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Degen DeFi | Dune Wiz | On-Chain Analysis | Computer Engineering (Cybersecurity) | 🍄 Open to Collaborations

Ethereum
Joined July 2023
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🔥PANIC OVER $RUNE CRASH🔥 📉-37% just today! Panic over CT "It's so over!", or that's what everybody is saying But what's going on for real? 👇𝐒𝐩𝐨𝐢𝐥𝐞𝐫: It's 𝘮𝘶𝘤𝘩 more complex than what you'd expect! 🧵
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What the actual fuck is going on @aave v3 on @arbitrum? Stablecoin APRs are too high and available liquidity is very thin.
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I guess it's time to cover up some shady practices with affairs. AI bubble requires someone taking responsibility, and America decided it's easier to get ridd of Jensen. Not even Epstein Files caused such a mess, and we're talking about raping, killing and eating children...
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So @acryptosdao ACLM has been exploited?
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Yes it happened
ACryptoS vaults were exploited. We’ve deployed an emergency fix: deposits are disabled and withdrawals remain open. We no longer have the resources to maintain ACryptoS, so it is now deprecated. Please withdraw ASAP.
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Market Talk: Il più grande hack cripto della storia teapawt.org/i/broadcasts/2dKYenLpW…
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Roberta Metsola handed all messages of the EU citizens to Palantir on a golden plate, for ~half million euros of political donation
🇩🇪Private Chats und Mails aus der #Chatkontrolle 1.0 landen ausgerechnet in Palantir-Systemen - skandalös! Betroffen u.a. Direktnachrichten über Instagram, TikTok, Discord, Snapchat, Skype, Xbox, Gmail. Details hier: arvidgrange.substack.com/p/i… #StopScanningMe
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Most privacy protocols don't make you invisible, they help you blend in with other users. But if your behaviour stands out, it can still give you away. That's why the size of the crowd matters and we've added a new metric to measure this crowd - the anonymity set. An anonymity set is the number of users your transfer could have come from. The bigger that group, the harder it is to single you out.
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The sky is the limit !
ci siamo! Hyperoute è iscritto ufficialmente a colosseum, hackaton che può dare un ottima vetrina e prize un super grazie al @superteamITA che ci ha dato la retta via! novità a breve??
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Google, Microsoft e NVIDIA hanno scritto come dovrà essere fatto il trasformatore del data center AI. Sono 24 pagine di specifica OCP, in vigore dal 22 giugno. Quasi nessuno le ha lette. Io sì. Ecco cosa c’è dentro 👇
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Let's assume I was hired by a research lab with the explicit mission of breaking some pre-quantum cryptography. Here is a list of five targets where I would direct research efforts, ranked by my very subjective estimate of difficulty, from easiest to hardest. 1. Factor the 1024-bit integer from the official Micali–Schnorr specification. We already know that factoring integers of this size is within reach if you're willing to throw enough $$$ at the problem. This is probably the least ambitious target on the list, since it doesn't require a fundamentally new algorithm. Just resources and engineering. 2. Find preimages of Poseidon over small fields. Poseidon has a very explicit algebraic structure, which makes it a particularly interesting target for algebraic cryptanalysis. I would focus on whether Gröbner basis techniques, perhaps combined with a more clever way of exploiting the structure of the round functions, could lead to substantially better attacks. In particular, I wonder whether we are missing a more efficient way to solve the polynomial systems arising from Poseidon over small fields. 3. Find a more clever algorithm for computing class numbers of imaginary quadratic fields. This is a beautiful and very classical number-theoretic problem, going all the way back to Gauss and his work on binary quadratic forms. More than two centuries later, we are still trying to understand how efficiently these objects can be computed. I would be curious whether a completely new perspective could lead to a substantial algorithmic improvement rather than just better constants. 4. Find a better algorithm for pairing inversion. Satoh has done some fascinating work on this problem, but as far as I can tell, he has been working on it almost in isolation, with surprisingly little attention from the broader cryptographic community. We know that pairing inversion is at least as hard as DLP, but that doesn't mean we fully understand its algorithmic complexity in every setting. I would be curious what happens if we throw a larger group of talented researchers at the problem. Perhaps there are approaches that haven't been seriously explored yet. 5. Break ECDLP over binary fields. Binary elliptic curves have a lot of additional algebraic structure compared to curves over prime fields. We already know several ways to exploit some of that structure, but perhaps there's something much more powerful waiting to be discovered. I would focus on finding an algorithm that genuinely beats the generic square-root barrier. Of course, this ranking is entirely subjective. I'm ranking these by how difficult I think it would be to make meaningful progress, not by the potential impact of a successful attack. The interesting question is not necessarily which primitive is weakest today, but where there is still room for an unexpected algorithmic breakthrough.
