
Humanitarian & Development | Displacement | Accountability | Ageing | Pastoralism | Minorities in Conflict Contexts #Ethiopia #SouthSudan #Sudan #HornOfAfrica
Addis Ababa & England
Joined December 2017
- Tweets17.1K
- Following296
- Followers2.8K
- Likes1.2K
Badawi retweeted
A joint @UNEthiopia and international partners’ mission is in Mekelle,Tigray, to engage with the new Caretaker Administration (CTA) and hear directly from communities, humanitarian partners, and other stakeholders about the current humanitarian and dev't situation in the region.
Badawi retweeted
So call "Dr. Tsegaye" is a pseudoscholar and
pseudo-intellectual who presents himself as an authority while spreading misinformation through emotional appeals, unsupported claims, hate speech and misleading rhetoric.
For the past two weeks, I have been closely following Dr. Tsegaye’s media appearances and his written commentaries.
I must confess that his discourse has been profoundly disconcerting, intellectually repugnant and analytically indefensible.
What emerges is a troubling amalgamation of historical revisionism, fabricated historical narratives, and inflammatory political rhetoric.
In the conflict between Oromo and somalis in ethiopia,he attempt to delegitimise the indigenous Somalis in somali region general, Particularly moyale.
he portraying the people of somali region as migrants who emerged following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991.
this
His propaganda rhetoric against somalis is so vile, disgusting, and sickening that it makes you want to vomit.
It is an appalling mixture of misinformation, historical distortion, and inflammatory rhetoric.
@DirreOnline
teapawt.org/DirreOnline/status/212…
Ignorance is the enemy of knowledge.
1. Tsegaye Regassa Ararssa shared a message received from OPP/OPDO Addis Ababa without even bothering to read, examine, or verify its contents. He lacks understanding of Oromo history and the formation of Ethiopia as a state.
2. Like other Derg- TPLF-are political orphans, he believes that Assab (Eritrea), Djibouti (Djibouti), Port Sudan (Sudan), Berbera (Somalia), Lamu (Kenya), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), and Aden (Yemen) belong to his tribe. Such baseless claims are not worth the ink used to write them. @Gafdiid7 @AbdimalekFarah
Badawi retweeted
Replying to @ImanoGuyo
The newly-found racists in the Horn of Africa like yourself will learn hard lessons soon. I am sure that system you intend to build will sink down. Also, the most sensitive individuals insult more. Ironic that is.
The Moyale Conflict in Ethiopia: Untold Facts, Figures, and What the Medea Missed:
If you really want to understand what is happening in Moyale and Hudet, you have to look beyond social media posts in, flags, and the competing territorial claims to find the real problem. November 15, 2026, marked four weeks (28 days), since the conflict in Moyale and Hudet began. Since 18 October 2026, the Oromo Geda Commando - which is similar to the "Republican Guard in the Prime Minister Office” - along with other groups, backed by the federal army, has been attacking Moyale and Hudet day and night, with no intervention from the federal authorities to stop the violence. This strongly suggests that Abiy Ahmed and his close inner circle, particularly those from his tribe and political networks are behind this conflict for political and tribal reasons. Therefore, the conflict is political, intertwined with ethnic, tribal, and religious agendas, and can only be solved through political solutions. Here are fifteen facts about the Moyale conflict that many people do not know and the media has not reported.
Moyale:
1.Moyale is located along the border between Kenya and Ethiopia, and is inhabited by two major ethnic groups: the Boran (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali). Moyale is an important multicultural border land where Kenya and Ethiopia share social, cultural, and economic relationships. Its society strongly influenced by pastoralism, cross-border mobility and ethnic diversity. In Moyale Kenya, the two communities live together peacefully, but tensions exist in Moyale Ethiopia.
2.Until 1948, Moyale was not two separate towns divided by an international border. It was one town inhabited by the Boran (Oromo) and Garre (Somali) communities. Colonial boundary-making divided this interconnected territory between Controlled Kenya and Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia). After the Second World War, Britain transferred part of the Moyale to Ethiopia, despite the presence of the Ethiopian administration in the border with Kenya and Somalia.
Moyale Ethiopia
3.Moyale Ethiopia is administrated by the federal government and also the Somali and Oromo regional states. According to projections by Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency (CSA), Moyale's total population in 2026 was estimated at 96,000 in 2026, with 69.21% (66,226 people) in Moyale Somali and 30.79% (29,461 people) in Moyale Oromo.
