
Humanitarian & Development | Displacement | Accountability | Ageing | Pastoralism | Minorities in Conflict Contexts #Ethiopia #SouthSudan #Sudan #HornOfAfrica
Addis Ababa & England
Joined December 2017
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Ethiopian officials claim the country's population is 136m, despite the Ethiopian Statistical agency projecting about 112m. They aim to exploit this higher number to maximize donor funding and food aid. @WFP @UNEthiopia @UNOCHA @Knowledge_iii @DRovera @EIshmael_ @SheiknorQassim
Badawi retweeted
A joint @UNEthiopia and international partners’ mission is in Mekelle,Tigray, to engage with the new Caretaker Administration (CTA) and hear directly from communities, humanitarian partners, and other stakeholders about the current humanitarian and dev't situation in the region.
Badawi retweeted
So call "Dr. Tsegaye" is a pseudoscholar and
pseudo-intellectual who presents himself as an authority while spreading misinformation through emotional appeals, unsupported claims, hate speech and misleading rhetoric.
For the past two weeks, I have been closely following Dr. Tsegaye’s media appearances and his written commentaries.
I must confess that his discourse has been profoundly disconcerting, intellectually repugnant and analytically indefensible.
What emerges is a troubling amalgamation of historical revisionism, fabricated historical narratives, and inflammatory political rhetoric.
In the conflict between Oromo and somalis in ethiopia,he attempt to delegitimise the indigenous Somalis in somali region general, Particularly moyale.
he portraying the people of somali region as migrants who emerged following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991.
this
His propaganda rhetoric against somalis is so vile, disgusting, and sickening that it makes you want to vomit.
It is an appalling mixture of misinformation, historical distortion, and inflammatory rhetoric.
@DirreOnline
teapawt.org/DirreOnline/status/212…
Ignorance is the enemy of knowledge.
1. Tsegaye Regassa Ararssa shared a message received from OPP/OPDO Addis Ababa without even bothering to read, examine, or verify its contents. He lacks understanding of Oromo history and the formation of Ethiopia as a state.
2. Like other Derg- TPLF-are political orphans, he believes that Assab (Eritrea), Djibouti (Djibouti), Port Sudan (Sudan), Berbera (Somalia), Lamu (Kenya), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), and Aden (Yemen) belong to his tribe. Such baseless claims are not worth the ink used to write them. @Gafdiid7 @AbdimalekFarah
The Moyale Conflict in Ethiopia: Untold Facts, Figures, and What the Medea Missed:
If you really want to understand what is happening in Moyale and Hudet, you have to look beyond social media posts in, flags, and the competing territorial claims to find the real problem. November 15, 2026, marked four weeks (28 days), since the conflict in Moyale and Hudet began. Since 18 October 2026, the Oromo Geda Commando - which is similar to the "Republican Guard in the Prime Minister Office” - along with other groups, backed by the federal army, has been attacking Moyale and Hudet day and night, with no intervention from the federal authorities to stop the violence. This strongly suggests that Abiy Ahmed and his close inner circle, particularly those from his tribe and political networks are behind this conflict for political and tribal reasons. Therefore, the conflict is political, intertwined with ethnic, tribal, and religious agendas, and can only be solved through political solutions. Here are fifteen facts about the Moyale conflict that many people do not know and the media has not reported.
Moyale:
1.Moyale is located along the border between Kenya and Ethiopia, and is inhabited by two major ethnic groups: the Boran (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali). Moyale is an important multicultural border land where Kenya and Ethiopia share social, cultural, and economic relationships. Its society strongly influenced by pastoralism, cross-border mobility and ethnic diversity. In Moyale Kenya, the two communities live together peacefully, but tensions exist in Moyale Ethiopia.
2.Until 1948, Moyale was not two separate towns divided by an international border. It was one town inhabited by the Boran (Oromo) and Garre (Somali) communities. Colonial boundary-making divided this interconnected territory between Controlled Kenya and Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia). After the Second World War, Britain transferred part of the Moyale to Ethiopia, despite the presence of the Ethiopian administration in the border with Kenya and Somalia.
Moyale Ethiopia
3.Moyale Ethiopia is administrated by the federal government and also the Somali and Oromo regional states. According to projections by Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency (CSA), Moyale's total population in 2026 was estimated at 96,000 in 2026, with 69.21% (66,226 people) in Moyale Somali and 30.79% (29,461 people) in Moyale Oromo.
4.On 18 October 2026, the Oromo security forces and armed groups - including the Geda Commando, QEERROO, and OLF) - launched attacks in the Somali-administrated areas of Moyale and also Hudet districts in the Dawa zone targeting civilians, homes, and busines in 40 locations across Moyale and Hudet districts in the Dawa zone, without any action by the federal authorities to stop the violence. The attacks are being carried out under the banner of the "Now or Never" Campaign. Unverified reports suggested approximately 20,000 armed personnel were deployed to Moyale and Hudet areas by the Oromo administration.
5.The fighting is exclusively within the Somali region. No Oromo locations have reported been attacked by forces originating from the Somali region. Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state's inability to take action, as is the case in failed states.
6.The principal actors involved in the conflict include the Geda Commando (Oromo region’s security forces), QEERROO (Oromo youth movement), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA):
(i) Geda Commando: A specialized regional security forces operating within the Oromo region and neighbouring border. It operates under Shimelis Abdisa (President of the Oromo Regional State) and Diriba Mekonnen (Head of Oromo Police Commission);
(ii) QEEROO Militia: A prominent Oromo youth movement associated with both the Oromo regional administration and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA). It played a significant role in bringing an end to the TPLF-led EPRDF government in 2018, and was also responsible for targeting civilians and ethnic minorities in the Oromo region between 2017 and 2020. QEERROO is a largely decentralized and loosely organized movement, with no clearly identified founders or formal leadership structure. However, Jawar is prominent political figure and influential leader associated with the movement; and
(iii) the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): a political and armed organization founded in 1973 to advocate for the self-determination of the Oromo people and establishment of Oromo state from Ethiopia and Kenya, an aspiration sometimes referred to as "Greater Oromo". Key figures include Dawud Ibsa Ayana (Main Faction Chairman), Ararso Bikila (Splinter Faction Leader), and Kumsa Diriba (OLA Commander).
