Thatcher Bean (@thatcherbean) profile picture

Views are my own and recently more fluid than normal.

Spain
Joined February 2014
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
First of all, I'll agree with you that Jeff Bezos was good at monopolizing e-commerce and is not particularly focused or hungry when it comes to space. And throw all the strays you want at Lockheed and Boeing. Their leadership is skilled at corruption and financial engineering, not production. I always like it when you go after corporate monopolies. That out of the way, I didn't say *anyone* can shove capital at an engineering problem and solve it easily. That's obviously untrue, and I'm not going to stand behind something I didn't say. I said that applying capital and engineering to a problem leads to improvement. It does. I don't think it's easy, but it's a clear and replicable model Americans have followed for hundreds of years. There's nothing unique about the path SpaceX took to make certain launches more efficient. But just because it's not unique doesn't mean it's not a real accomplishment. Good for your team, the pride you guys feel is well-deserved. There's also nothing unique about Boeing or Lockheed being shitty; financial engineering leads to poor results and limited learning. It's downright shocking that for many years we relied on the Russians for launches, and that was a straight-up policy failure. NASA's funding of SpaceX to break that cartel was a good choice. What is historically unusual today in the U.S. is two things. One, we as a society have dramatically narrowed the set of people who can marshal capital, and most of that set are not capable of hiring and running large engineering projects. It used to be the case that capable and interested leadership was necessary to raise capital, now the qualification is simply being part of a narrow set of monopolists. Bezos spends his time on a mega-yacht staring at his wife's boob job. And hey, that's fine for him, but it's weird that such a character would have control over a space company on which he's not focused. It's a waste of large amounts of capital and a society that allows it is quite Soviet. Same with Zuckerberg dumping $80 billion into the Metaverse, Boeing and its Jack Welch-inspired mess from the 1990s onward, or Microsoft's endless attempts to make corporate America pay for variants of Clippy. We've always know the rich and famous mostly don't innovate to challenge the status quo - why would they? As Woodrow Wilson put it in 1913, "The treasury of America... depends upon the inventions of unknown men, upon the originations of unknown men, upon the ambitions of unknown men. Every country is renewed out of the ranks of the unknown, not out of the ranks of those already famous and powerful and in control." It's not, therefore, a surprise, to see stagnation in America, which is a problem you've actually highlighted. You're a bit different than the rest of the Silicon Valley set. You are interested the technology work for which you fundraise, and you can inspire engineers to do great work. And that matters. There are downsides to your choices, and I won't go into them here, but the innovation is real. My question is why innovation is not more widespread, as it used to be. It's not just the narrow set of people who can marshal capital, the other gating factor is that we have de facto limited the structure in which one can organize capital to shareholder driven financial institutions. Such corporations have their place, and always have. But to only allow that kind of structure is weird, and would have meant we never would have created the original NASA that built the foundations of our space capacity. We had a far more innovative era and much more productive set of industries from the 1930s to the 1970s, when we built most of the foundational digital and aerospace technologies. With our financier-driven model today, for instance, we never would have the free universal GPS system that we take for granted, or the nuclear submarine developed by Admiral Rickover. We may not even have the semiconductor or the laser, or perhaps those would be bottled up in some large firm, protected by a thousand IP attorneys. All of those deployments of innovative scientific and engineering capacity are a result not just of engineering prowess, but of government policy to limit the power of dominant firms who had captured the control of those technologies, or to simply empower good leadership within public bureaucracies. I'll be a bit more specific. I once got a list of antitrust cases in 1952, and here are some of the industries where the DOJ antitrust division forced an end to anti-competitive uses of patents: Electric lamps, glass bulbs, tubing, argon gas, machinery, electrical equipment, fluorescent lamps, soap and synthetic detergents, variable condensers (the tubing devices used on radios to select broadcasting stations), chlorinating equipment, braking systems, electrical equipment, powder, and paste for the detection of defects in metal parts, wrinkle finishes for paint, enamel, and varnish, latex, prismatic glassware and illuminating appliances, peach pitting machinery, fluorescent materials, metal abrasives industry, machine tools, dental impression powder, telescope grocery carts, sheet chargers used to feed sheets of metal materials to rolling mills, etc. During WWII, we also basically had the government pay to replace pretty much all of the nation's machine tools. The government also financed R&D, and was the key customer for smaller firms building out the semiconductor industry, like Texas instruments and Motorola. Those companies licensed AT&T's tech because of the 1952 antitrust consent decree that forced the telecom firm to offer nondiscriminatory licenses to all comers of all Bell Lab innovations. The result of these policy choices was a ton of innovation. We are in a very different world now. Our current policy choices on who can raise