4.On 18 October 2026, the Oromo security forces and armed groups - including the Geda Commando, QEERROO, and OLF) - launched attacks in the Somali-administrated areas of Moyale and also Hudet districts in the Dawa zone targeting civilians, homes, and busines in 40 locations across Moyale and Hudet districts in the Dawa zone, without any action by the federal authorities to stop the violence. The attacks are being carried out under the banner of the "Now or Never" Campaign. Unverified reports suggested approximately 20,000 armed personnel were deployed to Moyale and Hudet areas by the Oromo administration.
5.The fighting is exclusively within the Somali region. No Oromo locations have reported been attacked by forces originating from the Somali region. Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state's inability to take action, as is the case in failed states.
6.The principal actors involved in the conflict include the Geda Commando (Oromo region’s security forces), QEERROO (Oromo youth movement), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA):
(i) Geda Commando: A specialized regional security forces operating within the Oromo region and neighbouring border. It operates under Shimelis Abdisa (President of the Oromo Regional State) and Diriba Mekonnen (Head of Oromo Police Commission);
(ii) QEEROO Militia: A prominent Oromo youth movement associated with both the Oromo regional administration and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA). It played a significant role in bringing an end to the TPLF-led EPRDF government in 2018, and was also responsible for targeting civilians and ethnic minorities in the Oromo region between 2017 and 2020. QEERROO is a largely decentralized and loosely organized movement, with no clearly identified founders or formal leadership structure. However, Jawar is prominent political figure and influential leader associated with the movement; and
(iii) the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): a political and armed organization founded in 1973 to advocate for the self-determination of the Oromo people and establishment of Oromo state from Ethiopia and Kenya, an aspiration sometimes referred to as "Greater Oromo". Key figures include Dawud Ibsa Ayana (Main Faction Chairman), Ararso Bikila (Splinter Faction Leader), and Kumsa Diriba (OLA Commander).
7.Despite often being locked in bitter political rivalry and armed conflict, the Geda Commando (the Oromo region’s special security forces), QEERRO (the Oromo youth movement), the Prosperity Party / Oromo Prosperity Party (formerly the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization "OPDO"), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA) have emerged from the same historical, cultural, and political ecosystem. They fundamentally disagree on how to secure Oromo self-determination – whether by leading a unified Ethiopian state from within (OPDO/PP/Geda Commando) or through radical self-determination and armed struggle against the Ethiopian state (OLF/OLA), with QEERROO divided between both camps.
8.On 18 October 2026, a 13 years old girl was killed during the violence. The Oromo administration claimed she was Oromo (Boran clan). However, she was buried by the Somali administration on the Somali-administrated side of Moyale, raising unanswered questions about her ethnic group and the validity of the competing claims.
9.Rather than a grassroots inter-communal conflict between the Boran and Garre clans or Oromo and Somali communities, the violence involves state security forces and allied militias backed by the federal army, using state resources and budget.
10. Oromo Ethiopian politicians from Shewa, Jimma and Wollega believe that Moyale belongs to them and that others should leave. Boran officials in Moyale objected to the fighting in Moyale and Hudet. This lead to their removal from government posts, and some were arrested by the Oromo administration.
11.Thousands of civilians have been displaced within the Somali region or have crossed the border into Kenya. Yet reliable data regarding total displaced within or or outside the Dawa Zone, including those who crossed the border into Kenya, remains scarce. In October, Kenyan government and UN agencies reported 50,000 people crossing the border, but that number shifted to 30,000 in November, raising questions about humanitarian reporting accuracy.
12.In Marsabit County, Kenya (Moyale Kenya), several needs assessments have been conducted and humanitarian assistance has been delivered to the displaced populations. However, in Ethiopia the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator has been unable to issue a statement on the humanitarian situation in the Dawa zone. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the country. The expulsion of the seven UN officials in 2021 was linked to concerns they had raised regarding the humanitarian situation and aid delivery of humanitarian assistance in both the Tigray and Somali regions.
13.The fighting has brought the Ethiopian government and Oromo rebel groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front, together, effectively ending more century of Oromo struggle against successive Ethiopian governments, without third-party involvement or mediation.
14.The conflict has disrupted trade activities between Kenya and Ethiopia, and spilled over into Kenyan society, deepening divisions between Oromo and Somali communities in Kenya. Oromo politicians in Kenya have tended to side with their ethnic group in Ethiopia, while Somalis have called for an end to the conflict and address it through dialogue, and state authorities and institutions, ensuring that no group is excluded from the dialogue and reconciliation process. Kenyan intellectuals have also expressed concern about the negative consequences of the conflict for Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.
15.Since the fighting began, officials from both regional administrations and federal government - including members of the federal army and security agencies - has been present in Moyale and reached several agreements from the day one. However, these agreements have consistently been violated by the Oromo side.
Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state’s inability to take action, as is the case in failed states. Therefore, the war in Moyale and Hudet should not be characterised as an ordinary communal dispute between two communities or merely as a disagreement over flags. Instead, it is driven by the Ethiopian government and ruling Oromo politicians in Ethiopia for political reasons and territorial expansion. Ethiopians, regional actors and the international community must act urgently before this crisis escalates into a wider cross-border conflict in the Horn of Africa. When accountability is absent, there is no difference between State Officials and Bandits. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @hrw @amnesty @AmnestyEARO @UN_SPExperts @CAGEintl @BillowKerrow @AbdiwahabSheik7 @DirreOnline @EIshmael_ @BashirHashiysf @Hassa23851483 @Salim8Said @hassanabdirahm8 @ManderaBlogger @Gafdiid7 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiAbdinur @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @Abdirik @awale_saad @ay_has @ElmiYabeh @Iyyesa
Replying to @faisalroble19
You are absolutely right to point out Proclamation 7/1992, which serves as the foundation text for the historical setup of ethnic federalism and regional self-governance in Ethiopia. Major drivers of conflict in Ethiopia and other African countries include power-sharing, access to national resources (budget and aid), exploitation of natural resources, and territorial and boundary issues.
1. The Somali-Oromo case:
⭕️ Legal Framework: Proclamation No 7/1992 established for formation of regions (regional self-governance), interregional boundaries, and administrative arrangements in multi-ethnic districts. Therefore, the Somali-Oromo cases (such Babile, Gursum, Ma'eyso, and Moyale), were already addressed under this framework.
⭕️ 1994 Federal Census: the census was conducted by the Ethiopia Central Statistical Authority without the involvement of the Somali regional administration. Even the census officials and enumerators were non-Somalis and from the highland (Amhara and Tigray), SNNP and Oromo regions. Again, the federal census result for these districts (Babile, Gursum, Ma'eyso, and Moyale) indicated that more than 95% of the population in these districts was Somali.
⭕️2005 Referendum by EPRDF (OPDO and TPLF): fifteen years later, the Oromo OPDO, a key EPRDF/TPLF member, become involved for political and religious motives. OPDO and TPLF manipulated the process, filling referendum ballot boxes in military barracks without the participation of the Somali regional administration and the population of these districts, and the outcome transferred these districts to Oromo administration.
2. Amhara-Tigray Case: Between 1991 and 1996, the Tigray and Benishagul regions shared a direct border, and the Metema area was administrated under the Tigray region. In 1996, the TPLF transferred Metema and its surrounding areas to the Amhara region, without reference to the constitutional procedures or formal legislative approval. The matter was never submitted to the law makers. Even the first constitutions of Amhara, Benishangul and Tigray regions identified Metema as part of Tigray's administrative territory.
3. Dire Dawa Case: In 1993 Somali law makers selected Diredhabo (Dire Dawa) as the capital city for the region, but federal officials from Amhara opposed the decision to project their political, social and economic interest, particularly those of Amhara business and employees in the city. Between 1991 and 2000, Dire Dawa's two members of the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPRs) were ethnic Somali. Drawing on precedents like the Metema boundary adjustment between Tigray-Amhara, the Oromo OPDO later sought control over Dire Dawa as part of broader political and security settlement amid the OLF insurgency in parts of Oromo region, particularly Bale, Arsi, Guji, Borana, and Wellega.
Therefore, unless these issues, as well as tribal territorial expansionism in the name of the federal government, are resolved constitutionally and through the genuine involvement of the regional states and local communities, one must expect inner-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, and cross-border wars in the Horn of Africa or the next 2-5 years. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @UNEthiopia @UnKenya @UNSomalia @UN_Sudan @DRovera @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @abduhar @ManderaBlogger @kenyaaxis @HBNOnlineTV @radiodaljir @awale_saad @Iyyesa @HassanKeynan2 @AbdimalekFarah @dervishconan @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @AbdiwahabSheik7 @AbdiAbdinur @Salim8Said @Abdirik @Hassa23851483 @foziaaosman @Gafdiid7 @enlightenedSoma @ay_has @ElmiYabeh @JamalMOsman @AbdullahiDerow @dagmawi_belay
Badawi retweeted
Absolute crap of an interview!
Jamal Muhumed Osman unwittingly, or purposely, gives an Oromo nationalism apologetic Jawar Mohammed the platform to sanitise the slaughter in Moyale. The journalist makes no pretense about the intent of of the dubious interview; and neither does Jawar fail to deflect & trivialise the unprovoked invasion of Somali region by his ethnic nationalist community on steroids! Shame on them!