7.Despite often being locked in bitter political rivalry and armed conflict, the Geda Commando (the Oromo region’s special security forces), QEERRO (the Oromo youth movement), the Prosperity Party / Oromo Prosperity Party (formerly the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization "OPDO"), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA) have emerged from the same historical, cultural, and political ecosystem. They fundamentally disagree on how to secure Oromo self-determination – whether by leading a unified Ethiopian state from within (OPDO/PP/Geda Commando) or through radical self-determination and armed struggle against the Ethiopian state (OLF/OLA), with QEERROO divided between both camps.
8.On 18 October 2026, a 13 years old girl was killed during the violence. The Oromo administration claimed she was Oromo (Boran clan). However, she was buried by the Somali administration on the Somali-administrated side of Moyale, raising unanswered questions about her ethnic group and the validity of the competing claims.
9.Rather than a grassroots inter-communal conflict between the Boran and Garre clans or Oromo and Somali communities, the violence involves state security forces and allied militias backed by the federal army, using state resources and budget.
10. Oromo Ethiopian politicians from Shewa, Jimma and Wollega believe that Moyale belongs to them and that others should leave. Boran officials in Moyale objected to the fighting in Moyale and Hudet. This lead to their removal from government posts, and some were arrested by the Oromo administration.
11.Thousands of civilians have been displaced within the Somali region or have crossed the border into Kenya. Yet reliable data regarding total displaced within or or outside the Dawa Zone, including those who crossed the border into Kenya, remains scarce. In October, Kenyan government and UN agencies reported 50,000 people crossing the border, but that number shifted to 30,000 in November, raising questions about humanitarian reporting accuracy.
12.In Marsabit County, Kenya (Moyale Kenya), several needs assessments have been conducted and humanitarian assistance has been delivered to the displaced populations. However, in Ethiopia the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator has been unable to issue a statement on the humanitarian situation in the Dawa zone. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the country. The expulsion of the seven UN officials in 2021 was linked to concerns they had raised regarding the humanitarian situation and aid delivery of humanitarian assistance in both the Tigray and Somali regions.
13.The fighting has brought the Ethiopian government and Oromo rebel groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front, together, effectively ending more century of Oromo struggle against successive Ethiopian governments, without third-party involvement or mediation.
14.The conflict has disrupted trade activities between Kenya and Ethiopia, and spilled over into Kenyan society, deepening divisions between Oromo and Somali communities in Kenya. Oromo politicians in Kenya have tended to side with their ethnic group in Ethiopia, while Somalis have called for an end to the conflict and address it through dialogue, and state authorities and institutions, ensuring that no group is excluded from the dialogue and reconciliation process. Kenyan intellectuals have also expressed concern about the negative consequences of the conflict for Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.
15.Since the fighting began, officials from both regional administrations and federal government - including members of the federal army and security agencies - has been present in Moyale and reached several agreements from the day one. However, these agreements have consistently been violated by the Oromo side.
Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state’s inability to take action, as is the case in failed states. Therefore, the war in Moyale and Hudet should not be characterised as an ordinary communal dispute between two communities or merely as a disagreement over flags. Instead, it is driven by the Ethiopian government and ruling Oromo politicians in Ethiopia for political reasons and territorial expansion. Ethiopians, regional actors and the international community must act urgently before this crisis escalates into a wider cross-border conflict in the Horn of Africa. When accountability is absent, there is no difference between State Officials and Bandits. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @hrw @amnesty @AmnestyEARO @UN_SPExperts @CAGEintl @BillowKerrow @AbdiwahabSheik7 @DirreOnline @EIshmael_ @BashirHashiysf @Hassa23851483 @Salim8Said @hassanabdirahm8 @ManderaBlogger @Gafdiid7 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiAbdinur @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @Abdirik @awale_saad @ay_has @ElmiYabeh @Iyyesa
The conflict in Moyale and Hudet have acted as catalyst and enabler for direct reconciliation between the Ethiopian government and Oromo rebel groups and militias (the Oromo Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Army, QEERROO, Oromo Islamic Groups), creating an opportunity for peace, ending the over-50 year Oromo struggle without third-party mediation. This means that a peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and Oromo groups would have been impossible without the conflict. In another words, the conflict united the Oromo people and solved their differences. (Point #13)
The situation in Moyale, the Somali minority in Ethiopia is deeply concerning. The threat of a Rwanda-style civil war and ethnic cleansing is looming over Ethiopia. A lot could be said, but the video speaks for itself. Everyone cares when it's too late. @UNEthiopia @EUinEthiopia @faisalroble19 @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @AbdimalekFarah @_AfricanUnion @igad
🚨 Federal government orders arrest of Somali journalists, social media influencers and Prosperity Party officials over Moyale territorial dispute amid continued shelling of the town by Oromia Gadaa Commando forces
The @AbiyAhmedAli regime has reportedly issued directives ordering the arrest of journalists, social media influencers and Prosperity Party officials in Somali Region over their positions and public commentary concerning the ongoing territorial dispute between Somali and Oromia regions over Moyale Town, according to local sources.
The federal government’s directives reportedly accuse the targeted individuals of spreading false information about Moyale and contributing to the escalation of fighting and instability between the two regions. Authorities in Jigjiga have reportedly received strict instructions and warnings to carry out the arrests.
The reported federal intervention comes amid continued fighting in Moyale, where heavily armed Oromia regional forces, including Gadaa Commando units equipped with crew-served weapons, have carried out attacks that displaced numerous ethnic Somali civilians and destroyed residential homes.
Sources criticized the federal government’s reported arrest orders, arguing that holding Somali journalists and social media influencers responsible for the violence represents an attempt to pressure them into abandoning their positions on Moyale’s territorial status. They further characterized the federal government’s actions as advancing the interests of the Oromo wing of the Prosperity Party.
Meanwhile, the Somali Regional Government has previously declared that it will not accept external pressure concerning Moyale’s administration and territorial status. Several rounds of negotiations involving Somali and Oromia regional authorities and the federal government have reportedly concluded without an agreement, leaving the dispute unresolved as military and political tensions continue to escalate.
4
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Badawi retweeted
Replying to @ImanoGuyo
The newly-found racists in the Horn of Africa like yourself will learn hard lessons soon. I am sure that system you intend to build will sink down. Also, the most sensitive individuals insult more. Ironic that is.
