
Bookish Christian wife photographing vintage America & old cars. '40s-donning old movie fan. 100% old-fashioned & likes Detroit hockey. #BeautyMatters.
The scenic route.
Joined May 2009
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My Grant post hit a chord with many. Some took exception to it thinking it denigrated Lee and other CSA commanders.
My whole point is the reputation of Grant as a first-rate military commander has undergone a considerable reassessment in recent decades. Once too often characterized as an unimaginative butcher who prevailed through sheer numerical superiority, Grant is now increasingly recognized as an exceptionally gifted tactician, operational commander, and grand strategist. In my judgment, the reassessment is entirely justified. Indeed, he deserves consideration as perhaps the greatest military commander in American history.
Perhaps his greatest achievement was recognizing that winning a war required something considerably more than winning battles. It required the coordination of armies, resources, transportation, logistics, and political purpose within a coherent strategy. He understood that the Union's advantages would mean little unless they were employed with determination and unity of command.
The old caricature of Grant as a plodding butcher has largely given way to a more informed appreciation of his generalship. It is about time. He was not merely a general who had more men. He was a general who knew what to do with them.
Lee was a great captain. Grant was a great captain who also understood how to conduct an entire war.
And when Grant crossed the Rapidan in May 1864, he established something that had been conspicuously absent from the Union war effort: a commander who would not turn back. That decision, and the strategic resolve behind it, may well have been among the most consequential acts of generalship in American history.
Upon assuming command of all Union armies in March 1864, he understood that the Confederacy had to be confronted as a unified military problem. Its armies could no longer be permitted to operate independently, reinforcing one another or exploiting opportunities created by the inactivity of Union forces elsewhere. Grant established a common strategic objective and coordinated operations across multiple theaters. Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, and other commanders would operate within that larger design.
An interesting contemporary document illustrates the magnitude of his authority. A dispatch dated March 18, 1865, from his headquarters at City Point bears the letterhead, "Head Quarters Armies of the United States." Grant signs it simply, "U. S. Grant, Lt. Gen." His formal rank was lieutenant general, but his responsibility extended to the entire Union military establishment. The distinction is significant. He was not merely commanding an army in Virginia; he was directing the military effort of a nation.
His advantage over Lee, therefore, was not simply the number of soldiers available to him. It was that he commanded a unified military system operating toward a common strategic purpose. Lee, for all his brilliance, was operating within a Confederate command structure beset by competing authorities, geographical separation, diminishing resources, and political difficulties. Indeed, Lee himself was eventually appointed general-in-chief of Confederate armies in February 1865, but by then the opportunity for effective centralized direction had largely passed.
The contrast should not be interpreted as a disparagement of Lee. He was a magnificent battlefield commander, possessing extraordinary tactical instincts and an ability to inspire devotion among his soldiers. His victories in the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville remain impressive military achievements. But there is a distinction between winning battles and conducting a war. Lee's invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania, particularly the latter, involved strategic risks that a resource-poor Confederacy could ill afford. Grant, by contrast, increasingly demonstrated an understanding of the entire war rather than merely the immediate battlefield.
The Overland Campaign of 1864 is perhaps the clearest illustration. After the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and North Anna, Grant did something that previous Union commanders had repeatedly failed to do: he continued south. Rather than retreating after suffering heavy casualties, he moved toward Richmond and Petersburg. His message was unmistakable. The Union would no longer abandon its strategic objective whenever Lee inflicted a costly tactical setback.
This is where the familiar description of Grant as a butcher becomes particularly misleading. Offensive warfare against a determined opponent, especially one occupying favorable defensive positions, inevitably produces substantial casualties. Lee himself suffered grievously at Malvern Hill, Antietam, and Gettysburg. Grant's losses were enormous, but so were the Confederate losses, and the Confederacy possessed neither the manpower nor the industrial capacity to replace them. Grant understood this asymmetry and was prepared to exploit it. He also understood that the destruction of Lee's army was more important than the capture of any particular piece of territory.
None of this means that Grant was infallible. Cold Harbor was a costly mistake, and his unsuccessful frontal assaults at Vicksburg deserve criticism. But great commanders are not measured by an absence of mistakes. They are measured by their ability to recognize the essential requirements of a campaign, adapt to circumstances, and achieve their objectives. Grant repeatedly demonstrated those qualities.
There is also something particularly admirable about his temperament. He was not given to theatrical displays, grandiose pronouncements, or the cultivation of a heroic public image. He was generally composed, practical, and remarkably persistent. He understood the relationship between military operations and political objectives. The purpose of the war was not simply to defeat Lee, but to preserve the United States. The two objectives were inseparable.
In comparing the great American commanders, Washington must always occupy a unique position as the indispensable military and political figure of the Revolution. Sherman was an extraordinary operational commander, and Lee was unquestionably one of the most gifted battlefield generals of the nineteenth century. But Grant's combination of tactical competence, operational imagination, strategic vision, logistical understanding, and ability to direct a vast military establishment places him in a category of his own.
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The pastor ought to have two voices: one, for gathering the sheep; and another, for warding off and driving away wolves and thieves.
~John Calvin
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
There are different ways of approaching a piece of art, but if you can't talk about art without talking about ideology, politics, or social issues, you can't talk about art.
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
“Come to Jesus just as you are. Don't delay to cleanse yourself; come to him to do it all.”
