If Somalis are low IQ and don’t work, but yet live better than Trump’s voters — what does that say about Trump’s view of his voters?
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Badass Norwegian parliament member Peter Frølich broke his country's export laws to smuggle thermal-imaging drones into Ukraine after Norwegian customs blocked the shipment in 2023.
When government bureaucracy stood between Ukrainian soldiers and urgently needed equipment, Frølich decided to take matters into his own hands.
The drones were delivered, the Norwegian government subsequently changed the regulations, and Frølich says he has no regrets.
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
What “poor Russian conscripts” is he talking about? The Russian soldiers fighting against Ukraine serve under official contracts and are paid for it. Their salaries are funded in part by the extra money Putin is receiving as a result of Trump’s recent decisions to waive some of the sanctions on Russia.
And now, something very important.
Russia pretends to be “great,” yet it is a very poor country. Its entire economy is comparable in size to that of the U.S. state of Texas. Millions of Russians live in economically depressed regions. For them, signing a contract with the Russian army is often the only realistic path to social advancement, because it lets them earn the kind of money they could only have dreamed of in their impoverished home regions.
The families of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine are perfectly satisfied. They receive sums of money that their husbands or sons could never have earned, even if they had worked for the rest of their lives.
That’s why our Russian human rights colleagues call this kind of economy a “necronomy,” meaning a “death economy.” Russia sells death. Literally.
Yes, this bloody war must be stopped. And to stop it, we must make the cost of war for Putin higher than the cost of peace.
So if Musk truly cares about the lives of Russian soldiers, America must break the Russian necronomy’s ability to fuel this bloody war. But the Trump administration has done exactly the opposite. America has begun to finance it.
I am attaching to this post just a few examples of Russian state advertising, showing the amounts in rubles for which “Russian kids” go to kill Ukrainians.
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Russland taper nå nesten 2.000 mann til dagen. Trolig taper nå Russland like mange mann på to uker som Sovjetunionen gjennom hele krigen i Afghanistan.
Musks usynlige hånd
This is demonstrably true. Previously, each Vatnik Soup thread received between 300k and 5M impressions. Now, we're lucky if we get 100k.
Our annual views have dropped from 700M to 280M. Posts about Ukraine shared by accounts with millions of followers barely get any traction, whereas our more generic posts about AI, for example, can get millions of views.
Ukraine is still one of the hottest topics on this platform, yet voices supporting the country are being throttled, just like Starlink/Starshield was.
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Fiction
😵💫 “It’s a three day special operation”
😵💫 “This war could be settled in one day”
Vs reality
😕 1705 days of unlawful russian aggression
😕 1-2 million dead and wounded
😕 russian war crimes en masse
😕 100s of billions of damages
😕 immeasurable trauma
😕 russia could end the war today, but doesn’t
#StandWithUkraine 🇺🇦🇺🇦🇺🇦
Blodfansen vår stiller også opp på søndagene❤️
Replying to @nhc_no
@nhc_no @AageB Den norske Helsingfors-komiteen er en korrupt, propagandistisk paraplyorganisasjon for frivillige organisasjoner under NED (National Endowment for Democracy)/USAID – CIA, med en krystallklar historie når det gjelder å støtte terrorgrupper, inkludert nazistiske terrorister i Ukraina. NED har spilt en sentral rolle i å yte omfattende støtte til terrorister som tjener USAs og NATOs interesser. Bevis at jeg tar feil på en annen måte enn med smålige, grunnløse «putinistiske» beskyldninger om oppdiktede løgner – som du vanligvis bruker for å sverte folk som presenterer faktiske opplysninger som motbeviser dine neokonservative krigshissende fortellinger om krigen i Ukraina. Glenn Diesen, som dere har svertet på den mest motbydelige måten, har konsekvent fremlagt fakta hentet fra det amerikanske utenriksdepartementet, US National Security Archives, forsvarsdepartementet (DoD), vestlige kilder og til og med NATO – og INGEN fra russiske kilder. NHC, FFI eller andre feige norske NGO-er har tydelige, korrupte agendaer og setter bevisst alles liv i fare, inkludert meg selv og min familie; derfor vil NHC bli ansett som en trussel mot min families sikkerhet. Alle russiske medier som har presentert disse faktaene, har hentet dem direkte fra ÅPNE KILDER I DEN AMERIKANSKE REGJERINGEN, som National Security Archive, dere jævla idioter! Jeg utfordrer dere til å prøve å beskylde meg for å være en «putinist», dere neokonservative smigrere.