The Moyale Conflict in Ethiopia: Untold Facts, Figures, and What the Medea Missed:
If you really want to understand what is happening in Moyale and Hudet, you have to look beyond social media posts in, flags, and the competing territorial claims to find the real problem. November 15, 2026, marked four weeks (28 days), since the conflict in Moyale and Hudet began. Since 18 October 2026, the Oromo Geda Commando - which is similar to the "Republican Guard in the Prime Minister Office” - along with other groups, backed by the federal army, has been attacking Moyale and Hudet day and night, with no intervention from the federal authorities to stop the violence. This strongly suggests that Abiy Ahmed and his close inner circle, particularly those from his tribe and political networks are behind this conflict for political and tribal reasons. Therefore, the conflict is political, intertwined with ethnic, tribal, and religious agendas, and can only be solved through political solutions. Here are fifteen facts about the Moyale conflict that many people do not know and the media has not reported.
Moyale:
1.Moyale is located along the border between Kenya and Ethiopia, and is inhabited by two major ethnic groups: the Boran (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali). Moyale is an important multicultural border land where Kenya and Ethiopia share social, cultural, and economic relationships. Its society strongly influenced by pastoralism, cross-border mobility and ethnic diversity. In Moyale Kenya, the two communities live together peacefully, but tensions exist in Moyale Ethiopia.
2.Until 1948, Moyale was not two separate towns divided by an international border. It was one town inhabited by the Boran (Oromo) and Garre (Somali) communities. Colonial boundary-making divided this interconnected territory between Controlled Kenya and Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia). After the Second World War, Britain transferred part of the Moyale to Ethiopia, despite the presence of the Ethiopian administration in the border with Kenya and Somalia.
Moyale Ethiopia
3.Moyale Ethiopia is administrated by the federal government and also the Somali and Oromo regional states. According to projections by Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency (CSA), Moyale's total population in 2026 was estimated at 96,000 in 2026, with 69.21% (66,226 people) in Moyale Somali and 30.79% (29,461 people) in Moyale Oromo.
4.On 18 October 2026, the Oromo security forces and armed groups - including the Geda Commando, QEERROO, and OLF) - launched attacks in the Somali-administrated areas of Moyale and also Hudet districts in the Dawa zone targeting civilians, homes, and busines in 40 locations across Moyale and Hudet districts in the Dawa zone, without any action by the federal authorities to stop the violence. The attacks are being carried out under the banner of the "Now or Never" Campaign. Unverified reports suggested approximately 20,000 armed personnel were deployed to Moyale and Hudet areas by the Oromo administration.
5.The fighting is exclusively within the Somali region. No Oromo locations have reported been attacked by forces originating from the Somali region. Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state's inability to take action, as is the case in failed states.
6.The principal actors involved in the conflict include the Geda Commando (Oromo region’s security forces), QEERROO (Oromo youth movement), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA):
(i) Geda Commando: A specialized regional security forces operating within the Oromo region and neighbouring border. It operates under Shimelis Abdisa (President of the Oromo Regional State) and Diriba Mekonnen (Head of Oromo Police Commission);
(ii) QEEROO Militia: A prominent Oromo youth movement associated with both the Oromo regional administration and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA). It played a significant role in bringing an end to the TPLF-led EPRDF government in 2018, and was also responsible for targeting civilians and ethnic minorities in the Oromo region between 2017 and 2020. QEERROO is a largely decentralized and loosely organized movement, with no clearly identified founders or formal leadership structure. However, Jawar is prominent political figure and influential leader associated with the movement; and
(iii) the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): a political and armed organization founded in 1973 to advocate for the self-determination of the Oromo people and establishment of Oromo state from Ethiopia and Kenya, an aspiration sometimes referred to as "Greater Oromo". Key figures include Dawud Ibsa Ayana (Main Faction Chairman), Ararso Bikila (Splinter Faction Leader), and Kumsa Diriba (OLA Commander).
7.Despite often being locked in bitter political rivalry and armed conflict, the Geda Commando (the Oromo region’s special security forces), QEERRO (the Oromo youth movement), the Prosperity Party / Oromo Prosperity Party (formerly the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization "OPDO"), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA) have emerged from the same historical, cultural, and political ecosystem. They fundamentally disagree on how to secure Oromo self-determination – whether by leading a unified Ethiopian state from within (OPDO/PP/Geda Commando) or through radical self-determination and armed struggle against the Ethiopian state (OLF/OLA), with QEERROO divided between both camps.
8.On 18 October 2026, a 13 years old girl was killed during the violence. The Oromo administration claimed she was Oromo (Boran clan). However, she was buried by the Somali administration on the Somali-administrated side of Moyale, raising unanswered questions about her ethnic group and the validity of the competing claims.
9.Rather than a grassroots inter-communal conflict between the Boran and Garre clans or Oromo and Somali communities, the violence involves state security forces and allied militias backed by the federal army, using state resources and budget.
10. Oromo Ethiopian politicians from Shewa, Jimma and Wollega believe that Moyale belongs to them and that others should leave. Boran officials in Moyale objected to the fighting in Moyale and Hudet. This lead to their removal from government posts, and some were arrested by the Oromo administration.
11.Thousands of civilians have been displaced within the Somali region or have crossed the border into Kenya. Yet reliable data regarding total displaced within or or outside the Dawa Zone, including those who crossed the border into Kenya, remains scarce. In October, Kenyan government and UN agencies reported 50,000 people crossing the border, but that number shifted to 30,000 in November, raising questions about humanitarian reporting accuracy.
12.In Marsabit County, Kenya (Moyale Kenya), several needs assessments have been conducted and humanitarian assistance has been delivered to the displaced populations. However, in Ethiopia the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator has been unable to issue a statement on the humanitarian situation in the Dawa zone. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the country. The expulsion of the seven UN officials in 2021 was linked to concerns they had raised regarding the humanitarian situation and aid delivery of humanitarian assistance in both the Tigray and Somali regions.
13.The fighting has brought the Ethiopian government and Oromo rebel groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front, together, effectively ending more century of Oromo struggle against successive Ethiopian governments, without third-party involvement or mediation.
14.The conflict has disrupted trade activities between Kenya and Ethiopia, and spilled over into Kenyan society, deepening divisions between Oromo and Somali communities in Kenya. Oromo politicians in Kenya have tended to side with their ethnic group in Ethiopia, while Somalis have called for an end to the conflict and address it through dialogue, and state authorities and institutions, ensuring that no group is excluded from the dialogue and reconciliation process. Kenyan intellectuals have also expressed concern about the negative consequences of the conflict for Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.
