Lee Slusher retweeted
Replying to @romanhelmetguy
I suspect the Athenians never offshored their sword-making facilities to potential adversaries to bolster quarterly sword company profits for a few quarters, so the CEOs could put Italian tile in the 7th vacation home... 😉
Lee Slusher retweeted
Those who doubt that Israel was 'caught by surprise' on Oct. 7 cannot receive answers to their Qs because a formally established, independent commission of inquiry has been consistently blocked by Netanyahu.
Here is the intel landscape surrounding Oct. 7
teapawt.org/LeeSlusherLLC/status/2…
Lee Slusher retweeted
Tom Barrack was in Damascus yesterday, standing next to Julani while the SDF was being pushed back.
This was a Turkish-American move, approved by Saudi Arabia and Israel.
They don’t want multiple phones in Syria.
They want one puppet.
I explained it here: teapawt.org/i/status/2012927078631…
I don't know why so many pundits and analysts fail to connect the dots and see the big picture here:
The expulsion of the SDF is not an internal Syrian affair, but part of a much larger, and may I say - historic - change in West Asia.
What we're seeing is the emergence of a new Sunni anti-colonial, anti-Western, anti-Zionist force in West Asia, headed by SA and Turkey, with Egypt joining in.
This is deeply connected with Saudi moves in Africa and the Horn of Africa against the Israel-UAE alliance to take over the Red Sea and natural resources.
This is neither led nor approved by the US, but an authentic regional process, brought about by two political systems that are more empowered and confident than they have been in many decades.
This is a powerful counter to Zionist aspirations in West Asia.
The result of the genocide in Gaza has not been a strengthening of Israel, but the opposite: now the Axis of Resistance has another and very powerful layer that's equally committed to stifling and neutralizing Zionist aspirations.
I am telling you - this is history in the making, and the Islamic civilization beginning to truly raise its head and seek its deserving place in the world.
I lamented the fall of Assad because I dreaded a scenario in which Syria became so weak that Israel began to expand into it (which would never have worked anyway). But if Syria is used by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to reassert the people of the region against Western imperialism, I am very much relieved.
With Arab and Muslim countries gradually letting go of Israel and organizing together to stop it, the prospects for Zionism are only getting dimmer.
It is no longer only the responsibility of Iran, Hezbollah, and Yemen to resist Zionism: it is returning to be the collective Arab and Islamic stance. And that's an amazing development
Lee Slusher retweeted
🎯 "The SOF-ification of the US military has been out of control for many years."
My good friend Lee Slusher hits the nail on the head.
* ESSENTIAL READING *
I'm a broken record, but this manual is instructive. One might expect a crippling capability gap in missile defense to temper operational ambitions, like threatening Iran—a country with advanced missile capabilities and ample supply. Not so, it seems.
Yes, many current US leaders acknowledge the severe deficiencies in conventional forces and industrial production, but there are no quick or easy fixes here. Again, though, there’s been no throttling of military adventurism (itself always an ill-advised policy anyway).
However, there is one very well-funded and deceptively-flashy apparatus within the US arsenal. But beware: Hard power > SOF power. I've seen the cult of SOF grow over the past quarter century. Quick victories, like that over the Taliban in late 2001, intoxicated leaders in Washington and elsewhere in the defense establishment. Even after years of counterinsurgency quagmires had dulled the shine of that initial win, the glare of SOF “magic” still burned bright—not only at home but often in their views of events elsewhere.
Russia’s swift seizure of Crimea in early 2014, from their perspective, was the work of “polite people” or “little green men” employed in concert with a slick information operations campaign. Less attention, if any, was paid to the tens of thousands of Russian troops amassed on Ukraine’s border, the presence of its Black Sea Fleet, complete with naval infantry, in Sevastopol, or the general decrepitude of the Ukrainian military at the time (to say nothing of other critical factors: historical, political, cultural, linguistic, etc.).
SOF are a highly-refined tool for very specific purposes. Excellent at those things—under favorable circumstances—but otherwise limited. In a major war, they are only ever a supporting effort, never the main effort.