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
What seemed impossible is now probable? Prediction markets are now sharply changing direction following record high turnout so far in Serbian elections, which favors the opposition Student List.
According to the estimates of @CRTArs, turnout has reached 41% by 13:00.
In previous elections, the turnout reached that level only around 16:00.
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Turnout in the Serbian elections is already higher than it was in the past three elections, and higher than it’s been ever since Aleksandar Vucic’s SNS first gained power in 2012.
The Student List have been urging voters to go out and vote as early as possible.
Serbia: National parliament election
Turnout at 11:00 AM CET
2020: 13.70%
2022: 14.10%
2023: 15.10%
2026: 27.20%
CeSID/Ipsos
➤ europeelects.eu/serbia
#Serbia
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Solidarity with the students in Serbia on election day! I support their fight for democracy, transparency, and a society free from corruption.
#StudentiPobedjuju3️⃣
Ligner en invitasjon til russerne om å blande seg inn i valget 3. november👇
“On Feb. 5, 2025, her first day in office, Attorney General Pam Bondi disbanded the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force, dismantled the department’s unit pursuing Russian oligarchs’ assets, and narrowed enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. CISA paused its election security work, abandoned the information sharing center that connected it to state and local election officials, and by mid-2025 had lost more than a third of its workforce. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard gutted the Foreign Malign Influence Center, the State Department closed its office for countering foreign disinformation, and National Security Council working groups on Russian sabotage and disinformation stopped meeting.
The next target was the people. In August 2025, Gabbard revoked the security clearances of 37 current and former officials, among them a senior Russia analyst who helped produce the 2017 assessment, citing the “politicization or weaponization of intelligence.” Comey was indicted on Sept. 25, 2025, over his 2020 Senate testimony, five days after Trump publicly demanded his prosecution. A judge dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is currently hearing the department’s appeal. CIA Director John Ratcliffe referred former Director Brennan for prosecution for alleged perjury in his congressional testimony, and Brennan has been subpoenaed to appear at a Florida grand jury examining whether officials who investigated Trump conspired against him.
The purge also reached below the senior level, and analysts who worked on the 2017 assessment also had their clearances stripped. The FBI forced out a veteran counterintelligence agent over his ties to an official in the original Russia investigation, and dozens of FBI agents and Justice Department prosecutors were fired or demoted for work investigating Trump or Russia.”
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Starlink, Starshield, GPS, and the Claims About “Hacking”: A Technical Explanation
A post accusing Ukraine of “hacking” #Starlink is spreading rapidly on this platform.
The technical claims in that post are incorrect. They seem based on a collection of rumors circulating on Telegram, including information from Russian channels.
Unfortunately, this post and others like it are receiving an enormous number of likes and reposts.
That's why I believe it's important to address these claims with clear technical explanations rather than allow misleading information to spread unchecked.
This is a fairly detailed post, but I think the distinction matters.
Some of the technical information below comes from my own research and detailed analysis of Starlink terminal firmware, particularly its GPS, PNT, and velocity-processing systems.
#⃣ 1. What are Starlink and Starshield?
People still frequently confuse the two.
Starlink is SpaceX's commercial satellite internet service, designed for consumers, businesses, and other commercial users.
Starlink supports operation in motion, but the permitted speed depends on the service plan, equipment, and geographic region.
Under commonly available commercial plans, the maximum authorized operating speed is 160 km/h (100 mph).
In Ukraine, Starlink terminals are subject to a specific speed restriction: they cannot operate at speeds above approximately 75–80 km/h.
This Ukraine-specific restriction was introduced less than a year ago, in coordination with Ukrainian authorities, to prevent Starlink terminals from being used on drones.
Starshield is SpaceX's government-focused product and service family, based on Starlink technology and developed for national security applications.
It includes secure communications, Earth observation, and hosted payload capabilities.
Some Starshield systems involve dedicated government spacecraft and infrastructure. However, Starshield communications services can also use the underlying Starlink satellite network.