15.Since the fighting began, officials from both regional administrations and federal government - including members of the federal army and security agencies - has been present in Moyale and reached several agreements from the day one. However, these agreements have consistently been violated by the Oromo side.
Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state’s inability to take action, as is the case in failed states. Therefore, the war in Moyale and Hudet should not be characterised as an ordinary communal dispute between two communities or merely as a disagreement over flags. Instead, it is driven by the Ethiopian government and ruling Oromo politicians in Ethiopia for political reasons and territorial expansion. Ethiopians, regional actors and the international community must act urgently before this crisis escalates into a wider cross-border conflict in the Horn of Africa. When accountability is absent, there is no difference between State Officials and Bandits. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @hrw @amnesty @AmnestyEARO @UN_SPExperts @CAGEintl @BillowKerrow @AbdiwahabSheik7 @DirreOnline @EIshmael_ @BashirHashiysf @Hassa23851483 @Salim8Said @hassanabdirahm8 @ManderaBlogger @Gafdiid7 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiAbdinur @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @Abdirik @awale_saad @ay_has @ElmiYabeh @Iyyesa
Ninkaan ciilay baa i caayaya 🤣🤣. Abtigay @RAbdiAnalyst runtuu ka sheegay socod-xumada Xasan waxa laga dhaxlaana ah kharribaad maanta & shalayto barrito 🧐
Rashid can't hide anymore. After 10 years of begging President Hassan and sending WhatsApp voice messages to the Prime Minister’s Office asking for cash, @KamalGutale knows exactly what I'm talking about. 😀
And look where he ended up: becoming Netanyahu's condom,
He finally knew the new Israels administration policy is different, he lose agains
Meanwhile, the Somali people in Hargeisa should be asking serious questions. Their taxpayers deserve to know where their money is going. Is this really what public resources are being spent on?
I actually enjoy watching the political chess game unfold presidentHassan’ and his team playing when it comes to foreignpolicy, i feel relaxed.
Cry louder, Papi. 😀🇸🇴
54
Communities in Moyale and Hudet, Somali region, are under threat after four weeks of armed violence without state protection. Worse, the federal government's backing of the attacks call its neutrality and accountability into question. #R2P MinorityUnderThreat #Ethiopia @GCR2P @unicefchief @UNDPPA @UNGeneva @UNReliefChief @UKinEthiopia @EUinEthiopia
The Moyale Conflict in Ethiopia: Untold Facts, Figures, and What the Medea Missed:
If you really want to understand what is happening in Moyale and Hudet, you have to look beyond social media posts in, flags, and the competing territorial claims to find the real problem. November 15, 2026, marked four weeks (28 days), since the conflict in Moyale and Hudet began. Since 18 October 2026, the Oromo Geda Commando - which is similar to the "Republican Guard in the Prime Minister Office” - along with other groups, backed by the federal army, has been attacking Moyale and Hudet day and night, with no intervention from the federal authorities to stop the violence. This strongly suggests that Abiy Ahmed and his close inner circle, particularly those from his tribe and political networks are behind this conflict for political and tribal reasons. Therefore, the conflict is political, intertwined with ethnic, tribal, and religious agendas, and can only be solved through political solutions. Here are fifteen facts about the Moyale conflict that many people do not know and the media has not reported.
Moyale:
1.Moyale is located along the border between Kenya and Ethiopia, and is inhabited by two major ethnic groups: the Boran (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali). Moyale is an important multicultural border land where Kenya and Ethiopia share social, cultural, and economic relationships. Its society strongly influenced by pastoralism, cross-border mobility and ethnic diversity. In Moyale Kenya, the two communities live together peacefully, but tensions exist in Moyale Ethiopia.
2.Until 1948, Moyale was not two separate towns divided by an international border. It was one town inhabited by the Boran (Oromo) and Garre (Somali) communities. Colonial boundary-making divided this interconnected territory between Controlled Kenya and Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia). After the Second World War, Britain transferred part of the Moyale to Ethiopia, despite the presence of the Ethiopian administration in the border with Kenya and Somalia.
Moyale Ethiopia
3.Moyale Ethiopia is administrated by the federal government and also the Somali and Oromo regional states. According to projections by Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency (CSA), Moyale's total population in 2026 was estimated at 96,000 in 2026, with 69.21% (66,226 people) in Moyale Somali and 30.79% (29,461 people) in Moyale Oromo.
4.On 18 October 2026, the Oromo security forces and armed groups - including the Geda Commando, QEERROO, and OLF) - launched attacks in the Somali-administrated areas of Moyale and also Hudet districts in the Dawa zone targeting civilians, homes, and busines in 40 locations across Moyale and Hudet districts in the Dawa zone, without any action by the federal authorities to stop the violence. The attacks are being carried out under the banner of the "Now or Never" Campaign. Unverified reports suggested approximately 20,000 armed personnel were deployed to Moyale and Hudet areas by the Oromo administration.
5.The fighting is exclusively within the Somali region. No Oromo locations have reported been attacked by forces originating from the Somali region. Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state's inability to take action, as is the case in failed states.
6.The principal actors involved in the conflict include the Geda Commando (Oromo region’s security forces), QEERROO (Oromo youth movement), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA):
(i) Geda Commando: A specialized regional security forces operating within the Oromo region and neighbouring border. It operates under Shimelis Abdisa (President of the Oromo Regional State) and Diriba Mekonnen (Head of Oromo Police Commission);
(ii) QEEROO Militia: A prominent Oromo youth movement associated with both the Oromo regional administration and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA). It played a significant role in bringing an end to the TPLF-led EPRDF government in 2018, and was also responsible for targeting civilians and ethnic minorities in the Oromo region between 2017 and 2020. QEERROO is a largely decentralized and loosely organized movement, with no clearly identified founders or formal leadership structure. However, Jawar is prominent political figure and influential leader associated with the movement; and
(iii) the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): a political and armed organization founded in 1973 to advocate for the self-determination of the Oromo people and establishment of Oromo state from Ethiopia and Kenya, an aspiration sometimes referred to as "Greater Oromo". Key figures include Dawud Ibsa Ayana (Main Faction Chairman), Ararso Bikila (Splinter Faction Leader), and Kumsa Diriba (OLA Commander).