The SOF-ification of the US military has been out of control for many years. More concerning still is that civilian leaders bought into the hype long ago. If they intend to rely on the “rockstars” of the US military to bridge the gap in Iran, it will not end well, and Operation Desert Claw II would have far worse and more wide-ranging consequences than the first.
Lee Slusher retweeted
Your daily reminder that Russiagate was the dumbest conspiracy theory of all time:
US forces board sanctioned Russia-flagged oil tanker that eluded Venezuela blockade trib.al/ibC3o9d
Lee Slusher retweeted
“I’m Not Able To Buy Food... Delivery To My Home Is Prohibited... I Have People Bringing Me Food”: EU Sanctions Trap Former Colonel Jacques Baud
Former Swiss Colonel Jacques Baud delivers a stark account of the immediate, personal consequences of EU sanctions, revealing their profound humanitarian and legal impact.
Baud describes being cut off from basic necessities: “I’m not able to buy food for instance… nobody is allowed to provide me with any kind of resources.” A concrete example underscores this: a friend’s attempt to order him food from Switzerland was blocked, proving “any delivery to my home is even prohibited.” He now relies on direct handouts to eat.
The sanctions create an inescapable trap. Baud explains, “I’m not allowed to travel in the EU, meaning that I’m not even allowed to go back to my country… if I were in my country, I could not come back to the place where I live.”
He criticizes the authorities for a process that bypasses due process. While Switzerland “failed to understand the consequence,” the EU’s bureaucratic machinery leaves him powerless: to get a “humanitarian” exemption merely “to buy food,” he must petition an administration that is currently “idle,” leaving him with “no resource whatsoever.”
Baud’s ordeal exposes a fundamental flaw in the EU’s system: the ability to wield political sanctions as a blunt instrument against individuals within its own borders, erasing legal protections and imposing a form of extrajudicial house arrest without trial, charge, or democratic accountability.
Lee Slusher retweeted
🛰️ China's Eyes 🛰️
Shivan Mahendrarajah @S_Mahendrarajah provides a valuable detailed analysis of Chinese satellite ISR capabilities in the article linked below.
Remember: Chinese ISR was provided to Iran during the "12-Day War".
mahendrarajah.com/2025/09/15…
Lee Slusher retweeted
there's an old joke: a man meets an old woman, is making conversation, and asks her where she's lived in her long life. she says, "well, I was born in Austria-Hungary, then lived in Poland during my childhood, then spent a stint in the Soviet Union and Germany, then spent the bulk of my adult life back in the Soviet Union, and finally retired in Ukraine."
"wow, you've done a lot of traveling!"
"nope, never left Lviv."
Lee Slusher retweeted
We are witnessing a civilizational collapse with the EU sanctioning Jacques Baud, a retired Swiss colonel and intelligence officer, for publishing books and articles expressing views on the Ukraine war contrary to those of the NATO leadership.
Lee Slusher retweeted
ICYMI - U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command activated, establishing the Army’s first four-star operational theater command based in the continental United States. The new command’s mission includes homeland defense and support to civil authorities.
disclose.tv/id/35wf4iaa0m/
Lee Slusher retweeted
The great slowdown: Germany at a standstill as ‘China shock’ hits
As Europe’s biggest economy is pummelled by structural problems and external threats, rocky China ties are compounding the dreary picture
My report from a rather depressing week in Berlin
scmp.com/news/china/diplomac…
Lee Slusher retweeted
⚠️ Britain is “no longer capable” of running a nuclear submarine programme after “catastrophic” failures pushed it to the brink, a former Navy chief has said.
Read more here: telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/12…
Lee Slusher retweeted
US finance scribblers now want to micrimanage fiscal policy in all European countries. Italy is not supposed to invest in domestic transport infrastructure, we are told. Instead it should rearm some more, pay the US for weapons and blow up people and weapons in Ukraine.
