Indiana Yoder

You can now click Zynt yourself. Live on Solana devnet. 🛠️ Today there's a public dashboard where you can connect a wallet and write a real compliance proof on-chain — six programs, live, clickable. 🔗 zynt-protocol.vercel.app Honest as always: it's devnet (valueless test network), unaudited, and the post-quantum + ZKML pieces are still stubbed — the page tells you exactly what's not live yet. This is "real and runnable for testing," not "done." Built by a non-engineer, with AI, in public. Source + whitepaper linked on the site. #BuildInPublic #Solana

Compliance-native infra on Solana — verifiable audit trails + post-quantum records for advisors. 6 programs live on devnet. Non-engineer building in public. Live demo 👇 zynt-protocol.vercel.app

The White House set a 2031 federal deadline for post-quantum digital signatures. NIST is updating its ID standards to use ML-DSA. FALCON is becoming FIPS 206. Zynt's signature layer is built on exactly those algorithms — ML-DSA today, FALCON-ready. Honest status: the verification logic is real and tested, stubbed on-chain (Solana compute limit i'm working through) 🔗 zynt-protocol.vercel.app · #Solana #PostQuantum

Quantum Technology in Finance: The Data Behind the Post-Quantum Imperative A Financial Analysis · June 2026 Prepared as market context for Zynt Protocol — an experimental, post-quantum-first compliance protocol for investment advisors. Executive summary The case for building financial infrastructure on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has, over the past twelve months, moved from a speculative concern to a documented priority of the institutions that govern global finance. Four shifts drive that change, and each is supported by data released between mid-2025 and mid-2026: The threat is already active — not future-dated. "Harvest now, decrypt later" (HNDL) means data captured today can be decrypted once quantum hardware matures. Long-retention records — exactly the multi-year compliance records advisors are legally required to keep — are the single most exposed data class. The timeline is compressing fast. Peer-reviewed estimates of the quantum resources needed to break today's cryptography have fallen by more than an order of magnitude in roughly a year, with every revision shortening the runway and none lengthening it. Regulation has arrived. The G7, NIST, the NSA, and the EU have all issued PQC transition frameworks with concrete deadlines clustered around 2030–2035. The G7 now treats quantum migration as a systemic-risk issue for the financial sector. Capital is following. The PQC market is forecast to grow at compound annual rates between roughly 15% and 50%, and McKinsey estimates quantum computing could create $400–600 billion of value in finance alone by 2035. For an infrastructure project whose thesis is "compliance records you can still trust in a decade," this is the macro tailwind. The remainder of this report lays out the evidence and closes with an honest assessment of where Zynt sits relative to it. 1. The core risk: data lifetime, not Q-Day The intuitive mistake is to treat quantum risk as a single future event — the day a quantum computer factors a 2048-bit key. The more useful framing, increasingly adopted by regulators, is a mismatch between how long data must stay secret and how long the cryptography protecting it will hold. A September 2025 Federal Reserve working paper (Mascelli & Rodden, FEDS 2025-093, "Harvest Now Decrypt Later: Examining Post-Quantum Cryptography and the Data Privacy Risks for Distributed Ledger Networks") lays out the trap with a concrete example: data with a ten-year shelf life harvested in 2025, a system that migrates to PQC in 2027, and Q-Day in 2030. Even though the system migrated before Q-Day, the attacker who harvested in 2025 can still decrypt the captured data. Migration protects only what has not already been collected. This is why long-lived data is the priority class in every serious framework. The G7's roadmap and downstream analyses single out exactly the categories that describe an advisor's books and records: regulatory filings, client communications, and financial records that must remain confidential for years or decades. A merger negotiation or a compliance record created in 2026 can still be actionable intelligence in 2034. The readiness gap is stark. Industry surveys in 2025 found that while roughly 69% of organizations acknowledge the risk to current cryptography, only about 5% have quantum-safe encryption in place. The threat is understood; the action is not yet taken. 