Every Oromo leader, including past Oromia Region presidents such as Abdula Gemeda, Lemma Megersa and others have in the past 30 years explicitly termed their expansionist Moyale takeover plan as vital, citing the international border, and it's perceived strategic significance to the Oromia Region and its community. This conflict is not about Borana clan, nor is it about a fancy pastoralists' dispute. Several Somali Region Presidents have in the past been removed from office by Addis Ababa for not helping the realisation of this nefarious political plan. Facts/evidence on these have shared on this account severally, and can be examined in my recent posts below.
Jawar dishonestly implies the Somali Garre clan in Moyale are from Somalia, and not Ethiopian. In a recent interview, he warned that Ethiopia's Somali Region stands to lose more if it doesn't acquiesce to their demands. Now, he warns efforts to rebuild Somalia could be affected if the conflict continues. Clearly, he implies Moyale's Somali Garre community are from Somalia, and hence consequences for Somalia..
Jawar doesn't address the pertinent issue: Oromo territorial expansionism which is at the heart of the war. He doesn't want to discuss the fact that the aggressor in the current war, like in all the previous ones, is Oromo security forces, assisted by Abiy Ahmed's federal forces. Nor does he want to recognise the regional boundary, and administrative jurisdiction, of the Somali Region, and it's future impact on Ethiopian ethnic federalism.. He is unreservedly apologetic to boot!
@Jawar_Mohammed @AbiyAhmedAli #SomaliRegion #Ethiopia #Moyale
Badawi retweeted
Thank you @BillowKerrow for your perspectives on this matter. I agree with you that the interview was an attempt to trivialize a serious and decades long unresolved federal boundary question as a local clan problem.
The October 2026 fighting began over the opening of a Somali regional administrative office and the raising of its flag in Moyale Woreda on the Somali Regional Government side which makes it a dispute over regional administrative authority, not over grazing. From many accounts, the conflict is "not merely an inter-ethnic conflict", since it is alleged that government forces were involved on the Oromia side. "Borana vs. Garre" label is therefore a clever ploy to hide the role of regional and federal security forces.
The same pattern appears earlier. The EPRDF split Moyale between the Somali and Oromia regions, so the dispute is built into the federal structure. Naming only two clans therefore removes the questions of who holds jurisdiction, who commands the forces, and who is accountable. This, I think is the intent of the interview: it makes the conflict look like something that can be managed locally, without addressing the federal boundary.
Describing the Garre as outsiders ties Ethiopian Somalis to Somalia. This is intended to make Ethiopian Somalis look like foreigners and misrepresents their citizenship. Attempting to link the dispute to the costs of "rebuilding Somalia" gives the diaspora a reason to hold back. The intention is to push the Somalis abroad, who are lobbying support for Ethiopia's Somali Region, to stay quiet or press their kin to concede. This threat is aimed at Somalis in diaspora and it comes alongside a refusal to engage on the boundary or on who started the violence.
Absolute crap of an interview!
Jamal Muhumed Osman unwittingly, or purposely, gives an Oromo nationalism apologetic Jawar Mohammed the platform to sanitise the slaughter in Moyale. The journalist makes no pretense about the intent of of the dubious interview; and neither does Jawar fail to deflect & trivialise the unprovoked invasion of Somali region by his ethnic nationalist community on steroids! Shame on them!
Every Oromo leader, including past Oromia Region presidents such as Abdula Gemeda, Lemma Megersa and others have in the past 30 years explicitly termed their expansionist Moyale takeover plan as vital, citing the international border, and it's perceived strategic significance to the Oromia Region and its community. This conflict is not about Borana clan, nor is it about a fancy pastoralists' dispute. Several Somali Region Presidents have in the past been removed from office by Addis Ababa for not helping the realisation of this nefarious political plan. Facts/evidence on these have shared on this account severally, and can be examined in my recent posts below.
Jawar dishonestly implies the Somali Garre clan in Moyale are from Somalia, and not Ethiopian. In a recent interview, he warned that Ethiopia's Somali Region stands to lose more if it doesn't acquiesce to their demands. Now, he warns efforts to rebuild Somalia could be affected if the conflict continues. Clearly, he implies Moyale's Somali Garre community are from Somalia, and hence consequences for Somalia..
Jawar doesn't address the pertinent issue: Oromo territorial expansionism which is at the heart of the war. He doesn't want to discuss the fact that the aggressor in the current war, like in all the previous ones, is Oromo security forces, assisted by Abiy Ahmed's federal forces. Nor does he want to recognise the regional boundary, and administrative jurisdiction, of the Somali Region, and it's future impact on Ethiopian ethnic federalism.. He is unreservedly apologetic to boot!