7.Despite often being locked in bitter political rivalry and armed conflict, the Geda Commando (the Oromo region’s special security forces), QEERRO (the Oromo youth movement), the Prosperity Party / Oromo Prosperity Party (formerly the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization "OPDO"), and the Oromo Liberation Front/ Oromo Liberation Army (OLF/OLA) have emerged from the same historical, cultural, and political ecosystem. They fundamentally disagree on how to secure Oromo self-determination – whether by leading a unified Ethiopian state from within (OPDO/PP/Geda Commando) or through radical self-determination and armed struggle against the Ethiopian state (OLF/OLA), with QEERROO divided between both camps.
8.On 18 October 2026, a 13 years old girl was killed during the violence. The Oromo administration claimed she was Oromo (Boran clan). However, she was buried by the Somali administration on the Somali-administrated side of Moyale, raising unanswered questions about her ethnic group and the validity of the competing claims.
9.Rather than a grassroots inter-communal conflict between the Boran and Garre clans or Oromo and Somali communities, the violence involves state security forces and allied militias backed by the federal army, using state resources and budget.
10. Oromo Ethiopian politicians from Shewa, Jimma and Wollega believe that Moyale belongs to them and that others should leave. Boran officials in Moyale objected to the fighting in Moyale and Hudet. This lead to their removal from government posts, and some were arrested by the Oromo administration.
11.Thousands of civilians have been displaced within the Somali region or have crossed the border into Kenya. Yet reliable data regarding total displaced within or or outside the Dawa Zone, including those who crossed the border into Kenya, remains scarce. In October, Kenyan government and UN agencies reported 50,000 people crossing the border, but that number shifted to 30,000 in November, raising questions about humanitarian reporting accuracy.
12.In Marsabit County, Kenya (Moyale Kenya), several needs assessments have been conducted and humanitarian assistance has been delivered to the displaced populations. However, in Ethiopia the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator has been unable to issue a statement on the humanitarian situation in the Dawa zone. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the country. The expulsion of the seven UN officials in 2021 was linked to concerns they had raised regarding the humanitarian situation and aid delivery of humanitarian assistance in both the Tigray and Somali regions.
13.The fighting has brought the Ethiopian government and Oromo rebel groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front, together, effectively ending more century of Oromo struggle against successive Ethiopian governments, without third-party involvement or mediation.
14.The conflict has disrupted trade activities between Kenya and Ethiopia, and spilled over into Kenyan society, deepening divisions between Oromo and Somali communities in Kenya. Oromo politicians in Kenya have tended to side with their ethnic group in Ethiopia, while Somalis have called for an end to the conflict and address it through dialogue, and state authorities and institutions, ensuring that no group is excluded from the dialogue and reconciliation process. Kenyan intellectuals have also expressed concern about the negative consequences of the conflict for Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.
15.Since the fighting began, officials from both regional administrations and federal government - including members of the federal army and security agencies - has been present in Moyale and reached several agreements from the day one. However, these agreements have consistently been violated by the Oromo side.
Such situations are highly unusual globally, and suggest either direct government involvement or state’s inability to take action, as is the case in failed states. Therefore, the war in Moyale and Hudet should not be characterised as an ordinary communal dispute between two communities or merely as a disagreement over flags. Instead, it is driven by the Ethiopian government and ruling Oromo politicians in Ethiopia for political reasons and territorial expansion. Ethiopians, regional actors and the international community must act urgently before this crisis escalates into a wider cross-border conflict in the Horn of Africa. When accountability is absent, there is no difference between State Officials and Bandits. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @hrw @amnesty @AmnestyEARO @UN_SPExperts @CAGEintl @BillowKerrow @AbdiwahabSheik7 @DirreOnline @EIshmael_ @BashirHashiysf @Hassa23851483 @Salim8Said @hassanabdirahm8 @ManderaBlogger @Gafdiid7 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiAbdinur @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @Abdirik @awale_saad @ay_has @ElmiYabeh @Iyyesa
28
This is compelling evidence, containing considerable truth that cannot easily be denied.
1. Historical records show that, British colonial authorities negotiated with the Garre Sultans and elders on Moyale including border demarcations, and grazing rights.
2. By engaging the Sultan as a diplomatic counterpart rather than a colonial subject, these formal negotiations and deals demonstrate that Britain recognized the Somali Garre as the legitimate representatives and ancestral owners of the indigenous people and borderlands.
3. Sultan Gabaaba Mahad, the father of Sultan Haji Hassan Gabaaba, was arrested by British colonial authorities in Nairobi in 1923 and died in the 1930s. His son, Sultan Haji Hassan Gabaaba, and grandson, Sultan Robow [Rooble] Haji Hassan Gabaaba were killed by Haile Selassie in the 1960s. @Djbawlah @dervishconan @AbdiAbdinur @hassanabdirahm8 @Hassa23851483 @Knowledge_iii @AminaMaandeeq @DirreOnline @ManderaBlogger @AbdimalekFarah @Iyyesa @faisalroble19 @Gafdiid7
Let me teach our Oromo brothers one important lesson in history: facts matters, and history cannot be rewritten to suit Oromo expensionism.
In 1902 British colonialists negotiated the jurisdiction and status of Moyale with Sultan Gababa Mahad, the father of the famous Sultan Hassan Gababa of Garre Somali.
Let this historical record be clear: i have absolutely no doubt that Moyale was and still remains a Somali town. History deserves respect, not distortion. @BillowKerrow @FarahMaalimM @JawaahirDaahir @Jawar_Mohammed
Ethiopia: Major Conflicts and Security Incidents over the past 2-3 weeks:
1. Gambella Region: Ethnic conflicts and violence, including attacks against indigenous communities and non-indigenous communities (including Amharas) and clashes involving federal forces.
2. Somali Region - Dawa Zone (Moyale and Hudet Districts): on-going conflict over the past three weeks involving heavily armed forces and groups from the Oromo region - including Oromo regional forces, Geda Commando, and the OLF – in the presence of federal forces (ENDF) without intervention.
3. Somali Region - Sitti Zone (West Sitti): Attacks against civilians, resulting in killings, looted properties, stolen animals, and civilian displacement by armed forces and groups from the Afar region, with the presence of federal forces (ENDF) without intervention.
4. Oromo Region – Bale and Wellega: attacks against civilians, including targeted attacks against Amhara communities, involving Oromo regional forces and other armed groups, with the presence of the federal forces (ENDF) but taking no action.