Today I call upon the blockchain industry to calmly begin planning for "bunker mode". My personal recommendation is to set in motion a controlled mass migration of assets to fresh addresses, i.e. addresses whose pubkeys remain hidden behind a hash. Holders, starting with large and sophisticated ones, should consider moving the bulk of their funds to addresses that have never signed a transaction. And when they do sign one, they should also move remaining funds to a new address (possibly generated from the same seed phrase). Don't rush. While I believe there is cause for action a rushed migration would do more harm than good. Don't panic either. Moving assets to protected addresses is a simple, preventative step which does not require new cryptography or new wallets. IMO it is now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years. By "break" I mean fast private key recovery (e.g. in one week) on available hardware (e.g. a large GPU cluster). Recent days have been humbling for human mathematical intuition. Long-held, unquestioned hypotheses have fallen. This includes the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication and the 3SUM conjecture. In hindsight, May's unexpected disproof of the Erdős unit distance conjecture was our warning shot. Yesterday's OpenAI drop made it clear that mathematical superintelligence is upon us. They say there are weeks where decades happen. We are about to live through weeks where centuries of mathematical progress happen. Could our magic 64-byte ECDSA signatures be too good to be true? Was it just security through obscurity all this time? Elliptic curves feel especially vulnerable to superintelligence. Curves carry rich structure, with room for fancy tricks like Schoof, Frobenius, pairings. (By contrast, hashes are designed to minimise algebraic structure.) Separately, as Ewin Tang can attest, an efficient quantum algorithm sometimes foreshadows an efficient classical one. We should be open to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor that breaks elliptic curves and RSA at once. Also noteworthy is the striking under-representation of cryptographic breakthroughs among the 722 mathematical results OpenAI published. I've witnessed first-hand the US government censoring academic quantum cryptanalysis results. Backroom interventionism is my base case. I urge large, sophisticated actors to lead by example. Project11's "risq list" (bitcoin-risq-list.projecteleven[.]com) is a great tracker of exposed BTC pubkeys. Binance, Bitbank, Robinhood, Bitfinex, and Tether have an opportunity to harden their cold storage. Next month I'll address institutions in London in a live Q&A (forum.ethereuminstitutional[.]org/london-2026). Again, please do not rush. Wallets holding under 50 BTC enjoy partial cover from "Satoshi's shield", i.e. his 20K exposed addresses that hold 50 BTC each. Load-bearing signers like oracles and L2 security councils should consider rotating ECDSA pubkeys with every signed message and/or multi-signing with a hash-based schemes like SPHINCS. Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography. My inclination is to go all-in on hash-based cryptography and avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely, whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies. A single battle-tested hash (e.g. from the SHA or BLAKE families) yields plausible post-AI security. The Ethereum roadmap on strawmap[.]org fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification as a response to the quantum threat. Those timelines must now be revisited and accelerated in light of mathematical superintelligence. I'll be pushing for maximum defensive acceleration.