capital to control technologies and within what structures they can do so represent an ideologically blinkered approach that kneecaps innovation. Many on the right see these policy choices as virtuous and inherent. They imagine that only great men can transcend what are actually just self-imposed traps that drown the talents of most Americans. You don't see that as much in China, which has plenty of innovation. That country has many policies the U.S. used to have, such as highly competitive markets, a financial system geared to production, weaker IP, and an export-oriented currency regime. They are predatory, but very capable, precisely because they control their financiers, as America did until the 1970s. Obviously I don't endorse the Chinese state's aims or totalitarian goals, but they have learned from us what works, and we should similarly learn from them. You understand my argument, you have a lot of investments in China and have commented on the capabilities of the Chinese government and people. Today, in the West, you are one of the small number of people who can access large amounts of capital in our dysfunctional and corrupt political order, and use it to actually bend metal. Why you can do so is a separate and perhaps not as charitable a discussion, but I will leave that aside. You can also hire capable engineers and empower them. Good for you. That's hard. It's also not genius. When you had a task in which you didn't control the context - DOGE - the results were different. The actual disagreement here is the nature of how leadership happens. Many find comfort in thinking they need great men to protect them and innovate, my own view is that ordinary people, when free, can do extraordinary things. So I think we should focus on undoing the shackles - whether monopolies, excessive patent thickets, corruption, poor financial regulation - confining the American people. To put it differently, I don't think we should make it extremely difficult for competent people to raise money to do innovative things just so Zuckerberg can waste money on his dork metaverse. I'll offer one other observation. You built your career starting in the 1990s, when there was a consensus that broadly technology was a force for good. That consensus existed precisely because of the old American policies I am discussing here, and the ones currently at work in China. We didn't confine the deployment of technology to a narrow extractive set of monopolists, but broadened it and ensured that it did offer public benefits through a certain legal framework. That framework collapsed, and there are now few protections for consumers, workers, or suppliers anymore. You know this directly too, you sued Apple for its misuse of its app store monopoly power. The result of this legal collapse is that there's too much innovation around harming people and extraction, too much investment in predatory gambling systems and surveillance pricing bullshit. There are too many monopolies and too much enshittification. So the consensus that technology is a force for good is fracturing. People don't think innovation is helping them anymore. Look at the anger at data centers, no one believes AI is going to benefit them. It's a very bad thing that people think this, but it's also rational. They see how it's used for pricing bullshit and surveillance and layoffs, on the vague promise from the financiers behind it that it *might* cure cancer one day. They see the narrow control of technology as all about extraction for a dominant few. It's not the Jetson's anymore. Some neat launch innovations don't change that. Maybe the collapse of that consensus doesn't bother you, or maybe you think it can be reconstituted via the same path used to destroy it. But you should think about it, because on this consensus rests your empire. And that's not even factoring in the reality that if we regulated our systems competently, AI might actually cure cancer instead of raising the price to treat it. At any rate, my view is what makes America awesome is that we set up our institutions so ordinary people can do extraordinary things. We are all, in the end, quite ordinary, but also touched with the divine. And that includes you. So good job to your team for what they accomplished. Most of them likely know they stood on the shoulders of giants, and that they contributed to the great flow of human knowledge that goes back thousands of years.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
A reminder that Chuck Schumer never endorsed Zohran Mamdani.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
And now let's go to opposition and support of Chuck Schumer's leadership. Why does he have so much support? Just two years ago, the Dems got absolutely wrecked, but he got reelected as leader unanimously. It's not his charming personality, it's an *institutional* question. Schumer's model of operating the Senate is very specific. He allows Senators a lot of room to legislate on their priorities, and operates as a logistical center to get them what they need to have a comfortable job. Money, staff, parking spots, whatever. But especially money for reelection. He is a very hard worker, perhaps the hardest in the Senate. Where does he get that money? Good question! Ironically, he gets it from those members themselves, indirectly. If they push legislation that challenges powerful interests, he uses that as leverage to get support from those interests, and then redirects that money to get those same people reelected. The legislation tends to die, as that is often the price for the money. Schumer also offers some adjacent useful policy choices that are incrementally useful to Senators on their pet questions. So it's a sort of odd dynamic, where Senators spend their time doing busywork in order for Schumer to generate the funds to get them reelected to keep doing busywork. I'll give you an example, but everyone who has dealt with Schumer has seen something similar. In 