In today's strategic and technological environment, maritime blockade is an extremely difficult operation. In the Hormuz crisis, neither the United States nor Iran has completely blockaded the strait.
BREAKING: Despite the U.S. naval blockade, Iran has imported at least $2 billion in missile and drone hardware through a shadow network of more than 5,000 Ministry of Defense agencies.
per a Reuters investigation.
Then the details sharpen it: one agency alone, MOD 346428, brought in $2.3 billion between January 2025 and June 2026 — rocket fuel ingredients, explosives, aircraft engine parts, and 435 Iveco trucks that can serve as mobile missile launchers. Shipments kept moving by land, sea, and air during the war itself. And in 97% of the reviewed transactions, no currency crossed a border at all.
So on paper, there's a blockade. In practice, the missile supply never stopped.
Thanks for DAV’s invitation. Some points shared.
Director Hu Bo's comment on Oct.8 in Hanio: DOC/COC is a mechanism of“10+1”instead of ASEAN plus China. Moreover, China is one of six claimants, not too special. As to the SCS issues, China should be treated equally based on the truth and facts, rather be given excessive attention and demands just because China is a great power.
Not at all.
Chinese mil news makes a big deal of some exercises at Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao) in the South China Sea. As Prof. Zhang Chi from Chinese NDU explains in the segment, these exercises combined both air and sea elements, as well as mingling CCG and PLAN too. The timing with the latest summit is interesting, of course. Did the two presidents discuss the South China Sea?
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
It is a misinterpretation that "China’s legitimate control around [Scarborough Shoal] and [Second Thomas Shoal] has now extended beyond 24 nautical miles, while regular control has been established around [Sabina Shoal] and [Sandy Cay]". China has intensified its operations beyond the 12-nautical-mile zone around these features, mainly in response to the provocative actions of the Philippines, and it does not mean controlling the airspace and sea areas beyond 12 nautical miles.
news.usni.org/2026/09/28/chi… via @withemes
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
The formal opening by Japan and the Philippines of negotiations to delimit exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east of Taiwan has implications beyond the allocation of resources between neighbouring States.
scspi.org/en/dtfx/why-china-…
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
USS George Washington and its CSG member, USS Robert Smalls and USS Shoup, are leaving the #SouthChinaSea via the Singapore Strait, possibly to replace the desperate USS Lincoln CSG, Aug.13.
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
Dr. Hu Bo argues that Manila exaggerates the intensity of China-U.S. rivalry, while Tokyo sees U.S. retrenchment as an opportunity to expand its strategic role.
yuzhehe.com/p/hu-bo-the-phil…
The U.S. military has carried out various types of operations in the SCS targeting China, with the FONOP being just one relatively minor category.
FY25 FON Annual Report just came out. It mentioned 4 types of FONOPs against China but does not mention any FONOP targeting the legal status of features claimed by China in the SCS. This means that several operations intruding into 12 nms of the Spratly features and Scarborough shoal were not FONOPs. policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Do…
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
China does not have such an agenda and plan of excluding other navies from the SCS.
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
After facing setbacks in its provocative actions at #SecondThomasshoal, the Philippines is likely to attempt something new regarding #Scarborough Shoal. Let’s wait and see what will happen.
Discussing distance every day is something only amateurs would do. Setting aside the differences between China and the Philippines on sovereignty and maritime rights, it is clear that the Philippine side has seriously hindered the freedom of navigation of the CCG.@jaytaryela
If there is any party here that provokes and escalates tension, it is only the unruly and barbaric China Coast Guard personnel who clearly do not understand UNCLOS.
Why else would they be this close to BRP Sierra Madre — a Philippine ship, sitting well within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone, and over 600 nautical miles from Hainan?
The provocateur is not the one staying home in his own waters. It is the one who sailed hundreds of miles to swing a baton at him!
We have always been the victim and you remained to be the bully!
However, these forces are primarily a peacetime presence and would be extremely vulnerable in a high-end conflict. Their existence serves more political, strategic, and diplomatic than military purposes .
scspi.org/en/yjbg/us-militar…
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
Dr. Hu Bo @HuBo0001 and Dr. Rommel @RommelBanlaoi on #Balikatan 2026 @Yanyan2026Y
#southchinasea... youtu.be/FySP_JhuZJM?si=2Ecg… via @YouTube
The data from last month shows a significant decrease compared to the 104 sorties in April. A probable cause or background for this is President Trump's visit to Beijing.
#Statistics: In May 2026, 63 sorties of US military land-based reconnaissance aircraft were spotted over the #SouthChinaSea according to ADS-B data, decreasing compared with the number in the last month. Cases: USN P-8As operated on May. 18 and 26.
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
In 2025, non-US extra-regional countries continued to expand their military presence in the Western Pacific, undertaking activities such as reconnaissance patrols, Taiwan Strait transits, forward deployments, drills and exercises, as well as port calls. The UK and France deployed carrier strike groups (CSGs) to the region, and conducted joint drills with allies like the US and Japan.
scspi.org/en/yjbg/report-mil…
胡波（Hu Bo) retweeted
Hu Bo: "Geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia were different from those in Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca was unlikely to face disruptions like those in the Strait of Hormuz, though the ongoing crisis in the Hormuz Strait is expected to heighten global awareness about maritime chokepoint security."
sc.mp/h7tqj?utm_source=twitt… via @scmpnews