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you are not ready for glamsterdam
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Vi aspettiamo stasera ore 21.30 in live per gli aggiornamenti su Ethereum. Special guest @0xOuterGod
🐸⚡ ETH supera i test: Glamsterdam spiegato semplice Ethereum sta entrando in una nuova fase e Glamsterdam è uno degli aggiornamenti di cui si parla di più. Ma cosa cambia davvero? Quali test ha superato ETH? E perché questa evoluzione può essere importante per la rete? 🎙️ Ne parliamo nel nostro Space su X con @thewildcarder . 📅 [28/08/2026] 🕐 [21:30] 👇 #Ethereum #ETH #Glamsterdam #Crypto #Web3
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STOP CHAT CONTROL 2.0. - What you should know: Tomorrow, 29 September, behind closed doors at the Council, the most draconian version of Chat Control 2.0 goes on the table. It is no longer only an intermediary reading all your private messages and cloud storage. It is a licence to search them for months, without suspicion against any individual. The leaked Presidency note to delegations (11956/26, 10 September) proposes "authorisation of search plans for a period of time rather than on a case-by-case basis" for private chats and emails. In plain terms: your messages, contacts, photos and cloud will be scanned under a state-issued licence for months, with no suspicion against you. The same note admits that under this regime "a high volume of reports generated do not lead to any operational outcome." The Council's Legal Service already warned this is general and indiscriminate surveillance, illegal under EU law. The @Europarl_EN mandate says the opposite: judicial authorisation, targeted to specific persons, no scanning licences. Tomorrow the pressure is on Parliament to fold. You remember the tricks used to push Chat Control 1.0 through and how @EPPGroup with @RobertaMetsola helped to push for it. So fasten your seat belt for what is coming tomorrow, and call or write to your MEP and your government now to reject Chat Control 2.0. as a whole! Remind them what this does to the privacy of every one of us. Under a search plan, every chat, photo or contact the scanner flags is stored by the provider and sent to a new EU agency, the EU Centre, which keeps it and passes it to police. Any state authority can then demand it, with a deadline and a fine for delay, and nobody has to check who is really behind the request, in case it is hacked or weaponised. That is exactly what happened at Revolut, and what keeps happening through abusive requests from authoritarian states, as we have reported for 13 years. In the Revolut case the hackers got access to a real state mailbox. Their requests came from an authentic certified email (PEC) account of an Italian Prefecture on the Interior Ministry's domain, with Postal Police protocol numbers, as European Investigation Orders in the name of the Milan prosecutor, for about five months. About 680 customers lost passports, selfies, home addresses, IBANs and full transaction histories. The files are being sold; hundreds of victims now fear kidnapping. No remedies exist as of now to protect against such attacks. Let's stop it before it is too late. Please repost.
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Stani deployed 30,968.25 AAVE of Aave liquidity in a single tick. This is a 1-tickSpacing range order, or a 0DTE covered call. It signals "I want to exit that position", not "I want to provide healthy liquidity".
Stani Kulechov just added another $4.77m worth of $AAVE to the Uniswap pool to provide more liquidity. Aave has surged from the local low of $58 in June to $154, a 2.7x increase. Absolutely incredible! arkm.com/explorer/address/0x…
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“La tokenizzazione non è innovazione.” È la provocazione da cui sono partito nel mio intervento alla Camera dei Deputati. Il mondo crypto ci ha insegnato quanto velocemente una narrativa possa svilirsi quando rimane fine a se stessa. La sfida oggi è fare in modo che la tokenizzazione diventi per la finanza ciò che la digitalizzazione è stata tra gli anni ’90 e 2000. Non limitarsi a portare strumenti finanziari su blockchain, ma costruire attorno a questa tecnologia nuovi servizi, nuovi mercati e un’intera economia onchain! Il potenziale è enorme e credo che il dialogo tra chi lavora ogni giorno su queste infrastrutture e le istituzioni possa essere decisivo per permettere all’Italia di avere un ruolo in quello che potrebbe diventare uno dei grandi sviluppi della finanza dei prossimi decenni. La mia idea rimane sempre la stessa: le persone sono importanti. Grazie all’On. @votacoppo, @Antonio_flyx e @GabrieleDelmese per aver aperto questa finestra di dialogo. Mi sento anche di ringraziare @gaudenzio_eth, @emmetiggi, @ilseccoz, @marcocostanza_, @NiccolQuattrini, Giorgio Guidetti, @crypto_gateway per il loro instancabile lavoro di divulgazione, necessario a rendere comprensibile e accessibile un settore che semplice non è. Grazie a @Ig_Nacho93 e a tutta la community del @ilpubpodcast che ci ha seguito persino dentro la Camera dei Deputati ❤️ Per i “chinotti” alla LinkedIn ci siamo dilungati abbastanza 😄 Adesso abbiamo tanto lavoro da fare. Vi lascio il mio intervento integrale 👇
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Introducing Altar-1, our first open-weight security model. Frontier-grade defensive AI, built to deploy. Own your own security.