Italy’s bridge to Sicily is a gift to Putin because it does nothing to really make Europe safer from Russian aggression, while diverting scarce fiscal space - which Italy has little of - away from what would truly protect Europe. This is Superbonus 2.0… on.ft.com/3UM6YKH
Lee Slusher retweeted
📜 America's Military Is in Big Trouble
@Michalis_Vlahos speaks eloquently to a thesis that — despite the ever-mounting evidence confirming it — is dismissed by the true-believing disciples of American dominance in perpetuum.
* HIGHLY RECOMMENDED *
theamericanconservative.com/…
Lee Slusher retweeted
Richard does an excellent job of explaining the central banking - warfare model - The Shocking Link Between Central Banks and Mass Death - Finally Explained, Highlights tuckercarlson.com/richard-we…
Lee Slusher retweeted
»In a war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia wins easily. In a proxy war between Russia and the West in Ukraine, Russia wins eventually—but with far more death and destruction, mostly for Ukraine.«
@LeeSlusherLLC - Rubble and Rhetoric. (Feb 08, 2023)
deepdivewithleeslusher.subst…
Ukraine: The War of Attrition Has Been Lost and Has Given Way to a New Phase
After three years and numerous weapons systems, Western optimism is giving way to the harsh reality of the battlefield.
The war in Ukraine has always been extremely challenging for the West, but it became nearly impossible when the West believed it could win a war of attrition against the Russians on their own border.
About a year and a half ago, I wrote about this:
teapawt.org/pati_marins64/status/1…
Today, this phase of the war is ending with a crushing Russian victory. Despite losses on their side, they still hold around 40-50% of the Soviet legacy within their borders, more what is deployed and being repaired.
Regarding Ukrainian equipment losses, based on my research, losses are estimated to be around 80-90% for tanks and vehicles, and 60-80% for artillery, reflecting high attrition especially in Kursk and Donetsk (2024-2025).
Considering these are visually confirmed losses and, based on my experience, an additional 25-30% of losses may go unreported, I am convinced that almost everything delivered to Ukraine has already been lost.
Tanks:
731 delivered (135 Leopard 1, 81 Leopard 2, 14 Challenger 2, 31 M1 Abrams, 410 T-72, 60 PT-91; Kiel Institute). Losses: approximately 585-690 (80-90%), with 400-500 destroyed, 70-100 damaged, 70-100 abandoned, and 70-100 captured. High losses include roughly 25-28 Abrams, 65-75 Leopard 2, and 340-390 T-72/PT-91, mainly due to Russian drones and mines (Forbes Ukraine, CSIS).
Armored Vehicles:
1,557 delivered (297 M2 Bradley, 440 M113, 250 BMP-1/2, 570 others; Kiel Institute). Losses: about 1,165-1,400 (75-90%), with 700-900 destroyed, 150-200 damaged, 150-200 abandoned, and 150-200 captured. Heavy losses include around 200-250 Bradleys and 500-600 M113s/BMPs, especially in Kursk (BBC, Forbes Ukraine).
Artillery:
1,039 delivered (200 M777, 30 CAESAR, 28 PZH 2000, 39 HIMARS, 12 M270, 730 others; Kiel Institute). Losses: roughly 625-850 (60-80%), with 500-600 destroyed, 100-150 damaged, 100-150 abandoned, and 100-150 captured. The M777 (140-180 units) and CAESAR/PZH 2000 (20-25 each) have been heavily impacted by drones (Forbes Ukraine, CSIS).
Summary Table (2025):
Tanks: 731 delivered, 585-690 lost (80-90%)
Armored Vehicles: 1,557 delivered, 1,165-1,400 lost (75-90%)
Artillery: 1,039 delivered, 625-850 lost (60-80%)
Sources: Kiel Institute, Oryx, CSIS (3,966 tanks/vehicles lost), BBC, Forbes Ukraine.
These figures from various sources clearly indicate the end of the attrition phase.
What followed is a new phase, ongoing to this day. It appears to be a drone maneuver warfare, where the Russians have more options connected to their arsenal, while the Ukrainians are more limited.