2019-2020, the House of Representatives Antitrust Subcommittee actually did its job, a throwback investigation of big tech firms that was exactly how New Deal Democrats of the 1930s operated. They got millions of documents, did hundreds of interviews, had a half dozen hearings, and over 18 months, put together a genuine analysis of four trillion dollar firms and the legal frameworks underpinning them. (It's not a coincidence that a key staffer for that investigation was @linamkhan, but I digress.) In 2021, House and Senate members sought to push legislation that would have addressed some of the market power problems that subcommittee uncovered (and that we're now dealing with in the form of giant AI monsters.) The bills involved things like antitrust as it applies to platforms, interoperability, app stores, advertising technology, basically the underpinnings of the big tech monopoly profits strangling our economy. Some of the legislation was great, some was poorly drafted, but it had genuine political support from 80% of Dems and 20% of Rs. The legislation all passed out of the Judiciary Committee, much of it carried by @amyklobuchar. Schumer leaked to Axios that it would get a vote on the Senate floor in the summer of 2022. A lot of Senators would have supported it if forced to take a vote, but they didn't want to have to do that because they didn't want to anger powerful interests. However, pushing a floor vote is what you do if you are interested in making Congress a functional body to address social problems. What did Schumer do? Well, Schumer told Klobuchar that to get a vote, she needed to get all the Democrats publicly on board. And Klobuchar couldn't, because that was impossible. He knew that would kill the bill. And coincidentally, Schumer then went to Seattle and raised dark money from Microsoft and other tech people for the 2022 election. Klobuchar might have been privately mad, but never voiced anything more than meek frustration. Why? Well she got something out of it too. She bragged about taking on big tech and got lots of attention. In other words, Schumer let Klobuchar do a bunch of work, and then collaborated with Mitch McConnell and Nancy Pelosi to avoid giving this legislation a vote, thus killing it and entrenching big tech's power. Much of the caucus was privately relieved, and Klobuchar got the publicity of being caught trying. That said, Schumer isn't all about blocking action. He helped move key staff to get appointed to the Biden administration, and that did help address some big tech questions. The Antitrust Subcommittee work did turn into major antitrust suits against Google, Amazon, Apple, and Meta, which got hung up in the courts because the Trump administration screwed it up. The FTC under Biden did kick some ass, and that's in part because of Schumer's management of the caucus. That's the play. That's what he's done with a whole host of legislative initiatives, on everything from big tech to the hedge fund carried interest loophole. It's why crypto legislation got strong Democratic support. His goal to get money to help other Democrats with outside spending, and the actual work of overt lawmaking is sacrificed to that goal. There is adjacent corruption, like his children working for Meta, Amazon, and now OpenAI, or his brother being a powerful antitrust defense lawyer who moves mergers. But that's not the driver, Schumer has a specific model of doing politics that is fairly common and had been, until this last election, quite popular. As with Pelosi's choice to double down on Gingrich's model of the House, Schumer actually inherited this model from Mitch McConnell, who organized the Senate around the filibuster blocking legislating. That technique was actually initiated to kill Bill Clinton's health care plan in the early 1990s, McConnell systemized it into the driver of the entire institution. Since the Senate is a bit more personality driven than the House, it is true Harry Reid for a time did things a bit differently. But it's been decades since the Senate actually functioned effectively to legislate. Schumer just did what McConnell taught him to do. It's important to recognize two things about this institutional setup. First, this strategy has a long term cost, which is increasing nihilism and cynicism from voters. They can see clearly that elections don't seem to matter when it comes to their pocketbooks. And second, Schumer isn't doing this alone, he's supported by much of the Democratic caucus and external stakeholders. A lot of the Democratic caucus in the Senate is just not interested in addressing big money interests or governing through public authority. Kirsten Gillibrand comes to mind, but there are many others. They think the system works reasonably well, and like governing by leaning on officials to get them to tweak something here or there. They do not have to marshal the evidence to make some sort of systemic change, because that isn't the job of the Senate anymore. They can just be comfy in a cushy job being modestly famous, and work on questions that don't implicate big money. Those who want actual legislating are characterized as impractical lefties. Blocking the ability to legislate has a number of other consequences. It empowers the courts, which is to say, the fancy corporate liberals who live in the elite world of courts, like Neal Katyal and Merrick Garland. It also empowers the national security world, that loves escaping from scrutiny, and the Federal Reserve, for similar reasons. And of course big business is mostly fine with the arrangement, as are economists who get to mostly dismiss the possibility of democratic action within the economy. And then there are activists, who don't have to pay attention to the actual details of votes. For instance, Jon Ossoff, who has flourished in the do-nothing Schumer world, is quite popular for giving speeches about corruption. But that's in between trips to Silicon Valley to raise money