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🚨NEW LEAK ALERT🚨🪡
The Iranian regime is holding the UAE hostage: It undermines the Emirati economy through missile and drone attacks, but also exploits the country's financial infrastructure to evade sanctions, all while creating friction with the US and the broader international community.
WikIran exposes a clandestine shadow banking network of front companies and oil brokers operating on UAE soil on behalf of sanctioned Iranian Bank Shahr: HMS Trading FZE and Petro Delta Energy Co. (PDECO).
The UAE must ACT IMMEDIATELY against this network.
Detailed analysis to follow. Stay tuned.
Link Below.
WikIran exposes European and Western that directly facilitated transactions on behalf of Iranian front companies within the Rahbar mechanism. The enormous scale of USD and Euro transactions should be a serious concern for all financial institutions, and particularly Western ones.
wikiran.org/document/article…
The newly leaked dataset uncovers covert rosters of bank accounts registered to front companies, along with the international banks that hold them. These institutions are facilitating systemic sanctions evasion, effectively linking the Iranian regime to accessible financial systems and the global market.
Compliance and AML officers, is your bank on our list of the top 10 international banks transferring funds in U.S. dollars, UAE dirhams, and euros on behalf of the Iranian regime? Find out here.
wikiran.org/document/article…
Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank was recently the subject of a Wall Street Journal article, describing it as a bank heavily involved in trade with sanctioned entities in Russia and Iran. The report cited research conducted by TRM Labs, which used WikIran to identify approximately 240 accounts held at ZCCB (out of 900 total across Chinese banks).
We gladly invite WSJ and TRM Labs to update their research and revisit their conclusions. In our latest Rahbar network dataset, we have identified 36 previously undisclosed accounts of Iranian entities held at ZCCB, which boldly disputed the accuracy of our information.
We call on the AML and compliance officers at ZCCB to review the following table, which lists reference numbers, dates and exact amounts transferred via ZCCB during 2025 – Dispute this.
The file lists approximately $200 million in transactions made in 2025 via ZCCB, on behalf of the Iranian Shadow Banking mechanism (see below).
Full analysis of the international banks facilitating Iranian Shadow Banking operations will be published on WikIran in the upcoming days. Stay Tuned.
Full transactions file available here:
wikiran.org/document/files/6…
WSJ article:
wsj.com/world/the-little-kno…
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WikIran’s new dataset outlines the financial mechnism that funds Iran’s missile programs, oil trade and terrorist proxies. The Rahbar documents reveal billions of dollars held abroad and hundreds of millions in transfers made on behalf of MODAFL, the IRGC and the IRGC-QF.
wikiran.org/document/article…
Check out our first analysis article of the Iranian Unified Foreign Currency Management System: This tool is used to manage and oversee the activities of several Rahbar companies, the intermediaries between the Iranian banks, exchange houses and front companies.
wikiran.org/document/article…
🚨New Database Alert🚨
WikIran presents an analysis of the leaked Rahbar network ledgers, exposing a wide range of entities involved in Iran’s shadow banking system.
Screenshots and files from the Unified Foreign Currency Management System reveal transactions involving military entities linked to MODAFL and the IRGC, exchange houses, front companies, foreign and domestic bank accounts, and employees of Rahbar companies.
Search and download the files here:
wikiran.org/leak/rahbar
The Caspian Sea has long been a major gateway for Iranian proliferation and a route for funneling illicit oil revenues and foreign currency back into Iran. This is documented in our Sahara Thunder articles, including records depicting the transfer of Shahed drones from Iran’s Amirabad Port to Russia.
Today, the Caspian Sea corridor is becoming increasingly central to Iran’s sanctions-evasion and blockade-busting operations.
Check out our Game of Drones investigation here:
wikiran.org/document/article…
Replying to @miadmaleki
(5/10) The Caspian is the corridor the U.S. Navy cannot reach. $3.4 billion in 2024–25, and it runs in reverse: only $0.5B of exports but $2.9B of imports. The Caspian is Iran’s import leak — goods from Russia and Kazakhstan flowing into Anzali, Amirabad, and Nowshahr.
After the blockade, Caspian cargo jumped roughly 50% (March–August 2026). And here’s the detail from financial data: the company that operates the blockaded southern ports bought the Anzali free-zone port company. Iran’s port operator is literally relocating its business from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian.
Great work by @WSJ, @aosipovich, @RoryWSJ and @kowsmann, based on our databases.
So, Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank (ZCCB) “disputes the accuracy of WikIran” and claims that some of the accounts did not belong to it. Does that mean you acknowledge that at least some of the 240 accounts were linked to Iranian entities? If so, please explain.
Our information is always #WikIranVerified: authentic and credible. ZCCB is either lying or allowing the Iranian regime to misuse its name and damage its reputation.
Sanctions are long overdue. @USTreasury @SecScottBessent
New: ZCCB, an obscure regional bank in eastern China, has emerged in recent years as a key conduit for Russian and Iranian money flows. But even as it raised red flags under both Biden and Trump, the US held off on sanctioning it. With @RoryWSJ @kowsmann wsj.com/world/the-little-kno…
Great work by Reuters, drawing on our Sahara Thunder and Bank Sepah materials!
That's just one example of what our databases contain, much more is still waiting to be exposed.
Go check them out:
wikiran.org/
Iran created a secret network of military agencies to import at least $2 billion in hardware, explosives and heavy-duty trucks since January 2025, evading both the US naval blockade and Western sanctions, a Reuters investigation found reut.rs/3UNGyfk
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The HMS Trading database is overflooding with Western nationals involved in business activities benefiting the Iranian regime.
One such individual Maria Oarga, a Romanian citizen (Passport no. 057290331) and UAE resident (Residency Card no. 784196032583252), who serves as manager of Dubai-based company Fortuity General Trading LLC. Italian national Aliashar Rangchi (passport no. YA7819862) is also listed as a shareholder in the company.
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Correspondence and corporate documentation indicate that Oarga has referred to Hosseini as a representative of Fortuity, authorized to negotiate and sign documents on the company's behalf. Separate records indicate that Hosseini approached Tejaram Hermes Energy Qeshm, a Rahbar company for Bank Shahr, and provided instructions concerning an approach to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to facilitate the sale of Iranian oil.
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Unfortunately for Mrs. Oarga, her company's name appears on contracts and invoices involving US-sanctioned companies, including PGPICC and Shiraz Petrochemical Co. Not exactly the kind of paperwork one would expect to find if proper due diligence had been done. Better luck next time!
Check out the HMS Trading and PDECO database for more information:
wikiran.org/leak/hms
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