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🎬 L’attaquant s’est trompé de nom... Revolut lui a donné la bonne formule ! ➡️ Mars 2026 > Une demande arrive par PEC. En Italie, la PEC c’est l’équivalent numérique du recommandé, celui des administrations et des tribunaux > L’intitulé du document est faux > Revolut ne coupe pas > Elle répond depuis [email protected] et explique comment corriger : ne pas mettre "Revolut Bank UAB - Italian Branch", mais "Revolut Digital Assets Europe Ltd", à Limassol, à Chypre > Autre adresse indiquée dans les échanges : [email protected] > Le mauvais papier n’est pas rejeté > On aide à le rendre recevable > Et on dit quelle enseigne doit figurer sur l’acte ! ➡️ Mai 2026 > Un document circule sous la forme d’une ordonnance d’enquête européenne, l’EIO > C’est un outil réel de l’Union : un État membre peut demander des informations à une banque d’un autre État membre > Ici, le papier invoqué va du parquet de Milan vers la Lituanie, où est enregistrée Revolut Bank UAB, Konstitucijos pr. 21B, Vilnius > C’est la banque du groupe : le compte, l’IBAN, les relevés > Date visible : 4 mai > Objet : informations bancaires et adresses de wallets > Les 4 et 5 mai, les accusés de réception s’empilent. Un mail parle même d’un décalage de communication et d’un audit interne > Le canal reste ouvert ➡️ Du printemps à la rentrée > L’attaquant raconte avoir pris la messagerie d’un agent avec un logiciel espion, puis l’avoir occupée en silence : lire, copier, effacer > Les réponses de Revolut auraient été sauvées en fichier .eml (l’e-mail brut, pièces jointes comprises) puis effacées avant que le titulaire ne les voie > 5 ou 6 mois de campagne > Rome n’a pas confirmé la prise de ses systèmes > En revanche le fait central tient : les demandes partaient d’un domaine gouvernemental réel, et Revolut a envoyé des dossiers Les fichiers mélangent deux tiroirs... Pièce, selfie, adresse, IBAN, relevés : plutôt Revolut Bank UAB, la banque lituanienne, parfois via sa branche italienne Référence de wallet, retraits crypto, historique Bitcoin : plutôt Revolut Digital Assets Europe Ltd, le CASP chypriote sous licence MiCA L’attaquant frappe Vilnius avec une EIO... Quand ça touche la crypto, la conformité le renvoie vers Limassol. Les dossiers sortent ensuite par le même tuyau ➡️ 26 juillet > Felix Römer, fondateur de Gamdom, et d’autres sont déjà sous chantage > Les dossiers servent déjà à faire pression > Revolut, elle, n’a encore rien dit à ses clients ! ➡️ 11 septembre, 22h25 > Le mail officiel arrive "Urgent security update about your Revolut account" > Adressé à FELIX MICHAEL, et à d’autres > La liste est complète : nom, date de naissance, métier, adresse, téléphone, passeport, permis, selfie, relevés, IBAN, référence wallet, retraits, historique Bitcoin > On conseille de remplacer ses papiers et de surveiller son crédit > Deux mois après le début du chantage. Toujours pas le nom de la filiale. Juste la marque ➡️ 12–14 septembre > Revolut confirme une usurpation "sophistiquée" > Ses serveurs n’ont pas été forcés. L’argent n’a pas bougé > Elle parle d’un "nombre limité" de clients > Le Financial Times écrit 680 > L’ICO britannique, le régulateur de la vie privée, ouvre une enquête > Les dossiers commencent à sortir sur Telegram > Une rançon de 10 000 bitcoin circule. Montant de cinéma ! > La banque ne commente toujours pas ➡️ 15 septembre > Publication du mode opératoire et des captures de l’EIO > Peut-être 100 Français parmi les visés > Les 147 Go dont on parle ne seraient pas 147 Go de clients @Revolut, mais un butin pris, selon l’attaquant, côté systèmes italiens > Sur le site de Revolut, toujours pas de page claire. Toujours pas d’entité nommément désignée comme expéditeur > Plusieurs noms d’attaquants tournent : IAmNotAVillain, Smilik, Revoloot... Plusieurs voix. Un même coffre Bref... On a une campagne de plusieurs mois Un chantage en juillet Un aveu en septembre 680 personnes prévenues Zéro euro volé Des vies déjà exposées. #Revolut