from OpenAI's Chris Lehane, or while voting for crypto interests or to harm college athletes by voting for Ted Cruz's Protect College Sports Act. In a Senate where legislating matters, Ossoff's good looks and camera angles would be less valuable. In other words, people who think Schumer is a bad pick because he seems to subvert the will of voters have it backwards. Schumer is the Senate leader precisely because he does subvert the will of voters on behalf of a whole set of stakeholders that want, for their own reasons, to have Congress dormant when it comes to lawmaking. His would-be successor, Brian Schatz, has the same approach. It's not a conflict just of personalities, but of political philosophies. They think that making real choices, doing the work of politics and governing, means retaining the support of powerful interests, who will then fund the necessary campaigns to keep the Democrats in power. The alternative to Schumer isn't just a different person, it's a different method of organizing power. One has to rebuild the institutions of governance, and then win elections based on governing effectively, not just getting the support of powerful interests. That sounds perhaps romantic, perhaps naive, but it is how the New Dealers did it. And of course there is always some balancing involved. Anyway, just recognize that when someone says 'Schumer delivered 9 Senate seats in 2026, we should keep him as leader,' they are making more than a claim about the midterms, they are endorsing a specific view of how our democratic institutions should operate.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
Gina Raimondo launched a $1 Billion fund with OpenAI, Anthropic, Microsoft, Amazon, Bank of America, Mastercard, IBM, and Eli Lilly She did this literally 5 months ago
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
My piece on how insiders see Hakeem Jeffries got some attention, it seems there's a hunger for information about how elected leaders/insiders operate vs base voters understand the world. So I'll offer a few tentative thoughts as to why the House of Representatives is so hated, and how to actually address it. I suspect the disagreement among insiders and base voters is slightly different than most assume. There are some policy fights, to be sure, about things like the U.S. relationship with Israel, war and peace, economic questions. But every political party has internal disagreements, the point of Congressional process is to work through them and build a coherent agenda that is broadly supported. That doesn’t seem to happen these days. The agenda seems imposed, artificial, and not consistent with the general impulse of voters. Why? To understand the problem, you have to think *institutionally.* It’s not really about individual personalities, whether Jeffries is speaker, or even getting some strong votes on Medicare for All or the war in Iran. It's about how the *institution* functions. For some reason, members of Congress don’t seem to know what’s going on in most of the country, are constantly caught by surprise by events, and have superficial or silly approaches to problems. There’s a lack of gravitas. That wasn’t always the case. In fact, prior to the mid-1990s, Congress actually could translate broad frustration into real policy. Cable rates, for instance, skyrocketed in the late 1980s, so Congress passed the Cable Act of 1992, which cut rates by 17%. Was it perfect? No. But do we see anything remotely like that today? No. So what happened in the 1990s? Well, GOP Speaker Newt Gingrich privatized Congressional thinking in 1995. To understand what happened, let's start with how Congress worked before Gingrich. The key frame is to recognize something that political scientists call a ‘legislative subsidy.’ You and I know it by a different name: corporate lobbyist. A corporate lobbyist isn’t effective just because he donates money, but because he actually does the institutional work of Congressional staff. That is, lobbyists have knowledge about an issue area, a legal framework, or an institution. Or they do important scheduling and process work, or they carry useful political information. All of these tasks can be done either by staffers funded by taxpayers, or lobbyists funded by corporations, or a mix of both. Before Gingrich’s right-wing Contract with America, the work of legislating was done more by publicly financed staff who answered to the public, instead of staff financed by private capital, who answered to big business. The result is Congress was far more knowledgeable. It wasn't because the members were smarter, it's because the institution had memory. You could build an entire career as a staffer with expertise in a specific area. There was a guy who knew everything there was to know about the Mississippi River, all the locks and tributaries, and every Army Corps of Engineers project. There were a dozen people who focused just on the Post Office. The Office of Technology Assessment could answer big problems, like how to decommission a Space Shuttle or how to understand a large complex industrial system. Some of the earliest work on climate change came out of the OTA. The Government Accountability Office was much better than it is today, as was the Congressional Research Service. Committees also had real staff and budgets. Wright Patman's chief investigator told me he used to go to the airport with a bunch of blank subpoenas he could fill in as needed. He found money laundering, corruption, and one time got a Federal Reserve branch to admit they bought 10,000 ping pong balls and put them in storage. (It's not clear why, maybe they got a discount.) This capacity led to quality policy, and to actual cooperation from the executive branch and corporate officials. They weren't talking to 25 year-olds covering a dozen issue areas, but to fellow professionals with a narrow focus that they couldn’t bullshit. Aside from the committees, there were real caucuses with