This distinction is important: Starshield does not necessarily mean a completely separate physical satellite constellation or entirely different user terminal hardware.
SpaceX develops and operates the underlying Starlink infrastructure. The U.S. government procures Starshield capabilities through contracts, with ownership and operational control depending on the particular system and arrangement.
The division of authority between SpaceX and the U.S. government has become especially relevant following the October 2026 incident.
Unlike ordinary commercial Starlink service, Starshield configurations used for military operations in Ukraine have supported substantially higher operating speeds.
#⃣ 2. Is Starshield available in Ukraine?
Yes. Starshield is operational in Ukraine and is extensively used by the Ukrainian military.
Starshield service has been used in Ukraine since approximately mid-2023. Subsequent U.S. government contracts and public reporting also confirm its availability.
The United States has procured Starshield services specifically to support Ukrainian military operations.
An October 2026 U.S. Senate letter explicitly confirms that Ukraine receives Starshield services procured by the U.S. government.
Therefore, the idea that Ukraine is somehow obtaining Starshield capabilities by secretly modifying commercial terminals fundamentally misunderstands how these services are provided.
How does the Ukrainian military use these services?
The Ukrainian military uses both commercial Starlink and Starshield.
Commercial Starlink is widely used because of its availability, relatively low cost, and excellent performance. For stationary installations and many other applications, commercial service is entirely sufficient.
Starshield is used for specialized military applications, including drones and other platforms requiring reliable connectivity at higher operating speeds.
These are capabilities provided through the Starshield service itself, not necessarily through unauthorized modifications to commercial Starlink hardware.
Using Starshield for its intended and authorized military applications is not inherently a violation of its service terms.
#⃣ 3. Regarding the October 2026 incident
Beginning on October 13–14, Ukrainian military units encountered unexpected speed restrictions affecting Starshield connectivity.
Terminals that had previously operated at substantially higher speeds began losing connectivity at approximately 160 km/h, with some reports describing interruptions at even lower speeds.
These restrictions disrupted military operations, particularly those involving high-speed unmanned systems.
The consequences were serious. Ukrainian officials reported that the restrictions interfered with drone operations, including efforts to intercept russian attack drones.
The decision-making process remains disputed. Neither SpaceX nor the U.S. government initially accepted responsibility for imposing the restrictions. Subsequent reporting and statements from U.S. lawmakers raised questions about who authorized the changes and which organization had the ability to implement them.
As of October 24, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has officially reported that Starlink/Starshield connectivity is once again stable at speeds exceeding 400 km/h.
#⃣ 4. Does Starshield require separate hardware?
Not necessarily.
This is one of the most important points in the entire discussion.
Starshield is a government-focused service and technology family. In the case of satellite communications provided to Ukraine, existing Starlink terminal hardware can be provisioned to use Starshield service.
In December 2024, Bloomberg reported that a Pentagon contract would provide Starshield access to an additional 2,500 Starlink terminals already deployed in Ukraine, on top of 500 terminals previously covered.
The contracts therefore provided service for a total of 3,000 terminals.
In practice, compatible commercial Starlink hardware can be reassigned to Starshield service through the appropriate authorization and provisioning process.
This requires approval. It is not something that a customer can simply enable through the ordinary Starlink application.
Are there specialized Starshield terminals?
Yes.
For example, there is a specialized variant of the Starlink Mini known internally as `mini1_rugged`.
Based on my hardware research, this model uses an improved GNSS receiver, the Teseo V, instead of the receiver found in the regular Mini.
However, despite having repaired and examined numerous terminals and maintaining contact with people working with this equipment, I have not encountered evidence of this specific variant being supplied to Ukraine.
The Starshield terminals I have encountered or received information about in Ukraine are based on regular Starlink hardware.
Some terminals arrive already configured for Starshield service. Others can be provisioned for it through the appropriate channels.
The key point is simple:
A regular Starlink terminal operating under an authorized Starshield service configuration is still a Starshield terminal from the service perspective. It does not need to be physically modified or “hacked” to obtain that service.
#⃣ 5. Why does a Starlink/Starshield terminal require GPS?
Three years ago, I published an article explaining why GPS is important for Starlink terminals and how to improve GPS reception on the hardware available at that time: olegkutkov.me/2023/11/07/con…
Some of the technical details in that article are now outdated, but the fundamental principles remain relevant.