5. Oromo Region –Wellega: Further violence across various areas, resulting in civilian fatalities, burned houses, and displacement, involving Oromo regional forces and other armed groups, with the presence of the federal forces (ENDF) but taking no action.
6. Central Ethiopian Region – Gurage Zone (Sodo District): Civilian killings and looting of a Church by armed groups from neighbouring Oromo region, with the presence of the federal forces (ENDF) but taking no action.
7. Tigray Region: Active fighting between ENDF-TDF, TPF involvement, drone strikes, and civilian casualties, and displacement.
8. Amhara Region: Active fighting between ENDF-FANO, drone strikes, and civilian casualties, and displacement.
9. Harari Region: The Harari ethnic minority faces increasing vulnerability, living under precarious conditions and heavily influenced by Oromo security forces and other groups.
10. Afar Region: increasing tensions and hostilities along the border with the Tigray and Amhara regions, neighbouring Eritrea, and involving Afar armed groups affiliated with the TDF.
11. Addis Ababa: A foreign investor (an Israeli businessman), was found dead under unclear circumstances in a restaurant in Addis Ababa. No further details regarding the circumstance of his death are currently available.
Such security incidents and hostile acts frequently occur following the release of the national budget, raising serious concerns about possible state sponsorship and involvement. Therefore, the regional and international communities must act collectively to stop these atrocities and ensure those responsible are held accountable before it is too late. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @criticalthreats @EekadFacts @Conflicts @UNDPPA @WarOnWant @dervishconan @Abukar_Arman @AbdimalekFarah @DirreOnline @AbdiAbdinur @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @Abdirik @ay_has @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @hassanabdirahm8 @Hassa23851483 @ElmiYabeh @BubalAbdi
Replying to @faisalroble19
You are absolutely right to point out Proclamation 7/1992, which serves as the foundation text for the historical setup of ethnic federalism and regional self-governance in Ethiopia. Major drivers of conflict in Ethiopia and other African countries include power-sharing, access to national resources (budget and aid), exploitation of natural resources, and territorial and boundary issues.
1. The Somali-Oromo case:
⭕️ Legal Framework: Proclamation No 7/1992 established for formation of regions (regional self-governance), interregional boundaries, and administrative arrangements in multi-ethnic districts. Therefore, the Somali-Oromo cases (such Babile, Gursum, Ma'eyso, and Moyale), were already addressed under this framework.
⭕️ 1994 Federal Census: the census was conducted by the Ethiopia Central Statistical Authority without the involvement of the Somali regional administration. Even the census officials and enumerators were non-Somalis and from the highland (Amhara and Tigray), SNNP and Oromo regions. Again, the federal census result for these districts (Babile, Gursum, Ma'eyso, and Moyale) indicated that more than 95% of the population in these districts was Somali.
⭕️2005 Referendum by EPRDF (OPDO and TPLF): fifteen years later, the Oromo OPDO, a key EPRDF/TPLF member, become involved for political and religious motives. OPDO and TPLF manipulated the process, filling referendum ballot boxes in military barracks without the participation of the Somali regional administration and the population of these districts, and the outcome transferred these districts to Oromo administration.
2. Amhara-Tigray Case: Between 1991 and 1996, the Tigray and Benishagul regions shared a direct border, and the Metema area was administrated under the Tigray region. In 1996, the TPLF transferred Metema and its surrounding areas to the Amhara region, without reference to the constitutional procedures or formal legislative approval. The matter was never submitted to the law makers. Even the first constitutions of Amhara, Benishangul and Tigray regions identified Metema as part of Tigray's administrative territory.
3. Dire Dawa Case: In 1993 Somali law makers selected Diredhabo (Dire Dawa) as the capital city for the region, but federal officials from Amhara opposed the decision to project their political, social and economic interest, particularly those of Amhara business and employees in the city. Between 1991 and 2000, Dire Dawa's two members of the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPRs) were ethnic Somali. Drawing on precedents like the Metema boundary adjustment between Tigray-Amhara, the Oromo OPDO later sought control over Dire Dawa as part of broader political and security settlement amid the OLF insurgency in parts of Oromo region, particularly Bale, Arsi, Guji, Borana, and Wellega.
Therefore, unless these issues, as well as tribal territorial expansionism in the name of the federal government, are resolved constitutionally and through the genuine involvement of the regional states and local communities, one must expect inner-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, and cross-border wars in the Horn of Africa or the next 2-5 years. @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @UNEthiopia @UnKenya @UNSomalia @UN_Sudan @DRovera @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @abduhar @ManderaBlogger @kenyaaxis @HBNOnlineTV @radiodaljir @awale_saad @Iyyesa @HassanKeynan2 @AbdimalekFarah @dervishconan @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @AbdiwahabSheik7 @AbdiAbdinur @Salim8Said @Abdirik @Hassa23851483 @foziaaosman @Gafdiid7 @enlightenedSoma @ay_has @ElmiYabeh @JamalMOsman @AbdullahiDerow @dagmawi_belay
I would like to add a few points and clarification on points 6 and 7:
6. The National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and the Somali region's Disaster Risk Management Bureau (DRMB), which are responsible for coordinate humanitarian efforts, including conducting needs assessments and facilitating aid delivery, have yet to make a public statement on the situation in Moyale and Hudet.
7. The expulsion of the seven UN officials in 2021 was linked to concerns they had raised regarding the humanitarian situation and aid delivery of humanitarian assistance in both the Tigray and Somali regions. In July 2022, the Head of the country’s relief agency (NDRMC) Mitiku Kassa, was also arrested and removed from his post in connection with this matter.
A government that imposes restrictions on humanitarian operations and access to information cannot be expected to provide a transparent and truthful account of the humanitarian situation in the Somali region or elsewhere across the country.
Tribal territorial expansion in Ethiopia is driven by state policies, ethnic politics, and competition over land and resources. When accountability is absent, there is no difference between State Officials and Bandits. #Ethiopia #OromummaaIdeology @UNEthiopia @EUinEthiopia @reliefweb @AbdimalekFarah @BillowKerrow @FarahMaalimM @AbdullahiDerow @DirreOnline @Ibtisammohamd @faisalroble19
Ethiopia: Humanitarian Crises Deepens in Moyale and Hudet
1. On 18 October 2026, heavily armed groups –including the Ooromo Geda Commando, Special Forces (Liyu Police), OLF, and QEERROO) - from the Oromo region, launched attacks in Moyale and Hudet districts of Dawa zone in the Somali region.