operating budgets and capacity. The liberal Democratic Study Committee, for instance, had a significant staff, it produced excellent policy briefs, managed personnel for Democratic offices, and whipped votes. But there were other caucuses too. Individual members could easily travel, investigate, and research policy There were downsides, of course. Inside the Democratic Party, the committee Chairs operated as autocratic bosses. John Dingell used to keep a photo of planet earth on the wall behind his desk, and point to it. He would say 'that's my jurisdiction.' Still, the ability to investigate, spotlight real problems, and then act on them with legislation led to real governance. Think Henry Waxman with the tobacco CEOs under oath - smoking has declined dramatically as a result. Congress could actually govern on behalf of the public, with insight in every area of the country. It’s because the governance was funded by the public. Behind this dynamic was a political economy of equality. Sure you could become a lobbyist and make more money, and that meant you'd have a nicer car and a nicer vacation. But it was possible to raise a family as a government staffer, and people did. Congress financed a public institutional memory. In 1995, Gingrich and the GOP ran against this system, arguing in the Contract for America that Congress has become slothful, overfed, and corrupt. They pointed to things like the Postal Banking scandal, but they also build on the public interest left, Ralph Nader’s longstanding attack on higher Congressional pay. Importantly, the GOP hadn’t controlled the House since the 1950s, so there was no institutional memory there. They had a blank canvass and could redo the entire system with little internal pushback. The key to understand what happened is that Gingrich privatized the work of developing policy. Gingrich destroyed the ability of the institution to think and remember. More importantly, he also replaced this institutional capacity with something else: K-Street. Policy ideas and memory were soon housed inside corporate-funded think tanks and corporate lobby shops, or nowhere at all. Specifically, Gingrich defunded the OTA, radically slashed committee staff and salaries, ended funding for caucuses, and cowed the Government Accountability Office into becoming meek with budget changes and threats. The Congressional Research Service still exists today, but it is smaller, attenuated, and stuffed with corporate-friendly people who haughtily dismiss Congress. Notably, Gingrich did not alter the institutions where the neoliberal economists controlled the flow of legislation, such as the Congressional Budget Office. Big corporations ran the show, and still do. For instance, the Telecom Act of 1996, which set the stage for consolidation of media and the internet, was crafted within telecom and tech trade associations. That’s very different than the Cable Act of 1992 just a few years earlier that I mentioned above. That one was built within the Senate itself, and with help from the FCC. We are still living in the world of the Telecom Act of 1996, because there just isn’t the capacity to understand how to undo it. This was not just a corporate takeover; a whole set of problems could no longer even be understood. If you wanted to figure out how to decommission the Space Shuttle, you couldn't. We can’t even imagine addressing big problems now through Congress, they all go to the Supreme Court or the corporate board room or the intelligence agencies. That isn’t because Congress because stupider, it’s because the institutional functions to address big problems were defunded. This privatization fostered important shifts within the parties. Because the institutions supporting the work of governing across the caucus were now gone, Congressional leadership had a lot more power within the parties, and the autocratic nature of committee chairs remained. Committee chairs and the Strong Speaker would tussle over turf, but increasingly the ideas populating both the committee chairs and leadership came from corporate lobbying shops. The real losers were the newer members of Congress, who couldn’t participate in much of anything at all. Raising money, which members in New York and California had an advantage in, meant power. Over time, these leaders built up parallel ‘legislative subsidies’ to do what the old publicly funded staff used to. For Democrats, it was firms like SKDK and a set of pollsters, funded by private capital. These lobbyists, ardent Democrats, however, were also anti-populist, because they had two bosses - Democratic leaders and big business. America’s political economy shifted towards inequality. Over time, staff and member pay declined such that it became impossible to raise a family on a staff salary. Today, a Senator gets paid less than some first year legal associates. That might feel satisfying to people who hate Congress, but you get what you pay for. To put it differently, if you don't pay your cops, they start taking bribes. In 2006, the Democrats finally won back power. And Nancy Pelosi and the incoming Democratic chairs could have restored the older system. In some ways, such as with autocratic committee chairs, she did. But not with broader capacity. NJ Congressman Rush Holt asked for her to restart the OTA, but that lost by one vote in the Appropriations Committee. Why? Well, the Appropriations Subcommittee Chair, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, opposed restoring the OTA. There was a view among Committee chairs and Congressional leaders that more capacity threatened the existing system of lobbyist and economist driven policymaking. The mediocre CRS, they thought, was good enough. There was a lot more interest in retaining the Gingrich-imposed status quo. Pelosi made sure that most Democratic offices didn't have anyone with a classified clearance, so only she and a few member offices could actually deal with national security questions. The