2. The timeline is compressing The hardware to break today's cryptography does not exist yet — but the estimate of how much hardware is needed has collapsed. In May 2025, Google researcher Craig Gidney showed RSA-2048 could be broken with under one million physical qubits, down from his own 2019 estimate of 20 million — a roughly 20× reduction. Subsequent work on newer error-correcting architectures has suggested figures as low as ~100,000 in specific designs. In March 2026, a Google Quantum AI whitepaper — co-authored with figures including Stanford's Dan Boneh and the Ethereum Foundation's Justin Drake — showed the elliptic-curve cryptography securing virtually every major cryptocurrency could be broken with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in minutes, not days. That was roughly a 20× reduction from the prior best estimate. The consensus among credible forecasters now clusters a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) in the early-to-mid 2030s: the Global Risk Institute's expert survey places the central probability in the 2033–2037 range, while capability-tracking analyses put the median nearer 2030, and some institutional advisory boards assign better-than-even odds before 2030. Notably, Google Quantum AI has set its own PQC migration target at 2029, and Cloudflare and major governments have pulled deadlines into the 2029–2030 window. The direction of every revision is the same: shorter. 3. Regulation has arrived What was guidance two years ago is now a coordinated, deadline-bearing transition program. The G7 Cyber Expert Group, co-chaired by the U.S. Treasury and the Bank of England, published Advancing a Coordinated Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the Financial Sector on 13 January 2026. It is non-binding but carries unusual weight: it reframes cryptographic transition as a systemic risk-management issue rather than a niche technology upgrade, and it establishes 2030–2035 as the critical migration window through a six-phase framework (awareness and inventory in 2026–2028, risk assessment and planning through 2029, migration execution in 2030–2032, testing through 2034, and continuous validation from 2035). A second G7 body — the Quantum Technologies Working Group, co-chaired by the Banque de France and Bank of Canada — followed in May 2026 with a broader report. The binding deadlines beneath that umbrella are already set: Authority Milestone NIST (FIPS 203/204/205, finalized Aug 2024) Standardized ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA NIST IR 8547 RSA and ECC deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 NSA CNSA 2.0 New national-security systems quantum-safe by 2027, full migration by 2035 EU Commission All 27 member states to begin PQC migration by end-2026, critical infrastructure protected by 2030 UK NCSC Critical systems migrated by 2031, complete by 2035 The recurring theme across all of these: cryptographic migration takes years, so institutions must begin well before the threat is live. An organization starting in 2026 has a reasonable runway; one waiting until 2028 faces a scramble. 4. The market: size, growth, and capital Forecasts for the dedicated PQC market vary widely by scope and definition, but every major analyst agrees on the shape: a small base today compounding at high double-digit rates. Source 2025/26 base Forecast CAGR Precedence Research $1.68B (2025) $29.95B (2034) ~38% Grand View Research $1.58B (2025) $20.5B (2033) ~38% IMARC Group $0.47B (2025) $19.2B (2034) ~49% Juniper Research $1.2B (2026) $13B (2035) ~30% The Niche Research $4.5B (2025) $15.6B (2034) ~17% The divergence reflects differing definitions (algorithms only vs. full migration services), but the consensus midpoint is a market scaling from low-single-digit billions to $13–30 billion by the mid-2030s. Analysts consistently flag financial services, government, and defense as the anchor demand, and note that migration services — the consulting and implementation work — will outgrow the raw algorithm products, because swapping cryptography across interconnected institutions is an operational challenge, not just a technical one. The broader quantum-in-finance prize is larger still. McKinsey estimates quantum computing could generate $400–600 billion of economic value in financial services by 2035 (part of up to $2.7 trillion economy-wide). Capital is moving accordingly: quantum-technology startup investment reached roughly $12.6 billion in 2025 — about 6× the prior year — and the leading banks are no longer observing. JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, and Goldman Sachs are actively deploying PQC, and JPMorgan has named quantum computing among the sectors in a multibillion-dollar strategic technology commitment. 