building infra for agents prev @_groww @olacabs

India
Joined December 2010
the newest codex mac app is so fkn laggy...
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You should just put /goal and a mildly sensible prompt and have multiple agents working on their own goals. It removes the hassle of back-n-forth responding to the agents and also provides you enough freedom to actually think and not just be an enabler of systems (yes/no) for your agents.
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You can't even use the codex subscription for your own usecases now. this is why we should have more frontier open-weight models
banned for reverse engineering work? that’s wild oh well, -$500, and a bunch of banked resets) but gained motivation to get 3 more machines and finish my cluster. i have never used openai to exploit or find vulnerabilities, only local reverse engineering which tripped daybreak.
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Codex on macOS: one long thread stalls on Thinking, then reconnects with "websocket closed by server before response.completed". Forking it has the same issue; fresh chats work. Same model: fresh "hello" ~3s, fork ~116s to first message. Anyone else seeing this?
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Satyam retweeted
156 Indian government websites are currently inaccessible because of a cert revocation by @eMudhra, including 4 that come under @GoI_MeitY. One of them is @ccaindiapki - which regulates eMudhra. cc @internetfreedom I made a list: captnemo.in/blog/2026/10/23/…
Replying to @GoI_MeitY
The reported security incident pertains to this only. MeitY is not involved in its audit. The impact of this incident on Indian websites and applications have been very limited and for a very short interval.
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Sold by @bendlang . We're going to see so many ports of apps to formally verified languages and runtimes
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The latest models refuse requests a lot now. I tried to replicate the emudhra situation locally and got flagged a bunch. So much maneuvering to make non-exploitary experiments.
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Forgetting about this? The OG DNS issue
is this the longest incident ever?
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This will be one hell of an RCA report, the beginning of the agentic era postmortem format. Going to have a lot of learnings
All deploys have now been restored Affected customers will finishing receiving emails in the next hour or so Finally, out of an abundance of caution, we will be posting the post mortem around 9am PST tomorrow
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Satyam retweeted
Replying to @Railway
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emudhra made a key so weak it revoked the whole business
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Neoclouds will get resilient. Folks have no idea how giants like AWS/GCP have had mammoth security issues pre-AI era and they came through with battle scars. All because of putting security foremost everything else. I just read how Railway moved on from using the gcp managed KMS for storing the encryption keys to their own to lower down costs, and how it come to bite them now. But they are the only ones who have been transparent about how they operate in their engineering blogs. I found next to nothing on Fly or vercel
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This is not what Hacktober was supposed to be
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she's a 10 but that was supposed to be a random 384-bit number
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For the next few days or weeks, anyone now has a root CA thanks to eMudhra. Time to have some fun with MiTMing unwilling devices!
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emudhra has shared their response on the incident, and i have so many questions lol > you used certified hsms and still ended up with 4 as a ca private key. > two audits missed it for 18 months > why even mention ai when someone could just try numbers below 256? >how did your entire process let this through?
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I work on production certificate-issuance infrastructure, and i'm struggling with the fact that one of e-mudhra's intermediate ca private keys was 4. And the fact that folks just recovered it from the public certificate. scotthelme.co.uk/eight-bits-…
‼️ BREAKING: The private keys of 8 certificates from Indian certificate authority eMudhra were compromised, Mozilla says. Firefox blocked them within 3 hours. Each key should be a 116-digit number, but one was just 4. Anyone can guess them and forge HTTPS certs for any website.
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p-384 requires an unpredictable choice from an enormous range. restricting the secret to one byte leaves 255 nonzero candidates. padding 4 to fill a 48-byte field changes its representation without adding randomness.
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even an hsm cannot protect against someone independently guessing the same key. how did this get through generation and approval for a trusted intermediate ca?
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