@Jawar_Mohammed @AbiyAhmedAli #SomaliRegion #Ethiopia #Moyale
Ethiopia: Humanitarian Crises Deepens in Moyale and Hudet
1. On 18 October 2026, heavily armed groups –including the Ooromo Geda Commando, Special Forces (Liyu Police), OLF, and QEERROO) - from the Oromo region, launched attacks in Moyale and Hudet districts of Dawa zone in the Somali region.
2. According to local communities, 40 villages / locations (kebeles) across the two districts (30 Moyale and 10 Hudet), have been affected by the conflict. The violence has displaced thousands of people from their homes, further exacerbating the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in the affected areas.
3. Reports also indicate that injured and sick individuals have been denied to travel to the country's capital, Addis Ababa, to seek essential medical and hospital services. Such restrictions raise serious concerns about the affected population’s access to urgent and life-saving healthcare in the country (Ethiopia).
4. Access to reliable and up-to-date data remains restricted due to government-imposed limitations, making it difficult to independently very the full extent of the displacement and humanitarian impact, civilian casualties, and the overall humanitarian impact of the conflict.
5. Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia and across the Horn of Africa region are worry about humanitarian situation in Dawa zone (Moyale and Hudet districts), particularly regarding population displacement, access to healthcare, and the timely delivery humanitarian assistance.
6. Despite the conflict having continued for than two weeks, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia ( @ozonnia ) have yet to make a public statement on the situation in Moyale and Hudet. This apparent silence has raised concerns among humanitarian partners, particularly amid reports of restriction on humanitarian information and access imposed by the government.
7. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region. This history has raised serious concerns about the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Ethiopia, the challenges they face, and their ability to independently monitor, document, and report on humanitarian crises without fear of reprisals or restrictions.
Therefore, access for humanitarian partners (including the @UN and NGOs) to the conflict affected areas, and also monitoring and an independent assessment are urgently needed to establish the scale of humanitarian needs, and inform an appropriate, timely, and coordinated humanitarian response in the zone. Everyone cares when it's too late. @UNReliefChief @FCDOGovUK @OCHA_Ethiopia @UNEthiopia @AmnestyEARO @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @UKinEthiopia @DRovera @ida_sawyer @faisalroble19 @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @dervishconan @Iyyesa @SpotonSomalia @EIshmael_ @Salim8Said @Hassa23851483 @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiwahabSheik7 @AbdiAbdinur @Abdirik @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @awale_saad @AminaMaandeeq @MohamoudGaildon @AbdikerM @Abukar_Arman @DSultantv26 @ElmiYabeh @ay_has @foziaaosman
Badawi retweeted
BELEDWEYNE
HIIRAAN
HIRSHABEELE
youtu.be/T8ovhXOQqwg?is=YAGL… #Beledweyne
Badawi retweeted
#Somalia mar hore ayey ku dhacday gacmo shisheye si fursad loogu helo:
✅Boobka khayrad ka Somalia. Sida gas, oil, macdan, iyo kaluun.
Ka dibna, shisheye-huna u samaystay shirkado yar yar oo aan iyaku wax baari karin, #FGS ka qaadato wax ay u bixisay xaqu-Qalinle oo 3 million dollar dhan.
Shirkadahas yar yar waxa ka mid ah: #SomaOil and Gas oo magaci hadda u bedelatay #Coastline Exploration, #SomaliaFish Guard Ltd, #Somali minerals, iyo kuwo kale oo qarsoodi ah.
✅In dastuur laga saaro qodob ka “xuduuda Somalia in ay muqadas tahay”sidii ku qornayd dastuuradii 1960-2025.
✅In dastuurka laga saaro #DD iyo #NFD oo la cadeeyo in ayn dhul Somaliyed ahayn.
✅In meesha laga saaro Kenya iyo Ethiopia in ayn haysan dhul Somaliyed.
✅In laga takhaluso #Dastuur kii 2012 ee heshiiska lagu ahaa si loogu daro qodobo badan oo #Faranji (shisheye) wato si ayn Somalia uga bixin gacan shisheye uguna jirto #chapter7.
✅In Waqoye #SL si looga jaro #Somalia aqoonsi loo radiyo, sidii horay ba UK uga soo jeedisay 2/23/2012, Somali London Conference I.
✅In #Konfur Somalia laga saaro Federal ka, laguna daro #EAC oo isku noqonaysa #Confederation ama hal dal. Waana sababta dagaalada loogu qaaday #Jubbaland, #Puntland, iyo #KG, kuwa kalena gurmada loogu hayo si ayn uga hor maan danaha shisheeyuhu ka leeyahay #Somalia.
✅Waana sababta loo eryey Gudoomiyihi Maxakamada Sare markii uu qabtay dacwado ay usoo gudbiyen Sheikh Shariif iyo Sheikh Shakir.