5. The blockchain exposure: on-chain finance is first in line For a protocol built on a public blockchain, the quantum exposure is sharper than for traditional systems — and that cuts both ways. Nearly every major chain — Bitcoin, Ethereum, and hundreds of derivatives — secures transactions with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) over curves like secp256k1. ECC is broken by Shor's algorithm, and because it needs fewer logical qubits than comparably secure RSA, ECC is expected to fall first. The blockchain-specific aggravator is permanence: every transaction ever broadcast is stored forever on thousands of nodes, so the "harvest" half of HNDL is already done by the network itself — any exposed public key can be archived today and attacked later. The scale of value at risk is large. Chain analyses cited in 2026 estimate millions of BTC sit in reused, key-exposed addresses (Deloitte's scan put ~2.5M BTC in exposed reused outputs; a Coinbase advisory report framed exposure in the millions), and Citi published a January 2026 analysis titled The Trillion-Dollar Security Race. The industry response is now concrete rather than theoretical: Ethereum's roadmap targets quantum resistance around 2030 with ML-DSA signatures already running on testnets, Ripple targets 2028, and Bitcoin's BIP-360/361 proposals debate a phased sunset of legacy signatures. The strategic takeaway: building a financial protocol on a chain in 2026 means inheriting a cryptographic layer that the entire ecosystem is racing to replace. Designing the application's own signature layer around the NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithm from the start is alignment with that direction, not a bet against it. 6. Implications for Zynt Protocol Zynt's thesis — that compliance records should remain verifiable and trustworthy for as long as they must be retained — sits directly on top of the strongest data point in this report: the highest-risk data class is long-lived records, and advisor compliance records are precisely that. Three points of alignment stand out: Right data class. Advisor books-and-records carry multi-year retention obligations. Under the data-lifetime framing the Federal Reserve and G7 both use, these are the records most exposed to HNDL — the exact problem Zynt is designed to address. Right algorithm. Zynt's signature layer is architected around Dilithium-3, i.e. ML-DSA (NIST FIPS 204) — not a bespoke scheme, but the precise standard NIST finalized and that regulators are steering the financial sector toward. The same algorithm is appearing on Ethereum's testnets. Right direction of travel. Building post-quantum signing into the protocol from day one matches the G7's "start now, the window is closing" posture and the compressing Q-Day timeline, rather than treating PQC as a later retrofit. An honest assessment of where Zynt stands today. This report establishes that the macro thesis is sound and well-supported. It does not establish that Zynt has solved the problem. Zynt's post-quantum layer is an early-stage, unaudited scaffold: the on-chain Dilithium-3 verification is still being made real, the system has not undergone a security audit, and it is not deployed for production use. What Zynt has done is design for the threat from the outset — which is the correct architectural posture given everything above — but designing for a threat and being a finished, validated defense against it are different things. The value of this analysis is that it confirms Zynt is building toward a real, regulator-endorsed, fast-arriving need; it is not a claim that the destination has been reached. The window the G7 describes — begin now, migrate through the early 2030s — is precisely the window in which post-quantum-first infrastructure has room to mature. That timing, more than any single figure in this report, is the opportunity. Sources U.S. Department of the Treasury / Bank of England — G7 Cyber Expert Group Roadmap for PQC Transition in the Financial Sector (Jan 13, 2026) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — Mascelli & Rodden, "Harvest Now Decrypt Later," FEDS 2025-093 (Sept 2025) NIST — FIPS 203 / 204 / 205 (Aug 2024); IR 8547 (deprecation timeline) NSA — CNSA 2.0; European Commission — PQC migration roadmap; UK NCSC timelines Google Quantum AI / Gidney et al. — RSA-2048 and ECDLP-256 resource-estimate whitepapers (May 2025; Mar 2026) Global Risk Institute — Quantum Threat Timeline; Fortinet, The Quantum Insider — CRQC timeline analyses (2026) Precedence Research, Grand View Research, IMARC, Juniper Research, The Niche Research — PQC market forecasts (2025–2026) McKinsey & Company — Quantum Technology Monitor 2026; Quantum computing in finance (2025–2026) Citigroup — Quantum Threat: The Trillion-Dollar Security Race (Jan 2026) Coinbase Independent Advisory Board / Deloitte chain analysis; crypto.news, The Quantum Insider — blockchain exposure analyses (2026) This document synthesizes publicly reported third-party research for informational purposes. It is not investment, legal, or security advice. Forward-looking estimates are inherently uncertain. Zynt Protocol is experimental, unaudited software.

My unglamorous "I built X with AI" post: 6 Solana programs compile, 53 tests pass I'm deep in making post-quantum signature verification actually work on-chain, not just return "true." That last word is the whole difference. Open source 👇 github.com/yoderyoder/zynt-p… claude.ai/public/artifacts/b…