whole Gang of Eight and Intelligence Committee thing insulated most of the national security world from any real Congressional scrutiny. Similarly, most prestigious lawyers in the liberal world went to the courts, sneering at the possibility of legislative work. Meaningful institutional pressure to retain the privatized Gingrich model did not meet much countervailing pressure to undo it. The new ‘majority makers’ in 2006 were Rahm Emanuel corporate cut-outs, uninterested in rocking the boat or even paying attention to policy. And activists by and large focused on policy votes, not any larger institutional questions about how Congress functioned. There have been a lot of negative consequences of this under-resourcing of Congressional capacity. Committees, despite being run autocratically, basically just become funnels for corporate ideas. During the financial crisis, the Financial Services Committee didn't have a single Bloomberg terminal. Barney Frank didn’t issue a single subpoena. There was no way to build out a coherent approach to the crisis without knowledge of what happened, knowledge the committee didn’t have and wasn’t seeking. Similarly, most legislation is now jammed into huge ‘must pass’ bills, like the ACA, Dodd-Frank, NDAA authorization, government shutdowns, and whatnot. That’s because the actual capacity to do real work, to generate the momentum to fix things by investigating and spotlighting problems, is mostly gone. There are a few instances here and there with real investigations, like big tech in 2019-2020, baby formula, and some drug pricing. But not much. There’s more. Despite the advent of social media and the internet, there hasn't been a real rethinking of the committee hearing process. Or the Constitutionally mandated franking privilege, which is the money members get to communicate with constituents. One reason that Democrats have no understanding of rural America is that the staff who might otherwise be tasked with understanding the problems of rural America just don’t exist now. And members from rural areas usually are elected in swing elections, and don’t have time to build up seniority before losing. So their voice is just never heard. Similarly, the corporate lobbyists who are the machinery of the Democratic leadership are deeply hostile to populist policy goals, or even knowing the preferences of rural areas or the middle class. The consequences is that the Speaker and Congressional leadership have a huge amount of power, as do committee chairs. The autocratic nature of committee leaders over the actual caucus hasn’t changed, but the leaders have diversified in terms of race and gender. The scope of what those committees can do is much narrower. There just isn’t a lot of legislating anymore. Most policymaking is controlled by a few members from very blue rich areas, which means that the Democratic Party is much clubbier and insular. That’s great if you’re in that club, it’s not great if you’re not. In other words, the fight over the Speakership is a proxy for a much bigger institutional question. This system, and its representatives like Jeffries, still have immense support across our establishment stakeholders. For instance, the leadership of the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee are constantly trying to build more authority for the national security world and Pentagon, and prevent scrutiny from the public. They do not want to have more involvement in this policy area from other members. Even right now, the House Foreign Affairs Chair is lobbying to get rid of the China Select Committee and prevent a new AI-specific select committee. The China Select Committee is the only place where members have some real staff to think through a cross-cutting policy problem, which is the relationship between the U.S. and China. The existence of that committee has no policy implications; the chair could be hawkish, dovish, or in between. If you want the U.S. and China to be cooperating on AI or stand down on trade conflict, or amplify it, that committee could be useful. But the reason certain House senior leaders don’t like it is because they don’t want more capacity, since that would erode their power. That’s also why they don’t want an AI-select committee. They didn’t want to restore the OTA, or rebuild much of the caucus or committee capacity. They want things the way they are for the same reason they like Jeffries. Building more internal capacity erodes the legislative pathways, aka corporate lobbyists, that answer to them. On the other hand, if you did build more capacity, then the new voices coming into the party would actually have the ability to be heard and reflected in policy and governance. And the old guard does sort of know that. So with that, let’s talk about the Jeffries choice. I think you can see now why there’s not a lot of interest in having a fight over the Speaker. Asking for a vote on Medicare for All, as much as you might find that compelling, doesn't begin to touch any of these problems. It's also besides the point. When you are organizing an institution like the House, what you are trying to do is build a process for constructing an agenda, not imposing that agenda upfront. Even if you did win on Medicare for All, Congress doesn’t have the capacity to oversee such a dramatic transformation in our health care system. Remember the disastrous roll-out of Obamacare? Yeah, Congress didn’t know about that or prevent it, because it doesn’t know about anything. That’s what would happen with M4A, a likely disastrous roll-up, but much more serious because it’s a much bigger transformation. And with that, let's go to what a new member, Don Leonard, said about this process, and how he's been threatened for making demands of Jeffries. @AOC essentially confirmed his account, explaining that members don't want to be banished to irrelevant committees for opposing Jeffries. Earlier, I said no one's afraid of Jeffries. So how can both