This drone maneuver warfare involves fixed-wing ISR systems linked to counter-battery drones like MACE, produced by UAC, along with numerous modified FPV drones. All of this is supported by a vast network of repeaters extending the drones' reach to dozens of kilometers.
The defeat in the attrition war has pushed Ukraine into a defensive drone warfare phase, which employs various drone types and a limited arsenal, but has been effective in slowing down the Russians. I am not sure if we should fully call it drone maneuver warfare, but that seems to be what it is.
Russia's challenge in Ukraine today is no longer how to face the depleted European arsenal, but how to bypass Ukrainian resistance by increasing their advance speed while minimizing losses.
At this stage of the war, I do not believe there are any weapons capable of changing the battlefield reality. At most, new weapons might cause some damage to facilities inside Russia, but, in my view, without significant changes on the front.
Lee Slusher retweeted
If you have not previously read this Lee Slusher classic, you should. If you have already read it, you should do so again, and then share it with your friends.
The State of Western Warcraft
This piece belongs to the thematic series, “Flipping the Board.”
In early 2023, the head of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Christopher Cavoli, remarked, "precision can beat mass." (1) This is true; precision can beat mass. But some countries now have the capability to render Western precision much less precise, both by “hard kill” (kinetic) and by “soft kill” (electronic). More to the point, these countries now possess both precision and mass, whereas the West is left to rely on a degraded version of the former and has long since abandoned the latter.
Power Projection versus National Defense
The “unipolar moment” of the post-Cold War period has led to thoroughly misguided notions about the nature of military power. Here it is important to understand the difference between power projection and national defense. Most militaries exist to provide the latter, i.e., the means by which to protect their nations from threats in their respective regions. Very few ever hold the ability to project power far from home.
But the US military primacy of recent decades, specifically the ability to wage and sustain war in far-flung locations, has become to many the hallmark of military power writ large. In this view, any nation unable to project power globally—essentially everyone except the US—is therefore inferior on the whole. This view is incorrect. What matters ultimately in war is the force that can be brought to bear, both the attacker’s and the defender’s, at the specific time and place it is needed.
Consider the conclusion many drew about Russia in the wake of the Assad regime’s collapse. “Russia is a paper tiger with nukes!” According to such thinking, Russia’s inability to continue propping up Assad, or its decision not to do so, somehow translated into weakness elsewhere, most notably in Ukraine. This, too, is incorrect.
When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, it was entirely uncontroversial to conclude that this operation was likely the limit of Russia’s power projection capabilities. Yes, the country has formidable strategic air, naval, and rocket forces, but these serve mainly as a deterrent. The primary focus of all other Russian forces is to defend Russia, especially on its Western and Southern borders opposite NATO. Here Russia remains incredibly strong. Similar logic applies to China. For instance, those who mock the country’s lack of a true “blue water” naval capability overlook the potency of that force in the waters that line China’s shores.
Operation Desert Storm was the watershed moment for the brief period of US military primacy. It occurred shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is an ongoing debate in military circles over the significance of Desert Storm. Both critics and supporters continue to misunderstand several key takeaways.
Critics point out that the US-led coalition had many months to amass a force in Saudi Arabia, did so uncontested (save the Scud missile attacks), and then smashed an inferior enemy. These things are all true. What critics fail to realize is that the ability to do all of this—diplomatically, economically, logistically, militarily, etc.—was itself an expression of extraordinary power. Moreover, they downplay the fact that this coalition really did possess operational technologies that others, including Russia and China, did not have at the time, as well as the innovations these asymmetries would prompt in weapons development in the years to follow. This was especially the case in Moscow and Beijing.
The primary failure of the war’s admirers, including many current rank and file in the US defense establishment, is to think such an operation is replicable today. They brush aside the fact that most members of the coalition still maintained their enormous Cold War-era forces, but have long since abandoned them. They exaggerate the current reach Western diplomatic influence and industrial capacity. Lastly, they cling unflinchingly to the notion of superior Western military technology. Such people are frozen in the amber of 1991.