2. According to local communities, 40 villages / locations (kebeles) across the two districts (30 Moyale and 10 Hudet), have been affected by the conflict. The violence has displaced thousands of people from their homes, further exacerbating the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in the affected areas.
3. Reports also indicate that injured and sick individuals have been denied to travel to the country's capital, Addis Ababa, to seek essential medical and hospital services. Such restrictions raise serious concerns about the affected population’s access to urgent and life-saving healthcare in the country (Ethiopia).
4. Access to reliable and up-to-date data remains restricted due to government-imposed limitations, making it difficult to independently very the full extent of the displacement and humanitarian impact, civilian casualties, and the overall humanitarian impact of the conflict.
5. Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia and across the Horn of Africa region are worry about humanitarian situation in Dawa zone (Moyale and Hudet districts), particularly regarding population displacement, access to healthcare, and the timely delivery humanitarian assistance.
6. Despite the conflict having continued for than two weeks, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia ( @ozonnia ) have yet to make a public statement on the situation in Moyale and Hudet. This apparent silence has raised concerns among humanitarian partners, particularly amid reports of restriction on humanitarian information and access imposed by the government.
7. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region. This history has raised serious concerns about the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Ethiopia, the challenges they face, and their ability to independently monitor, document, and report on humanitarian crises without fear of reprisals or restrictions.
Therefore, access for humanitarian partners (including the @UN and NGOs) to the conflict affected areas, and also monitoring and an independent assessment are urgently needed to establish the scale of humanitarian needs, and inform an appropriate, timely, and coordinated humanitarian response in the zone. Everyone cares when it's too late. @UNReliefChief @FCDOGovUK @OCHA_Ethiopia @UNEthiopia @AmnestyEARO @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @UKinEthiopia @DRovera @ida_sawyer @faisalroble19 @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @dervishconan @Iyyesa @SpotonSomalia @EIshmael_ @Salim8Said @Hassa23851483 @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiwahabSheik7 @AbdiAbdinur @Abdirik @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @awale_saad @AminaMaandeeq @MohamoudGaildon @AbdikerM @Abukar_Arman @DSultantv26 @ElmiYabeh @ay_has @foziaaosman
Badawi retweeted
Absolute crap of an interview!
Jamal Muhumed Osman unwittingly, or purposely, gives an Oromo nationalism apologetic Jawar Mohammed the platform to sanitise the slaughter in Moyale. The journalist makes no pretense about the intent of of the dubious interview; and neither does Jawar fail to deflect & trivialise the unprovoked invasion of Somali region by his ethnic nationalist community on steroids! Shame on them!
Every Oromo leader, including past Oromia Region presidents such as Abdula Gemeda, Lemma Megersa and others have in the past 30 years explicitly termed their expansionist Moyale takeover plan as vital, citing the international border, and it's perceived strategic significance to the Oromia Region and its community. This conflict is not about Borana clan, nor is it about a fancy pastoralists' dispute. Several Somali Region Presidents have in the past been removed from office by Addis Ababa for not helping the realisation of this nefarious political plan. Facts/evidence on these have shared on this account severally, and can be examined in my recent posts below.
Jawar dishonestly implies the Somali Garre clan in Moyale are from Somalia, and not Ethiopian. In a recent interview, he warned that Ethiopia's Somali Region stands to lose more if it doesn't acquiesce to their demands. Now, he warns efforts to rebuild Somalia could be affected if the conflict continues. Clearly, he implies Moyale's Somali Garre community are from Somalia, and hence consequences for Somalia..
Jawar doesn't address the pertinent issue: Oromo territorial expansionism which is at the heart of the war. He doesn't want to discuss the fact that the aggressor in the current war, like in all the previous ones, is Oromo security forces, assisted by Abiy Ahmed's federal forces. Nor does he want to recognise the regional boundary, and administrative jurisdiction, of the Somali Region, and it's future impact on Ethiopian ethnic federalism.. He is unreservedly apologetic to boot!
@Jawar_Mohammed @AbiyAhmedAli #SomaliRegion #Ethiopia #Moyale
Badawi retweeted
Thank you @BillowKerrow for your perspectives on this matter. I agree with you that the interview was an attempt to trivialize a serious and decades long unresolved federal boundary question as a local clan problem.
The October 2026 fighting began over the opening of a Somali regional administrative office and the raising of its flag in Moyale Woreda on the Somali Regional Government side which makes it a dispute over regional administrative authority, not over grazing. From many accounts, the conflict is "not merely an inter-ethnic conflict", since it is alleged that government forces were involved on the Oromia side. "Borana vs. Garre" label is therefore a clever ploy to hide the role of regional and federal security forces.
The same pattern appears earlier. The EPRDF split Moyale between the Somali and Oromia regions, so the dispute is built into the federal structure. Naming only two clans therefore removes the questions of who holds jurisdiction, who commands the forces, and who is accountable. This, I think is the intent of the interview: it makes the conflict look like something that can be managed locally, without addressing the federal boundary.
Describing the Garre as outsiders ties Ethiopian Somalis to Somalia. This is intended to make Ethiopian Somalis look like foreigners and misrepresents their citizenship. Attempting to link the dispute to the costs of "rebuilding Somalia" gives the diaspora a reason to hold back. The intention is to push the Somalis abroad, who are lobbying support for Ethiopia's Somali Region, to stay quiet or press their kin to concede. This threat is aimed at Somalis in diaspora and it comes alongside a refusal to engage on the boundary or on who started the violence.
Absolute crap of an interview!
Jamal Muhumed Osman unwittingly, or purposely, gives an Oromo nationalism apologetic Jawar Mohammed the platform to sanitise the slaughter in Moyale. The journalist makes no pretense about the intent of of the dubious interview; and neither does Jawar fail to deflect & trivialise the unprovoked invasion of Somali region by his ethnic nationalist community on steroids! Shame on them!
Every Oromo leader, including past Oromia Region presidents such as Abdula Gemeda, Lemma Megersa and others have in the past 30 years explicitly termed their expansionist Moyale takeover plan as vital, citing the international border, and it's perceived strategic significance to the Oromia Region and its community. This conflict is not about Borana clan, nor is it about a fancy pastoralists' dispute. Several Somali Region Presidents have in the past been removed from office by Addis Ababa for not helping the realisation of this nefarious political plan. Facts/evidence on these have shared on this account severally, and can be examined in my recent posts below.
