Rolf Scott

Donald Tusk is actually the part of Poland's post-communist history shaped by foreign interferences that Western audiences rarely hear about. Behind him stands a whole consortium. European institutions of course, BUT ALSO: German-owned media corporations, American leftist networks, and the structure inherited from Poland's communist past. These forces did not necessarily act under a single command, but their interests converged around one objective: removing the conservative Law and Justice government. 1. The European Union played an obvious role. For years, Brussels exerted financial and political pressure on Poland, withholding billions of euros in recovery funds and pursuing proceedings against the Polish government over its judicial reforms. The official justification was the defence of the rule of law. The political effect was unmistakable: the EU's confrontation with PiS strengthened Tusk's argument that only a change of government could restore normal relations with Brussels and unlock European money. 2. But the German media networks operating in Poland deserve even greater attention. Through Ringier Axel Springer Polska, the German publishing giant Axel Springer and its Swiss partner Ringier control an extensive media empire that includes Onet, Fakt, Newsweek Polska and Business Insider Polska. Together, these outlets reach millions of Polish readers, from tabloid consumers to business professionals and politically engaged urban voters. Their ownership gives foreign corporations extraordinary influence over the information consumed by Polish society. 3. Then there is TVN24, one of the most influential political television channels in Poland. Owned during the 2023 election by the Democrat-affiliated American corporation Warner Bros. Discovery, TVN24 became a central platform for opposition narratives and criticism of PiS. Its coverage is plagued with systematic political bias: selecting controversies, framing events and presenting political actors in ways that favour Tusk's camp. The result is not simply hostile journalism but an entire information environment in which viewers are repeatedly encouraged to interpret Polish politics through the same ideological assumptions. 4. There is another dimension that Western observers frequently overlook: the survival of networks inherited from communist Poland. The fall of communism in 1989 did not mean the disappearance of the communist establishment. The transition was negotiated, and many former officials, managers and individuals connected to the old system retained influence, professional relationships and access to capital. Much of the old establishment successfully adapted to capitalism. Some became successful businessmen, others entered democratic politics, while still others found positions in the emerging media and financial sectors. The origins of capital and ownership relationships in the post-communist media market, including the development of Agora and Gazeta Wyborcza, are therefore important subjects of historical scrutiny. This is where the conventional Western understanding of Solidarność becomes misleading. The movement was enormous, reaching approximately ten million members at its peak, but it was never a politically homogeneous organisation. It brought together workers, Catholics, nationalists, liberals, intellectuals, socialists and people whose opposition to the communist regime varied considerably in motivation and intensity. Some wanted national independence, others democratic socialism, economic reform or simply better living conditions. The movement's apparent unity concealed profound disagreements about Poland's future. Donald Tusk's political career must be understood against this background. He emerged from the political order created after 1989, developed strong relationships with European institutions and benefited from a media environment in which several powerful outlets were consistently hostile to his conservative opponents.