that be true? Well, Jeffries isn't just about himself, the Gingrich model in which he is embedded has a lot of stakeholders. A LOT. A friend of mine once told me about how a decision about a committee chairmanship happened, and why advocacy on policy was irrelevant to the outcome. "It's hundreds of relationships built over decades," he said. Hakeem Jeffries has been the Speaker-in-waiting since 2018, when he beat Barbara Lee for the House Caucus chairmanship. That's eight years where members worked with him with the understanding he would be the leader after Pelosi. In 2022, he took over formally. But behind even those relationships are all of the institutional stakeholders who like the Gingrich model, the think tanks, the lobbyists, the executive branch types who like the lack of scrutiny, the courts, and the intelligence community. So how do you attack this system? Well, you have to design a different one before you can reduce the power of the current one. And it has to have significant support within the Democratic caucus. That means bringing together a group of members, as happened in the 1980s in what was called the Committee for Party Effectiveness, to actually build out something new. Don't start with a personality like Jeffries. Start with what the House should look like. Members of Congress should think of themselves like the elected board of directors of America, a $35 trillion economy. They need the resources and capacity to manage it. I could go into some of the things that I think should change, but the point isn’t the specifics. The point is that right now Congress doesn’t work for the American people, and the new crop of Democrats should band together and actually think through how to change that dynamic. A very clear example of a problem going unaddressed is that the economic statistics collected by the government - GDP growth, CPI, and so forth - simply don’t reflect how Americans feel anymore. Congress needs real capacity to figure out why and force changes on how the government measures the economy. What should that capacity look like? Who should do it? More broadly, what would Congress need to actually assess problems and communicate effectively? What would it mean to roll back the for-private legislative subsidies, aka corporate lobbying and economists, while building up the staff and member capacity? How should the caucus broadly participate in national security decisions? How could member designed caucus outside of the committee system become functional for building policy ideas? How should hearings work in the age of social media? What kinds of ethics rules are outdated and silly? What does an individual member need to actually serve his or her district effectively? Why have both parties been unable to deliver and what forums need to exist to address that? What new members should do is ask the new leadership, whoever that might, and committee chairs to create a new Committee for Party Effectiveness, and stock it with different kinds of voices. Build out an agenda over the next few years to reform the institution, the budgeting, staffing, policy analysis, how to do hearings and so forth, as well as highlighting the big policy questions that need broader debates, like public financing of elections, Citizens United, war and peace - stuff that has fundamental institutional implications for the House of Representatives. Bring in real experts on how to do things differently, like More Perfect Union people to rethink hearings, or Lina Khan to discuss how to systematize investigations. Then come out with a real set of reform proposals over the course of the next year. I wish something like this were ready to go, and there are some proposals floating around, but there is no consensus on anything. There were meager attempts by members to actually do something like this after the losses in 2024, but they didn’t focus and so it all got drowned in personalty skirmishes. And no one prepared for the massive wave of 2026 and what that might mean. But now there’s a real need to move beyond business as usual. The best time to start is yesterday, but today’s better than tomorrow. So anyway, yeah, have it out over Jeffries and Schumer. That’s good. But also start thinking about the bigger institutional question of why these narrow set of leaders are so dominant in setting the agenda. I'm eager to hear more thoughts.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
.@MajorityDems to the free press, again
So Sirota raised a stink and @MajorityDems let their guys in. And now the day before the conference, our guy has been kicked out. I guess we're scarier!
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
"Chuck and I grew up, literally, in the same [Brooklyn] neighborhood. I am older than Chuck, but we went to the same elementary school, the same high school. We were on the Banking Committee together when I was first elected to Congress. So I have known Chuck for a long time, and I like Chuck, personally. He’s a very nice guy. But, I think, in this moment in American history, Chuck’s views are way out of touch with where the American people are at—and especially with where [the base of] the Democratic Party is. On issue after issue, I think he is just not in tune with where his constituents are at." thenation.com/article/politi…
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
🚨NEW: Dems won Congress promising to fight corruption - but so far, the party has matched its soaring anti-corruption rhetoric with small-bore initiatives. We cannot let them bait-and-switch America with half-measures. Here is a serious anti-corruption agenda - pass it on👇
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
If congressional Dems had heeded this advice after Richard Nixon got elected, there would be no EPA, no Clean Water Act, none of the original campaign finance laws, no War Powers Resolution, and no expansion of Medicare - all of which Dems enacted while Nixon was president.
