Joined November 2011
Cool then, good progress for a Sunday... Enjoy your weekend!, I'll let you and Matt get back to it..♥️
Replying to @trevp__
Nobody is defending _any_ of the E-R drafts.
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You can argue OpaquePRF had different motivations, channel-binding or whatever. My issue is you keep using these rationales for OpaquePRF to defend *ExtendedRandom*, which was clearly written *not* to enable channel binding but to simply send more random.
Replying to @trevp__
I literally don’t care. I’m fine with whatever you say it was. The one thing I care about is whether the authors of these RFCs could plausibly have intended something other than a backdoor. The case for that, based on the information I’ve seen, appears strong.
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So you agree it was an NSA plot, then? Likely an NSA plot? Can we at least put a pin in that?
Replying to @trevp__
Again: I do not think E-R is a good thing. I have no trouble believing people inside NSA were excited to have a BSAFE TLS extension that made DualEC way more effective, or even that NSA pushed to make that happen, for that reason.
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I'm pointing out that your "structured input" defense of why ExtendedRandom might not be an NSA plot does not apply to ExtendedRandom. You are arguing that OpaquePRF was an unrelated effort and then trying to slide that into a defense of ExtendedRandom.
Replying to @trevp__
It doesn’t “keep alive” the idea that it might not be a plot. It literally says I lean against it being one. You don’t think maybe we’re talking past each other?
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You could argue they wanted OpaquePRF for "structured input" reasons. It's implausible, even EKR's contemporary understanding of OpaquePRF was that it was for extended randomness, see his minutes: ietf.org/proceedings/69/minu… But you can't make that argument for ExtendedRandom.
Replying to @trevp__
What’s my leading argument? I think E-R is bad, for obvious reasons. My question is about the intent EKR and Salter (and the others) had in requesting it, and that’s based on reading things from EKR about structured data that apparently weirdos wanted to put into the TLS h’shake.
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Re-reading sockpuppet, which very much keeps alive the idea that ER might not be a malicious NSA plot. For example it's titled "Is Extended Random a Malicious NSA Plot"?
Replying to @tqbf @trevp__
I don’t know if I just wrote (many years ago) un-clearly but there isn’t a live debate about whether E-R was benign.
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You're right but it also doesn't matter; even supposing OpaquePRF was separate from ExtendedRandom wouldn't make E-R innocent; that's Tom's leading argument and it's a non sequitur.
What I’m saying here is that it seems hard for me to view these as different documents serving different needs, rather than two versions of the same document with totally different justifications.
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Strong agree with Matt. Someone who tried to sneak crypto backdoors into commercial products and standards should not be "Director of Applied Crypto" at any company serving the public. The issue isn't having an "offensive" role (she didn't, she was IA), it's the deception.
Offense to defense happens all the time. I worked with @0xcharlie for years and I think he’s an ok guy. But if you tamper with US commercial crypto, you should not be trusted to work in commercial crypto. Until the details have been made public and we have a full picture.
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Trevor Perrin retweeted
Technology preview: Signal Private Group System signal.org/blog/signal-priva… Private groups are one of the things that make Signal unique. The service has no record of group memberships, titles, avatars, or other attributes. We've been working on technology to make them even better.
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Come help us build HacSpec, a new specification language for cryptographic primitives franziskuskiefer.de/post/hac…
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Trevor Perrin retweeted
Talk by @zx2c4 on wireguard.io VPN: ox.cloud.panopto.eu/Panopto/…
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And what rough beast, its hour come round at last Snuffles towards Bethlehem to be born?
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So, @QubesOS estimated userbase nearly reached 20k this month, and the curve starting to look exponential :) Potentially fun time ahead...
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New blog post "Some challenges in post-quantum standardization" (comments to NIST): blog.cr.yp.to/20161030-pqnis… #standardization #nist #pqcrypto
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Why you shouldn't trust other people's primes: cryptanalysis of 1024-bit "trapdoored" prime numbers. caramba.inria.fr/hsnfs1024.h…
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The entire field of searchable encryption seems like a contest to see how much information you can leak.
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