La situation a changé ce dimanche 13 septembre... Ceux qui tiennent les dossiers ont commencé à les montrer > Ils publient sur Telegram, avec le filigrane t .me/IA > Ils parlent d’exemples, un par un > Ils disent qu’ils continueront chaque jour tant que Revolut ne paie pas > Ils promettent aussi des messages internes et des détails sur la façon dont l’équipe travaille > Ils accusent la société d’avoir laissé partir des informations hors de sa juridiction. Le premier nom clairement collé à un dossier, c’est Felix Römer. Fondateur de Gamdom, casino crypto et de Skinscom Les attaquants ont sorti ce qu’ils appellent son KYC complet : photo de vérification Revolut et papiers d’identité, avec un document allemand visible sur les captures... Vers 18h31, il a répondu publiquement : "Ah wtf @Revolut" Le deuxième nom mis en avant est Alexander Shevchenko, joueur ATP D’autres clients avaient déjà dit avoir reçu le mail officiel de Revolut : Marc Zeller Nikhil Foster Mark Karpelès C’est @MagicalTux qui donne le détail le plus précis de la soirée... Il n’est pas un commentateur extérieur. Ancien patron de Mt.Gox, il fait partie des clients touchés. C’est en partie grâce à lui que le public a vu noir sur blanc ce que la société admettait avoir envoyé : > nom > date de naissance > métier > adresse > téléphone > passeport ou permis > selfie > relevés > IBAN > date d’ouverture > référence de wallet > retraits > historique complet y compris Bitcoin Ensuite, il ne s’est pas arrêté au communiqué. Il a poussé Revolut. Il a regardé le droit applicable Son constat : l’adresse utilisée n’était pas une adresse déjà connue de l’équipe. Les règles, sur le papier, auraient dû imposer plus de vérifications avant d’envoyer ce type de dossier. Ce n’était pas, selon lui, un simple oubli technique. C’était une demande qui n’aurait pas dû passer comme ça Dimanche soir, en voyant les publications des attaquants, il écrit que ça empirait. Puis il pointe ce qu’il a trouvé dans leurs posts : > un fichier msg.eml de 59,95 Mo Un fichier .eml, c’est un e-mail brut. En-têtes, corps, pièces jointes, le message entier tel qu’il a voyagé. Presque 60 mégaoctets, ce n’est pas une lettre. C’est une valise ! Ce fichier, d’après Karpelès, est passé par la PEC italienne, la Posta Elettronica Certificata En Italie, ce n’est pas un mail ordinaire. C’est le canal certifié, l’équivalent numérique du recommandé, celui qu’utilisent administrations, tribunaux, entreprises quand un envoi doit avoir une valeur juridique Le fichier était protégé Le mot de passe n’était pas dedans Il arrivait dans le mail suivant Ça recadre toute l’affaire. On n’est plus seulement face à un e-mail qui avait l’air officiel On est face à un envoi qui emprunte le rituel italien de l’acte certifié, assez lourd pour contenir une liasse de documents, assez formel pour que le service conformité croie avoir affaire à une vraie réquisition Le reste... > Les dossiers commencent à circuler au-delà du premier salon > ZachXBT, qui a rendu l’incident public, s’est fait bloquer par les deux comptes officiels Revolut ! > La société n’a toujours pas nommé l’agence, ni le nombre de victimes, ni répondu clairement aux publications de ce dimanche > Aucun montant de rançon n’a filtré > Seulement l’exigence : que Revolut paie, sinon d’autres noms demain Voilà où on en est Les fonds sont restés dans les comptes... Les personnes, elles, sont sorties du classeur Merci #Revolut, merci les #KYC pour la "sécurité" 💢
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Orderflow article is out. Private TPU feeds, a rev-share vault, and the validators getting paid from it.