Jawar dishonestly implies the Somali Garre clan in Moyale are from Somalia, and not Ethiopian. In a recent interview, he warned that Ethiopia's Somali Region stands to lose more if it doesn't acquiesce to their demands. Now, he warns efforts to rebuild Somalia could be affected if the conflict continues. Clearly, he implies Moyale's Somali Garre community are from Somalia, and hence consequences for Somalia..
Jawar doesn't address the pertinent issue: Oromo territorial expansionism which is at the heart of the war. He doesn't want to discuss the fact that the aggressor in the current war, like in all the previous ones, is Oromo security forces, assisted by Abiy Ahmed's federal forces. Nor does he want to recognise the regional boundary, and administrative jurisdiction, of the Somali Region, and it's future impact on Ethiopian ethnic federalism.. He is unreservedly apologetic to boot!
@Jawar_Mohammed @AbiyAhmedAli #SomaliRegion #Ethiopia #Moyale
Ethiopia: Humanitarian Crises Deepens in Moyale and Hudet
1. On 18 October 2026, heavily armed groups –including the Ooromo Geda Commando, Special Forces (Liyu Police), OLF, and QEERROO) - from the Oromo region, launched attacks in Moyale and Hudet districts of Dawa zone in the Somali region.
2. According to local communities, 40 villages / locations (kebeles) across the two districts (30 Moyale and 10 Hudet), have been affected by the conflict. The violence has displaced thousands of people from their homes, further exacerbating the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in the affected areas.
3. Reports also indicate that injured and sick individuals have been denied to travel to the country's capital, Addis Ababa, to seek essential medical and hospital services. Such restrictions raise serious concerns about the affected population’s access to urgent and life-saving healthcare in the country (Ethiopia).
4. Access to reliable and up-to-date data remains restricted due to government-imposed limitations, making it difficult to independently very the full extent of the displacement and humanitarian impact, civilian casualties, and the overall humanitarian impact of the conflict.
5. Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia and across the Horn of Africa region are worry about humanitarian situation in Dawa zone (Moyale and Hudet districts), particularly regarding population displacement, access to healthcare, and the timely delivery humanitarian assistance.
6. Despite the conflict having continued for than two weeks, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia ( @ozonnia ) have yet to make a public statement on the situation in Moyale and Hudet. This apparent silence has raised concerns among humanitarian partners, particularly amid reports of restriction on humanitarian information and access imposed by the government.
7. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region. This history has raised serious concerns about the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Ethiopia, the challenges they face, and their ability to independently monitor, document, and report on humanitarian crises without fear of reprisals or restrictions.
Therefore, access for humanitarian partners (including the @UN and NGOs) to the conflict affected areas, and also monitoring and an independent assessment are urgently needed to establish the scale of humanitarian needs, and inform an appropriate, timely, and coordinated humanitarian response in the zone. Everyone cares when it's too late. @UNReliefChief @FCDOGovUK @OCHA_Ethiopia @UNEthiopia @AmnestyEARO @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @UKinEthiopia @DRovera @ida_sawyer @faisalroble19 @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @dervishconan @Iyyesa @SpotonSomalia @EIshmael_ @Salim8Said @Hassa23851483 @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiwahabSheik7 @AbdiAbdinur @Abdirik @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @awale_saad @AminaMaandeeq @MohamoudGaildon @AbdikerM @Abukar_Arman @DSultantv26 @ElmiYabeh @ay_has @foziaaosman
Ethiopia: Humanitarian Crises Deepens in Moyale and Hudet
1. On 18 October 2026, heavily armed groups –including the Ooromo Geda Commando, Special Forces (Liyu Police), OLF, and QEERROO) - from the Oromo region, launched attacks in Moyale and Hudet districts of Dawa zone in the Somali region.
2. According to local communities, 40 villages / locations (kebeles) across the two districts (30 Moyale and 10 Hudet), have been affected by the conflict. The violence has displaced thousands of people from their homes, further exacerbating the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in the affected areas.
3. Reports also indicate that injured and sick individuals have been denied to travel to the country's capital, Addis Ababa, to seek essential medical and hospital services. Such restrictions raise serious concerns about the affected population’s access to urgent and life-saving healthcare in the country (Ethiopia).
4. Access to reliable and up-to-date data remains restricted due to government-imposed limitations, making it difficult to independently very the full extent of the displacement and humanitarian impact, civilian casualties, and the overall humanitarian impact of the conflict.
5. Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia and across the Horn of Africa region are worry about humanitarian situation in Dawa zone (Moyale and Hudet districts), particularly regarding population displacement, access to healthcare, and the timely delivery humanitarian assistance.
6. Despite the conflict having continued for than two weeks, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia ( @ozonnia ) have yet to make a public statement on the situation in Moyale and Hudet. This apparent silence has raised concerns among humanitarian partners, particularly amid reports of restriction on humanitarian information and access imposed by the government.
7. In 2021, the Ethiopian government expelled seven UN officials after they raised concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region. This history has raised serious concerns about the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Ethiopia, the challenges they face, and their ability to independently monitor, document, and report on humanitarian crises without fear of reprisals or restrictions.
Therefore, access for humanitarian partners (including the @UN and NGOs) to the conflict affected areas, and also monitoring and an independent assessment are urgently needed to establish the scale of humanitarian needs, and inform an appropriate, timely, and coordinated humanitarian response in the zone. Everyone cares when it's too late. @UNReliefChief @FCDOGovUK @OCHA_Ethiopia @UNEthiopia @AmnestyEARO @_AfricanUnion @IGADsecretariat @UKinEthiopia @DRovera @ida_sawyer @faisalroble19 @BillowKerrow @DirreOnline @dervishconan @Iyyesa @SpotonSomalia @EIshmael_ @Salim8Said @Hassa23851483 @AhmedAbdiIsse1 @AbdimalekFarah @AbdiwahabSheik7 @AbdiAbdinur @Abdirik @amggebre @NeaminZeleke @awale_saad @AminaMaandeeq @MohamoudGaildon @AbdikerM @Abukar_Arman @DSultantv26 @ElmiYabeh @ay_has @foziaaosman
Badawi retweeted
BELEDWEYNE
HIIRAAN
HIRSHABEELE
youtu.be/T8ovhXOQqwg?is=YAGL… #Beledweyne



