Neera Tanden at The National Press Club: The next two years should not be an opportunity for every group in DC to dust off their wish list for the last decade. It's not a time to pressure Congress to fruitlessly spend time, political capital on ideas that we couldn't get done in a Democratic trifecta just a few years ago.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
bro does not care about whipping votes (unless it’s for aid packages to israel)
I asked Hakeem Jeffries about attendance appearing decisive in the Pete Hegseth vote. (11 House Dems did not vote tonight.) He told me and reporters: "I haven't had a conversation with anyone on the floor team about what may or may not have happened in terms of the Hegseth resolution, but this is not the end of it. It's just the beginning."
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
When you don't even bother going to the job interview and you still feel like the job is yours... @RepJeffries Great work leading the @HouseDemocrats. I get it, why bother ending the Iran war or impeaching Hegseth when you have office furniture to buy
The 11 House Democrats who didn’t vote in the effort to kill the Hegseth impeachment resolution (which succeeded 210-204) were: Brownley Correa Hollen Hosford Jackson (IL) Pelosi Pettersen Stansbury Stevens Strickland Wilson (FL)
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Jake Tappers' tweet contains errors. Vote was 211-204 (Roll Call 317), not 210-204. Absent Dems: Brownley, Correa, Gillen (NY; not Hollen), Horsford (NV; not Hosford), Jackson (IL), Pelosi, Pettersen, Stansbury, Stevens, Strickland, Wilson (FL). Sources: clerk.house.gov/Votes/2026317 nytimes.com/live/2026/11/1… politico.com/news/2026/11/1…
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
This is pathetic.
I asked Hakeem Jeffries about attendance appearing decisive in the Pete Hegseth vote. (11 House Dems did not vote tonight.) He told me and reporters: "I haven't had a conversation with anyone on the floor team about what may or may not have happened in terms of the Hegseth resolution, but this is not the end of it. It's just the beginning."
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
There was no opposition to Schumer. Only when some Senators came forward saying they are a no on Schumer did Van Hollen say he's open to challenging. That's how it'll work in the House. We need enough members of the House to say no to Jeffries before a challenger will show up.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
Don Leonard isn't DSA. He's a frontline Dem who flipped a heavily Trump district. The fact that Hakeem is threatening him, and thus threatening the Dem majority, is a total non-starter for leader. It's a slap in the face of everyone who worked so hard for this blue wave.
So, it’s cool when DSA makes threats and demands to Dems to get their support, but when Dems clap back, DSA runs to social media and cries.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
The Democratic Party needs a new and bold direction. I will not support Chuck Schumer’s reelection as Democratic leader.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
Most of the new Texas Dems went Blue Dog, while @katy4congress raised eyebrows joining Capitol Hill's Progressive Caucus "If I'm going to spend time away from my young children, I guarantee you I am going to make that worth it" sanantonioreport.org/deep-re…
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
Let’s go!!! Now, the rebellion is on fire. And there are activists in front of Schumer’s Senate office, and they’ve locked the door to keep them out! The walls are literally closing in on them. I’ve never seen the establishment under siege like this. @ChrisVanHollen for leader!
BREAKING: Senator Bernie Sanders will NOT support Chuck Schumer as the Senate’s next Majority Leader. “This election was about change. People want new leadership here in the Senate, so I will not be supporting Chuck,” said Senator Sanders.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
“We have two newly-elected senators who would not be there if Schumer and the DSCC had their way. Schumer and the DSCC sided with the crypto industry and AIPAC.”
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
Note that Republicans are showing more intraparty accountability over their epic loss than Dems did over theirs in 2024. Dems kept every person in charge who was responsible for losing to Trump in every swing state, which is why this leadership reckoning is so important now.
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Thatcher Bean retweeted
“To deliver affordability means stepping on toes and breaking taboos. Not least, the economists’ cartel with its aversion to rent and price controls. Not least, the health insurance industry and the pharmaceutical companies. Not least, the private-equity energy mafia. Not least, the budget and resource drain that is our distended, obsolete military. And not least, the shibboleth that interest rates are the sole domain of the Federal Reserve, to be raised—crushing housing while enriching the banks—on the empty pretext of “fighting inflation.”” James Galbraith
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