Waxa laga baqay “checks and balances” haddii ay jirto in ayn suurto gelayn qorshii laga laha #Somalia.
✅Mudanayaal iyo Marwooyin #Somalia imisa sano ayey sii jiri karta haddii sidan arrintu u sii socoto? Wadeeca Allah💔
@HESharifShAhmed @M_Farmaajo @HassanSMohamud @AbdiShirdoon @HassanAKhaire @AadanMadobe @HESaidADeni @Laftagareen @PresidentMadobe @AAbdishakur @FaqiAlis @Dr_AMHashi @afyare_elmi @Abukar_Arman @HassansheikhAli @MAWareSO @faaraxsheekh @AbdiDr @MPDrAbib @khatumokeen @agaraad @alihwarsame @FaroleMax @cunayee @SherifAbdinur @HoehneVirgil @agaraad @Amohamednur @4rukun @ProfAbdiSamatar @EnowMohamoud @MohamoudGaildon @ProfHusseinWar @ShAbdiHersy @GeedFadhi1 @faisalroble19 @AbdiAbdinur @Cabdalleaxmed @EIshmael_ @Deee_luul @dervishconan @SpotonSomalia @HalimaAIGutale @Shabuu_II @HornChronicles @Ehelsan_Saleban @filsanfilsan
Badawi retweeted
Replying to @AwRobleh
Dawladda Abiy mahan dawld Ethiopia oo dhab ah, he is an Oromo nationalist. Bani Shangul ayay la'dagalamiyaan,Ahmaro wa isla cool an dhamaad laheyn.Abiy's objective is for Oromo to rule entire Ethiopia & expand territory into Eritrea,over run Jabouti & capture upto Zeilac in Awdal Somalia. Wahaa layiri 'Habar fadhida lagdin baa lafufud' Oromadu haddi ay stajing wayaan dagaalka Moyaale,Somalia wa in ay amusnanta dhaftoo ee soo dakhisha.Soomaali galbeed ha la laga xureeyo!
Badawi retweeted
Demonstration was held at EU headquarters, organized by Somali community and joined by Amhara, Tigray, Benishangul, and Eritrean communities. Protesters condemned Oromo-led Ethiopian government's territorial expansion and escalating conflicts in Moyale and northern Ethiopia.
CPA Billow Kerrow, former Senator for Mander County gave a rare, insightful and important interview on the on-going conflict in Moyale and Hudet districts of the Dawa zone in Ethiopia's Somali region. In the interview, Kerrow discussed the situation on the ground and warned of an impending humanitarian crisis and severe human suffering resulting from state-sponsored attacks by heavily armed forces from Ethiopia's Oromo region, while the federal government remained silent. Here are some of the key points raised during the interview:
Moyale:
1. Moyale is a border town situated between Kenya and Ethiopia. The Ethiopia’s Moyale town is divided between two regional administrations: one part is governed by the Oromo region, while the other side is governed by the Somali region.
Moyale Somali region:
2. What is happening now, the kind of artillery and weapons has been directed to the Somali region by what many believe are now not only the Oromo militia forces but literally supported by federal government.
3. There are no basic services in the Somali side including electricity, water and telecommunication services, which are usually provided by the government. Everything has been disrupted, the life of the entire population in that area has been completely disrupted and people are displaced.
4. The conflict in Moyale is more than and beyond a clan dispute, and should not be understood simply as a disagreement between the Garre (Somali) and Boran (Oromo) communities.
5. The two administrations (the local police forces of the Oromo and Somali regional states) have been engaged in a bitter military fight for two weeks, while the federal government has yet to intervene. There is no country in the world where two states within a federal system of government fight each other. This is not only unusual, but clearly this is something that the federal government seems to support for one reason or the other.
6. Most observers of Ethiopian politics or conflict zones have described the on-going conflict in Moyale as unusual because of the intensity of night fighting. Their argument is that local militia forces lack the capacity to fight at night. The level of night combat, combined with the use of heavy weapons suggests the possible involvement of regular military forces rather than local militia.
7. Therefore, the Addis Ababa administration seems to believe that the Oromo region should be given time and should do whatever is has to do to reclaim the Somali administered part of Moyale town.
8. Former President of Oromo Regional State Abadula Gemeda (time in office: 2005-2010): "During the 2004 boundary referendum between the Oromo and Somali regions, we [OPDO/EPRDF and the federal government] did not want the referendum to take place in Moyale, because the majority of the town’s population was Somali".
9. Former President of Oromo Regional State Junedin Saddo [Junaydi Sa'adudin] (time in office: 2001-2005): "Moyale for us [Oromo] is a make-or-break issue. For strategic reasons, no way Moyale to become part of the Somali region." The statement means that, Moyale is an extremely important territorial and strategic issue for the Oromo people and Oromo Regional State, and they must maintain control of Moyale town.
