.
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Proud moment with my brother and California’s next governor, Xavier Becerra—longtime Congressman, former AG and HHS Secretary, and the state’s first Latino governor elected in over 150 years.
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