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EUROPOL IS LOBBYING THE EU COMMISSION TO BAN END-TO-END ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS "Horizon scanning on emerging privacy enhancement technologies" lobby report just dropped. Europol, with EU taxpayers' money, is again lobbying to end privacy, seeking unlimited access to all messages worldwide, and pushing to ban end-to-end encrypted messaging apps and VPNs. This is part of the EU Commission's earlier ProtectEU agenda, which includes concerning snooping laws and mass-surveillance elements. Europol calls privacy-enhancing technologies, or PETS, the tools of criminals: “PETs are used by criminal actors for secure communication, anonymisation, and protection of data. Criminal networks utilise various PETs, including end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, encrypted phones, and virtual private networks (VPNs), to communicate securely and anonymously. “ "For this reason, lawful access to electronic evidence has become one of the most critical issues for European law enforcement" These idiots still do not understand that the backdoor they want for themselves will be open for everyone in the world, and once opened, cannot be closed again. We had such a backdoor in the 90s, and after a lot of citizenship legal warfare, we managed to close it. The closed door was further tightened after Edward Snowden revealed how the USA spies on everyone on this planet, including the EU members of parliament themselves. Now, Europol wants the backdoors back because of “protecting the children.” If consumer-grade encryption is made illegal, criminals can, and will, still use it, as anyone can build an encrypted messaging app with an AI in two days. Only normal citizens will have their data collected, sold and consumed by advertisers, opposition politicians, Russian oligarchs, Donald Trump, and God knows who. And of course Europol itself. Remember, a state where the police make the rules is called a police state. Europe has a rich and complicated history of snooping on its citizens, as for example with the Stasi or Brigada Político-Social ("la Secreta"). Even our current politicians in this decade have been using Israeli NSO spyware to spy on opposition politicians in Poland, Greece, Hungary and Spain, and nobody in the police has been sentenced for this. Mind you, these were judge-approved requests. Against this backdrop, getting "lawful" access to all messages in the world is a tall ask from Europol. Furthermore, a deliberate path laid out for privacy violations and EU-wide snooping access erodes trust in the EU as an institution. The EU was sold to us as a trade union, but the Commission has taken an interest in turning it into the police state it wants. This drives voters to the far-left and far-right parties. And what do the European Commission and Europol want? Here are the most important highlights from the paper. BANNING END-TO-END ENCRYPTION IS A PRIORITY FOR EUROPEAN COMMISSION "This report presents the results of a joint horizon scanning exercise carried out by the EU Policy Lab at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), and Europol, the EU law enforcement cooperation agency. It contributes to broader JRC efforts to support the European Commission’s political priority, the ‘New Era for European Defence and Security’, by anticipating future technological developments. “ END-TO-END ENCRYPTION MUST BE MADE ILLEGAL “Existing regulatory frameworks might need to be reviewed to clarify and simplify compliance processes and reduce the current legal uncertainty related to data usage, particularly in light of the challenges and opportunities that current and emerging PETs pose to law enforcement.” WE WANT TO HAVE A BACKDOOR IN EVERY SYSTEM “A proactive and informed approach to regulating advanced PETs and key enabling technologies is needed to leverage the benefits of these technologies effectively and to prevent potential new risks stemming from them. This includes developing clear guidelines to include law enforcement access to data.” WE WANT TO HAVE A BACKDOOR IN EVERY SYSTEM EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD WITH OUR POLICE BUDDIES, NO MATTER IF THOSE COUNTRIES ARE A BIT QUESTIONABLE “Collaboration and international partnerships are essential to develop common standards for PETs and foster law enforcement cooperation in fighting cybercrime, including lawful access to data for law enforcement agencies; implementation of relevant international agreements should also be promoted” The snoopers who signed this paper and want to read your messages include: — Sigita TRAINAUSKIENE (JRC) — João FARINHA (JRC) — Mark WITTFOTH (Europol) — Diederik DON (Europol) — Alexandra de MALEVILLE (JRC) And the others: — Adrianus Warmenhoven, Nord VPN — Bart Preneel, KU Leuven — Cornelia Kutterer, Considerati — Cyril Piotrowicz, FR Gendarmerie — Denise Mayerdorfer, Federal Ministry of Interior – Austria — Dorine Walter, National Gendarmerie – France — Fredrik Heintz, Linköping University — Freek Bomhof, TNO — Igor Nai Fovino, JRC — Ismael Alvarez, Europol — Johanna Laurin Gulled, Swedish Police Authority — Juraj Kubica, DG CNECT — Olga Batura, TNO — Pieter Nooren, TNO — Jürgen Freudenberger, Cyberagentur — Kasper Rasmussen, Oxford University — Kirsi Jauhiainen, Police of Finland — Marjolein Lanzing, University of Amsterdam — Miguel Fayos Mestre, Guardia Civil – Spain — Mihai Tiganus, Romanian Police — Ralf Zimmermann, Central Office for Information Technology in the Security Sector – Germany — Tariq Elahi, University of Edinburgh — Vasileios Rovilos, Future of Privacy Forum — William Borg, Danish Online Police Patrol — William Karlberg, Malta Police Force — Gwendolyn BAILEY (JRC) — Antonia MOCHAN (JRC) I have attached some screenshots of these authors celebrating the steps taken to erode privacy. If you want to stop this, the best way is to raise awareness: I kindly ask you to refer this to the local press and ask them to call these people for an interview to ask them what is so important that they should read our private messages. europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/…
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