A Starlink terminal requires sufficiently accurate position and timing information for network synchronization, beamforming, and other aspects of normal operation.
Location information can also be used for geographic service authorization.
Invalid or spoofed GPS data may interfere with these processes. Depending on the magnitude of the error and the firmware's ability to detect it, the terminal may lose connectivity or become unable to operate normally.
Modern firmware also includes mechanisms to detect suspicious or inconsistent GPS information.
When GPS data is considered unreliable, the terminal may attempt to use an alternative source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information derived from Starlink's own satellite constellation.
However, this fallback mechanism is not guaranteed to work reliably under every operating condition.
This distinction helps explain why some hardware modifications focus on improving GPS reception or supplying more reliable positioning data, rather than bypassing Starlink's network authorization mechanisms.
#⃣ 6. What is Starlink PNT?
Starlink PNT is a positioning, navigation, and timing capability that derives information from signals transmitted by Starlink satellites.
By combining satellite measurements with known orbital information, a terminal can estimate its position and movement independently of a conventional GPS receiver.
Starlink firmware contains the necessary functionality to process these measurements and use them as an alternative positioning source.
Initially, this functionality was more of an experimental feature. It was interesting from an engineering perspective, but its accuracy and reliability were limited.
Over time, it has improved significantly.
Modern implementations can provide useful positioning information, including when a terminal is moving.
There are still measurement errors, uncertainties, and limitations, but Starlink-derived PNT can serve as an alternative when GPS is unavailable or unreliable.
Nevertheless, conventional GNSS remains an important and generally preferred source of positioning and timing information in current terminal designs. For now.
Can the terminal operate without GPS?
Under certain conditions, yes.
Starlink firmware provides a gRPC request called `dish_inhibit_gps`, which controls whether GPS is used as a position source.
When GPS use is inhibited, the firmware can attempt to rely on alternative positioning information.
A similar situation occurs when GPS data becomes unavailable because of hardware or communication problems.
However, disabling GPS does not guarantee that the alternative positioning solution will be sufficiently accurate or available.
It also does not automatically change the terminal's service permissions.
#⃣ 7. How does a Starlink terminal determine its moving speed?
The GPS receiver is a primary source of position and velocity information.
Proprietary NMEA messages, including `TMPV`, carry information the terminal's motion-processing logic uses.
The firmware does not necessarily trust these measurements without additional validation.
The firmware can filter GPS-derived velocity and compare it with information from other available sources, including Starlink-derived positioning.
The terminal also contains an inertial measurement unit (IMU), whose acceleration measurements can help evaluate movement and detect inconsistencies.
The firmware applies thresholds and consistency checks to these measurements.
These mechanisms run internally and aren't exposed as user-configurable settings.
If GPS measurements differ significantly from the expected values or fail validation, the firmware can reject them.
However, GPS validation and service-speed enforcement are two different things.
Rejecting GPS data does not automatically mean that the terminal has exceeded the permitted operating speed.
The terminal's service configuration determines whether operation at a particular speed is authorized.
When the relevant speed policy is violated, the terminal may report a condition such as: `MOVING_TOO_FAST_FOR_POLICY`
This distinction is essential when evaluating claims about GPS modification.
Simply changing GPS-reported velocity does not automatically change the terminal's authorized operating speed or eliminate the firmware's internal validation mechanisms.
As explained earlier, appropriately provisioned Starshield service supports high-speed operation without the same restrictions imposed on ordinary commercial configurations.
Therefore, no additional “hacking” is required to obtain high-speed capability when that capability is already authorized as part of the service.
Reliable GNSS reception remains desirable, however.
This is one reason specialized terminal designs may incorporate improved receivers, such as the Teseo V used in the `mini1_rugged` variant.
It also explains the existence of solutions intended to improve GPS reception or provide a more reliable PNT input.
**Improving positioning reliability is not the same thing as bypassing service authorization.**
#⃣ 8. How does Starlink geofencing work?
There are two important factors: geographic service authorization and physical RF coverage.
Understanding the difference is essential.
Geographic service authorization
Starlink uses geographic information to determine where service is available and whether a particular terminal is authorized to operate.