10. Ethiopia has its own international borders. Why, then, would the Oromo region need its own exit and international borders? Is Oromo region an independent country, or is it part of Ethiopia?
Based on these facts and statements made by Oromo officials (Junedin Saddo [Junaydi Sa’adudin] and Abadula Gemeda), the developments in Moyale are part of Oromo’s political agenda to expand their territory and secure greater strategic access to Kenya. The on-going conflict will not stop at Moyale and borders between Ethiopia and neighbouring countries. Therefore, the @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat and the @UN community must act urgently to prevent further escalation and protect civilians in Ethiopia and broader Horn of Africa region. Failure to address the situation could seriously undermine peace and stability throughout the region. @AmnestyUK @hrw @AbdimalekFarah @ManderaBlogger @DirreOnline @HBNOnlineTV @radiodaljir @kenyaaxis @Salim8Said @SpotonSomalia @dervishconan @EIshmael_ @Hassa23851483 @DSultantv26 @foziaaosman @AminaMaandeeq @Knowledge_iii @Gafdiid7 @AbdiAbdinur @awale_saad @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @faisalroble19
My interview this morning on Dhab TV on Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed's war on Somali region.
youtube.com/live/_1ybgz8EsZg…
Badawi retweeted
My interview this morning on Dhab TV on Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed's war on Somali region.
youtube.com/live/_1ybgz8EsZg…
Fact-Check: ACLED'S Report on the On-going War in Moyale and Hudet, Somali region
1. Since 18 October 2026, Moyale and Hudet districts in Ethiopia’s Somali region have been reportedly faced attacks by heavily armed groups from Ethiopia's Oromo region (including the Oromo Liyu Police, Geda Commando, Repelola militia, regular police, OLF/OLA, and Qeerroo Haromsa) with Ethiopian military uniforms, weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and bases. The objective of the "Geda Operation" is to drive non-Oromos communities from Moyale and then use the town as a strategic gateway to destabilize Kenya and to control Lamu port.
2. According to the community elders in Moyale and Hudet districts, 12 locations (six in each Moyale and six Hudet) were attacked, or came under attack from, Oromo Geda Commando forces and other militias.
3. The conflict in Moyale and Hudet districts of the Dawa zone, Somali region, has displaced thousands of people, forcing them to flee their homes.
⭕️ Somali region: More than 150,000 civilians have reportedly been displaced from their homes, seeking refuge in temporary camps and with host communities in Mubaarak and Qadaaduma districts of the Dawa zone.
⭕️ Oromo region: UNHCR and Kenyan authorities reportedly that 40,000 and 50,000 people fled from Moyale (Oromo side) into Kenya. However, Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency (CSA) projected Moyale Oromo's population at just 15,000 in 2026. This significant discrepancy raises questions about the geographical origin of the displaced people and the accuracy and of the reported figures.
4. According to local reports, all areas subjected to attack since the outbreak of hostilities in Moyale and Hudet are within Somali region, while no locations in the Oromo region have been reported as attacked. Often, displacement occurs in war-affected areas, which indicates that displacement has primarily happened within the Somali region and raises questions about claims that 40,000-50,000 people fled from the Ethiopia’s Oromo side of Moyale.
5. In light of these facts, the ACLED report cannot be viewed as an objective assessment, instead, it reflects a biased and politicized approach that lacks the neutrality, rigorous methodology, and ethical standards and accountability required when documenting and reporting active humanitarian crisis. Under no circumstances should humanitarian and research institution present narratives of ethnic groups or political organizations in their reports. They must uphold impartiality, objectivity, and evidence-based reporting.
When accountability is absent, there is no diffrenece between UN/Humanitarian agencies and Bandits. #R2P @GCR2P @ACLEDINFO @UNHCR_Kenya @UNEthiopia @ONLFofficial @UNPOintl @UNDPPA @Iyyesa @kulanpost
#Moyale #Hudet: Ethics and Accountability in Crisis Reporting
1. When conflict-monitoring organizations like Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) report on sensitive and highly politicised issues, maintaining ethical standards and accountability presents a major challenge.
2. Since 18 October 2026, local documentations and regional accounts have indicated that government forces and affiliated paramilitary militias from Oromo region have launched attacks on the Moyale and Hudet districts in the Somali region. However, ACLED's data reflects biased tribal and political narratives, as well as geographic misrepresentations promoted by Oromo nationalist politicians who rule Ethiopia.