The Fluid Nature of Capability Gaps
For decades, the US effectively had monopolies on many decisive capabilities, particularly in terms of deploying them at scale and with broad geographic reach. These included precision-guided munitions, night-vision, global strike, and others. The absence of high-intensity conflict between the US and other nations underscored this reality.
But the list of nations with advanced capabilities continues to grow, and capability gaps continue to narrow. In some cases, these gaps have closed, particularly in missile technology (including hypersonics), air defense, electronic warfare, and, more recently, unmanned systems. More importantly, and to the persistent disbelief of naysayers, some countries now have an edge over the US and its allies in some areas.
Push back hard enough on the arguments of NATO evangelists and one will find, eventually, the sole pillar on which their belief system rests. Such an exchange might begin with their boasting about Tomahawk cruise missiles. By the time these projectiles lazily make their way to their intended targets, and assuming most are not shot down or defeated electronically, Russian missiles—superior in speed, range, and payload—will have already been launched. Some will have already struck, and the others will trail behind them.
Consider the Oreshnik, for which there are no publicly known countermeasures. The prevailing theory is that the Oreshnik is a redesigned intermediate-range ballistic missile that carries six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, each of which carries six projectiles. It is capable of striking targets across Europe, and elsewhere, within minutes. Although the Oreshnik is nuclear capable, such warheads would be unnecessary—short of Armageddon—given the missile’s range, speed, and destructive power. This is a key point. Russia is trying to achieve strategic overmatch while removing the need for nuclear weapons. Perhaps it already has. This would be checkmate, at least in terms of a conventional war.
Of what use is the Oreshnik? There are the obvious answers, like striking NATO’s missile systems, bases, and factories, but there is a much more significant target set. Central to NATO’s plan for a defense of Europe is the expectation that American and Canadian troops and materiel would reinforce the continent, and the US was always the long pole in this tent by far. But how would they get there? Airlift would be insufficient; it simply lacks the necessary throughput. Such a conflict would require mass, and mass moves by sea. One could assume Russia keeps European ports under persistence surveillance, including on the ground. With the Oreshnik and other missiles, Russia could destroy the ports within a half hour, supplying follow-on strikes as necessary. The continent would be left with whatever it had on hand. The weakest link would become the primary one, and everything in Europe would remain vulnerable to continued strikes from Russia’s over-the-horizon systems.
Here NATO’s defenders play their perceived trump card, airpower. However, many of these aircraft are outdated while many of Russia’s have grown more advanced. Furthermore, along its periphery with NATO, Russia has the most advanced air defense network and electronic warfare complex in existence. The latter has already proven effective against many of the very technologies on which NATO’s entire way of war depends, particularly GPS-guided bombs.
All of their hopes appear to be pinned on the F-35. It all comes down to this plane, an aircraft dubbed Lightning even though it has demonstrated difficulty flying in that very weather. Could the F-35 defeat all these many threats? No one knows and that is the most honest answer anyone could provide. Neither the US nor anyone else has flown against such formidable threats—ever. Doing so would be an extraordinary gamble and ought to be understood explicitly as such. Here many suffer from a potentially terminal case of “F-35 brain” for which catastrophic defeat might be the only remedy.
Anyone who thinks China lacks similar capabilities, perhaps with the exception of an Oreshnik analogue, is a fool. Consider the possibility of a US-led defense, or even a resupply, of Taiwan in the event of a war with China, a wildly popular fantasy within the US foreign policy establishment. China has built a robust sensor-to-shooter capability that links spaced-based and terrestrial surveillance with many thousands of missiles capable of striking targets well into the adjacent skies and seas. Even if the US had sufficient armaments to support such a war (it does not), the country lacks the sealift and the ability to penetrate Chinese defenses. The entire notion of such an operation is militarily and logistically illiterate. It belongs mostly to the polished history obsessives with no real-world operational experience who populate the thinktank ecosystem.