— Charles Spurgeon
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【原宿店】
今日のふくろうブログ🦉✨
~サングラス~
owlvillage.jp/blog-owl/40276…
#ウラルアウル #モリフクロウ #ナンベイヒナフクロウ #可愛い #もふもふ #推しが尊い #owlcafe #harajuku
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
A competing championship once prompted racing’s biggest tracks to work together to protect the Triple Crown. Forty years later, the competition is coming from within.
More: paulickreport.com/news/ray-s…
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
Quite a sight in Mobile Bay this morning….
That's the ex-USS Enterprise (CVN-65) — the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier — arriving under tow after an 11-day trip from Newport News, Virginia. She has no engines running; she's a dead tow, led by the tug Ocean Sky at under 8 miles per hour.
She's here for her final chapter. The Big E is headed to the MARS recycling yard on the Mobile River, where she'll be dismantled and recycled over the next few years — the first commercial dismantling of a nuclear supercarrier. Her eight reactors were defueled years ago; the reactor compartments are the biggest engineering challenge of the job.
She served more than 50 years, from the Cuban Missile Crisis through Vietnam and the first strikes into Afghanistan after 9/11.
And here's the poignant part: she's taking the same spot at the MARS yard that the SS United States just left on Monday — the Big U went out to become a reef, and the Big E has come in to be recycled. Two legends, passing in the night.
Photo from Josh Stanley
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SS United States wreck dive, November 12, 2026.
The top deck will be roughly 55 to 65 feet below the surface, with the bottom on the seafloor around 180 feet down.
Video credit Casey Walentowicz.
#ssunitedstates
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
Sad to news to share....Vincent Price’s only son, poet, journalist, and activist Vincent Barrett Price (V. B. Price), died on November 11, 2026, at the age of 86
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
The end result, whether attacking a ship, it suffering an accident, or even the simple act of scuttling it, is flooding the ship to sink it.
The demolition company did scuttle the SS United States, so they succeeded in that regard. However, she did not make it easy. Judging by how she rolled, the internal compartmentalization functioned as it was designed and kept the flooding contained (which, after decades of degradation and gaps left in her compartmentalization is pretty impressive).
I imagine the company could have done things better by figuring out methods to bypass her compartmentalization and sink her more easily. However, such methods would require money and time. I doubt the demolition company is going to thoroughly research the design and devise appropiate methods to bypass her compartmentalization. This was probably the cheapest method they could use, even if it wasn't pretty.
Replying to @thegeneralboard
Hi.
Not a shipbuilder or engineer or anything... just a guy with a computer here:
It's my understanding that it was designed against sinking due to enemy fire & accidents... but this was a planned scuttle (scuttling?). So didn't the people in charge of that, well, fail?
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
On this day in 1776, John Paul Jones made a capture that did not sink a warship or win a famous duel, but may have done as much practical good as any single act of the early naval war: he seized a British transport loaded with thousands of winter uniforms, and handed them to a freezing Continental Army just in time.
By late 1776, Jones was already one of the most aggressive captains in the tiny Continental Navy, commanding the brig Alfred on a raiding cruise in the cold North Atlantic. He was hunting British shipping, and off the coast he came upon a prize: a British transport ship called the Mellish, sailing with an escort. The Mellish was not a glamorous target, no guns to speak of, no glory in taking her. But Jones had a sharp eye for what actually mattered in a war, and the Mellish turned out to be worth more than a warship.
The problem was her escort. A lone transport might be easy prey, but a British warship guarding her was another matter. So Jones used his seamanship and his nerve to maneuver the Mellish away from her protector, luring the transport out of reach and then pouncing, taking her as a prize before the escort could intervene. It was a clean, clever piece of work.
And then they opened her hold. The Mellish was carrying a cargo of around ten thousand British military uniforms, thick winter clothing meant to outfit the King's soldiers for the coming cold season. Jones understood instantly what he was looking at. The Continental Army, Washington's army, was in rags. As winter closed in, American soldiers were marching and fighting and freezing in worn-out clothes and broken shoes, with no supply system able to properly clothe them. And here, by sheer boldness, Jones had just captured a floating warehouse of warm winter uniforms, enough to clothe thousands of men.
He made sure the prize got home, and those captured British uniforms went to the Continental Army. There is a real satisfaction in the image: American soldiers getting through that hard winter wrapped in the very coats the British had shipped across the ocean to warm their own troops. Jones had, in effect, made the enemy clothe the men fighting against them.
It is easy, when we remember John Paul Jones, to think only of the dramatic moments, the burning deck, the defiant shout that he had not yet begun to fight. But the capture of the Mellish is a reminder of the other, quieter way the naval war mattered. Every ship Jones and the other American raiders took was supplies the British lost and the Americans gained, powder, muskets, food, and in this case the clothes on thousands of soldiers' backs. Wars are won not only by courage but by boots and blankets and coats, and on November 12, 1776, John Paul Jones delivered a shipload of them to an army that desperately needed them.
Remember the capture of the Mellish. No cannon duel, no legend, just a bold captain, a clever maneuver, and ten thousand warm coats taken from the enemy and given to cold, ragged American soldiers at the start of a brutal winter. Sometimes that is exactly what victory looks like.
Jen 🇺🇸 retweeted
“There is nothing more conservative than conservation.”
Russell Kirk
NEWS: The Trump administration is officially planning to sell off public lands.
The Interior Department publicly laid out a strategy to reduce the amount of federal lands by selling property to states, tribes, and local governments.
washingtonsun.com/energy-env…








