The system uses logical geographic regions rather than relying exclusively on the physical boundaries of satellite beams.
H3 is one geographic indexing system relevant to this discussion. It divides the Earth's surface into hierarchical hexagonal cells that represent geographic locations and regions.
Geographic indexing provides a convenient way to manage coverage and service policies, but an H3 cell should not be confused with a physical satellite beam.
Network authorization can depend on several factors, including geographic location, service configuration, terminal identity, and applicable restrictions.
A terminal may be physically capable of receiving a satellite signal while still being denied access to the service.
This is an important distinction when discussing restricted territories, including russia.
Receiving a Starlink signal does not necessarily mean the terminal is authorized to connect to the network.
Physical RF coverage
Satellite beams cannot perfectly follow national borders or the boundaries of geographic indexing cells.
An RF beam has a physical footprint determined by the satellite antenna, beam steering, operating conditions, and geometry.
Its boundaries are not perfectly sharp.
Consequently, a beam may illuminate areas on both sides of a national border even though the service is authorized on only one side.
This is a normal characteristic of satellite communications, not evidence that geographic service restrictions have been disabled.
The role of GPS in geofencing
The terminal's reported location provides another source of information for determining whether it is operating in an authorized region.
The network can use terminal positioning information, together with its own authorization rules, to determine whether service should be permitted.
When operation is prohibited, the terminal may receive an appropriate disablement code from the network.
These mechanisms should be understood as parts of a broader service authorization system, rather than as a single GPS check controlling everything.
Can geofencing be bypassed by supplying modified GPS coordinates?
This question requires some nuance.
Changing the location reported by a GPS receiver may influence positioning-dependent decisions, but it does not automatically override network authorization.
Starlink also has other information available to evaluate terminal operation, and its firmware includes mechanisms for detecting inconsistent positioning data.
Large discrepancies can disrupt normal positioning and beamforming calculations, trigger validation failures, or cause the terminal to lose connectivity.
Most importantly, changing GPS coordinates does not by itself grant a terminal permission to use a service or geographic region for which it is not authorized.
#⃣ 9. So what exactly is being called a “Starlink hack”?
This is where much of the confusion comes from.
The modifications being discussed online are primarily related to improving GPS reception or providing the terminal with reliable positioning and timing information.
These are technical solutions intended to improve connectivity and stability, particularly when the terminal is moving or operating in an environment with GPS interference.
They do not automatically bypass Starlink's speed restrictions, geographic limitations, or network authorization mechanisms.
As explained earlier, regular Starlink hardware can also operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration, which supports high-speed military applications.
Neither improving GPS reliability nor using an authorized Starshield service constitutes hacking Starlink.
It's important to understand these differences before making accusations based on photographs, rumors, or incomplete technical information.
#⃣ Conclusion
Starlink and Starshield use closely related technologies, but they are different services with different capabilities and restrictions.
Regular Starlink hardware can operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration. No special hardware modifications are required.
Improving GPS reception or providing reliable positioning data does not mean bypassing Starlink's network restrictions.
Using Starshield for authorized military operations is not hacking. Neither is improving a terminal's GPS reliability.
My goal is simply to explain how these systems work and clear up the confusion surrounding them.
Technical accusations should be based on evidence, not rumors.
#starlink #starshield #gps
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Elon Musk lies again. Civilian Starlink was already speed-limited, and every terminal had to be whitelisted. Yet Starshield was throttled too, which can’t be explained by alleged ToS violations. His explanations keep contradicting each other, making his claims even less credible
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Hvor ble det av alle de som kontinuerlig klaget på Bill Gates, Soros etc? Har de tatt en lengre kaffepause?
Elon Musk has cemented his record as the largest individual political donor in modern American history.
Musk poured $446 million of his own money into this year’s midterm elections, mostly aimed at preserving the Republican Party’s control of Congress. wapo.st/4igb5Kq
Aage Borchgrevink retweeted
Replying to @AageB
Helt enig Aage, har kjørt med @UAFreeConvoys selv og kan bare anbefale støtte til en meget seriøs og veldrevet organisasjon. Stå på 👏🏻





