Contrary to Western talking points, Iran possesses at least some of these capabilities. Yes, much of Iran’s war machine is rickety, but these lackluster elements coexist alongside advanced capabilities. Western governments and media celebrated the “defense” of Israel in April and October of 2024. They derided Iran’s missiles as “crude” despite the fact that the projectiles penetrated Israel’s air defense en masse and struck sensitive targets. That Iran did not execute a wide-ranging, catastrophic assault was wrongly interpreted as a lack of ability instead of as a sign of restraint. Iran responded to Israel’s provocations by messaging that it did not want a wider war and, critically, by previewing some of its high-end offensive capabilities. Regarding Israel, one should also consider the Houthi’s ability to send missiles to Tel Aviv even in the presence of the US’s premier air defense systems, known as THAAD.
Forces and Sustainment
It is common in the West, particularly among NATO member nations, to point to charts that display collective strengths in men and materiel. These graphics depict total personnel, including reservists, and tallies of a range of vehicles, artillery pieces, aircraft, and other tools of war. Such things display nicely on a PowerPoint slide. The assumption here is that synergy would occur in a conflict, that together these disparate factors would form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. While the thirty-thousand-foot view can be instructive in some instances, this is not one of them.
Individually, most Western militaries possess combat power similar to or only marginally greater than that of gendarmeries (militarized police forces capable of dealing with extensive, internal civil disturbances). As such, their suitability for foreign deployment is limited to peacekeeping operations and the provision of humanitarian aid—and, even then, only under conditions in which the warring parties are sufficiently weak or disinclined to engage them in combat. The ability of such militaries to defend their own countries from foreign threats faces similar limitations. Even the once-mighty British Army could field, at most, three brigades.
To be clear, a handful of Western militaries are larger and more capable than their anemic brothers, though none possesses its former mass. What then of their collective ability, the large and the small? Such a thing is difficult to establish, much less to maintain, without frequent, large-scale exercises in which participants stress-test every step of the “road to war” and do so as a collective. This would include: the mobilization, training, and equipping of reservists; the deployment of forces from garrisons to staging areas to front lines; fire and maneuver across wide geographic areas; and many other things. This last happened during Exercise Campaign Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) in 1993. NATO has since opted for small, infrequent exercises, often involving only command elements or limited operational forces. Even then, the exercises revealed further deficiencies. Yes, these countries have since gained many years of experience in peacekeeping in the Balkans and in low-intensity combat in Afghanistan, but such experiences occurred under ideal conditions, most notably air superiority and uncontested supply lines.
A far more pressing problem is the current state of defense industrial production throughout the West. Though some of us have made this point for years, reality has finally begun to make its way into the mainstream discourse beyond the confines of the defense and foreign policy commentariat. In December 2024, The Atlantic published an article titled, “The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military.” (2) The piece noted, correctly, that the US is incapable of supplying Ukraine with sufficient weapons and ammunition to sustain high-intensity combat against Russia. This would be true even if Ukraine had the necessary manpower (it does not). It went on to question, again correctly, whether the US could manufacture enough materiel to fight a high-intensity war of its own. The US could not do this at present or at any point in the immediate years to come, and its allies are in an even more perilous position.
Like with the charts that show aggregate strengths in Western manpower, vehicles, etc., many derive the wrong conclusions from total Western economic might. Think of this as “collective delusion over collective GDP.” The years of fighting in Ukraine have revealed shortfalls in both production and stockpiles throughout the West. Yet, many persist in the belief that the sum of Western economic power means victory against Russia—whether in the proxy war in Ukraine or a potential direct war with NATO—is assured. “Russia is an economic dwarf!,” they shout.
GDP is but one measure of economic mass, and often a misleading one. For instance, except in extreme comparisons between the richest and poorest nations, GDP says little about the economic wellbeing and day-to-day quality of life of a regular person. It says even less about a country’s capacity to make war. Again, what matters in combat is the force that can be brought to bear and at the specific time and place it is needed. A similar logic applies to the production and distribution of armaments. In Western nations, GDP consists largely of things like professional services, real estate, and non-military government spending. In other words, collective GDP cannot be loaded into a howitzer and fired at the enemy.