3. It is hardly surprising, given that Dr Jalata Getachew Birru, who wrote this article, is an Oromo and OPDO cadre. Under no circumstances should individuals with clear ethnic and political affiliation be allowed to shape and present narratives on behalf of their ethnic groups or political organizations without independent and impartial oversight.
4. This raises serious questions about impartiality of ACLED’s report, which risks misleading Ethiopians and international community through a biased presentation of the on-going state-sponsored war on the Somali people in Moyale and Hudet districts.
5. Ethical conflict monitoring requires strict transparency about methodology, communication with all actors involved or affected, accurate reporting of the facts, willingness to correct reports when facts on the ground are contested, and implementation of thorough cross-verification processes.
Therefore, human rights organization, humanitarian agencies, and research institutions must uphold strict codes of conduct and professional ethics when reporting on conflicts and other sensitive issues. They must ensure impartiality, accuracy, and accountability in their reporting rather than disseminating misleading or tribal and political narratives. If they cannot meet these standards, the should refrain from publishing unverified claims or biased documents. @ACLEDINFO @UNOCHA @USAID @AmnestyUK @hrw @AbdimalekFarah @FarahMaalimM @BillowKerrow @ManderaBlogger @DirreOnline @HBNOnlineTV @radiodaljir @kenyaaxis @Salim8Said @SpotonSomalia @dervishconan @EIshmael_ @Hassa23851483 @DSultantv26 @foziaaosman @AminaMaandeeq @Knowledge_iii @Gafdiid7 @BestSeller2026 @AbdiAbdinur @awale_saad @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @faisalroble19
acleddata.com/expert-comment…
Badawi retweeted
The Borana community, whose history and presence are deeply woven into the cosmopolitan fabric of Garissa town, has spoken with one voice, affirming its resolve to support my 2027 gubernatorial bid.
I am deeply grateful for the confidence they have expressed in my leadership and the possibility of what we can once again achieve together for Garissa County. Their trust is both an honour and a responsibility I do not take lightly.
The community representatives, comprising elders, women and youth, conveyed a united message of assurance. I appreciate their solidarity and reaffirmed my commitment to an inclusive government that recognises their place in our county, responds to their needs and concerns, and advances the collective aspirations of all communities that call Garissa home.
As we look towards August 2027, I also urged them to take an active role in mobilising their families, friends and neighbours to register as voters and turn out in large numbers on polling day. Our region must overcome voter apathy and translate its numerical strength into meaningful participation in the democratic process.
Together, we can build a Garissa County where every community belongs, every voice matters and no one is left behind.
#Moyale #Hudet: Ethics and Accountability in Crisis Reporting
1. When conflict-monitoring organizations like Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) report on sensitive and highly politicised issues, maintaining ethical standards and accountability presents a major challenge.
2. Since 18 October 2026, local documentations and regional accounts have indicated that government forces and affiliated paramilitary militias from Oromo region have launched attacks on the Moyale and Hudet districts in the Somali region. However, ACLED's data reflects biased tribal and political narratives, as well as geographic misrepresentations promoted by Oromo nationalist politicians who rule Ethiopia.
3. It is hardly surprising, given that Dr Jalata Getachew Birru, who wrote this article, is an Oromo and OPDO cadre. Under no circumstances should individuals with clear ethnic and political affiliation be allowed to shape and present narratives on behalf of their ethnic groups or political organizations without independent and impartial oversight.
4. This raises serious questions about impartiality of ACLED’s report, which risks misleading Ethiopians and international community through a biased presentation of the on-going state-sponsored war on the Somali people in Moyale and Hudet districts.
5. Ethical conflict monitoring requires strict transparency about methodology, communication with all actors involved or affected, accurate reporting of the facts, willingness to correct reports when facts on the ground are contested, and implementation of thorough cross-verification processes.
Therefore, human rights organization, humanitarian agencies, and research institutions must uphold strict codes of conduct and professional ethics when reporting on conflicts and other sensitive issues. They must ensure impartiality, accuracy, and accountability in their reporting rather than disseminating misleading or tribal and political narratives. If they cannot meet these standards, the should refrain from publishing unverified claims or biased documents. @ACLEDINFO @UNOCHA @USAID @AmnestyUK @hrw @AbdimalekFarah @FarahMaalimM @BillowKerrow @ManderaBlogger @DirreOnline @HBNOnlineTV @radiodaljir @kenyaaxis @Salim8Said @SpotonSomalia @dervishconan @EIshmael_ @Hassa23851483 @DSultantv26 @foziaaosman @AminaMaandeeq @Knowledge_iii @Gafdiid7 @BestSeller2026 @AbdiAbdinur @awale_saad @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @faisalroble19
acleddata.com/expert-comment…
