The relationship between GDP and military power exists only to the extent a nation can turn wealth into weapons. The height of America’s ability to do this was during World War II, a conflict from which incorrectly-derived lessons continue to plague us. The US turned Detroit into a massive armaments factory, and did much the same throughout the rest of the country. Not only did the US have the factories at the time to do this, it also had the know-how. With the loss of domestic manufacturing came the disappearance of many of its necessary skill-sets. Then there are the supply-chain realities, which are just as stark. Those who claim the US could fight a war against China need to explain how the country could produce sufficient weapons and ammunition while also relying on its enemy for so many of the necessary material inputs. Then, of course, there is the question of how to pay for all of this.
Reckoning with Reality
A common criticism of arguments such as mine is the supposed implication that the West’s adversaries are somehow omnipotent or invincible. This is a misunderstanding at best and a strawman at worst. Again, one must consider the intended purpose of a military and its associated design. The US’s post-World War II military was sufficient to contest Soviet influence. Its post-Cold War predecessor enabled the growth of the “rules-based international order,” particularly as former foes struggled through the stages of domestic strife and economic reorientation. But the game has changed.
In more recent years, the US’s most powerful competitors built formidable national defenses capable of contesting Western power projection. These nations correctly identified and adapted to the asymmetries between their own forces and those of the hegemon. They did not dismantle and outsource the industrial machinery necessary to sustain the defense of their respective homelands. Thus, their rise occurred in tandem with imperial decline. But throughout the West, so strong was the perception of perpetual US military primacy that America’s allies willingly accepted their own decades-long slide into military impotence.
The current balance of military power between the US and its adversaries reveals a symbiosis. The US is incapable of projecting power sufficient to subjugate its adversaries, but these adversaries are even less capable of projecting power against the US homeland—at least for now.
(1) businessinsider.com/ukraine-…
(2) theatlantic.com/politics/arc…
Lee Slusher retweeted
In hindsight this was spot on 🤷
Replying to @BankerWeimar @Benshooter
The US certainly can drop ordinance and perform kill/capture missions, but my sense is that even an extended campaign would fail to halt the attacks on shipping.
-This situation is like a counterinsurgency in one very important regard: The adversary doesn't have to win—he only has to keep fighting. He wins by not losing outright.
-A loss here would require the Houthis to decide to stop altogether, which I don't see happening while the Gaza war persists, or the US has to eliminate all of their attack capabilities.
-I used to be a targeter. It's easy enough to go after specific targets with sufficient resources. It's impossible to go after all targets, even with a sizeable occupation. Disarmament happens politically, not militarily (absent turning the place into glass, which isn't going to happen.)
-The Houthis use plentiful, inexpensive, dispersed weapons systems. Ours are much more expensive and fewer in number, at least on station. The US/West have severe inadequacies in terms of defense industrial base. There are many (many) competing demands on our resources at present and no way to replenish in a timely manner.
-Also, I wonder about the US ability to resupply on station quickly, especially with all the naval difficulties the US has had in recent years.
-Any land incursion, even one by special operators, comes with many risks (think Mogadishu). The quick reaction force would come from the Marine Expeditionary Unit that's been in the area for a while, but the US has no ability to easily relieve/reinforce them with another MEU. (See this: teapawt.org/LeeBTConsulting/status….)
-The only other option to reinforce quickly would be with paratroopers and additional SOF. Great troops, of course, but I don't see such a force taking and holding all of the Houthi's terrain.
-So, even if this were to turn into a broader land war, the US is pretty hard up and NATO/EU allies have, for the most part, token forces with limited power projection and sustainment capabilities.
-"The enemy gets a vote." This particular "enemy" is the Axis of Resistance, which operates across the entire Middle East. If we get embroiled in Yemen, the whole region could ignite, and we have no means by which to deal with that.






























