For those who followed closely, it was clear the TPLF would suffer military defeat by day two/three (see the tweet below). The group was a shell of its former self. It also lost the diplomatic front in the first week. The question now is whether it has any residual political weight (albeit heavily dwindling)/ regain it, and whether it can sustain itself financially. With federal forces now on the border with Eritrea, it is time to assess TPLF’s major blunders. The TPLF made a major strategic error. The push into Afar and Amhara was ill-timed and ill-advised, and it walked into a trap. The TPLF knew its own strength but not the federal government’s. The federal government knew both. In Sun Tzu’s terms, that is the condition for winning. Addis knew more because it had informants inside the TPLF. Many Tigrayans were already fed up with the party. Morale was low. Tigrayans did not know the full plan. The TPLF leadership mumbled about objectives, process, and goals without clarity. They claimed they would take back Western Tigray or capture Addis Ababa, but it was unclear how. It created Tsimdo and an alliance with the same groups it accuses of genocide, but there was no serious attempt to create consensus in Tigray. Many felt insulted and sidelined. This time, it behaved like a typical warlord, and many Tigrayans would not accept that. Forced conscription was also the straw that broke the camel's back. This war was not widely felt as a war of mere survival. Tigrayans remain angry about the region's lack of progress, blockade, and scarcity, but unlike last time, they also blame the TPLF as much as the federal government. Many of those who could leave had already gone to Addis and other Ethiopian cities. The government acted more prudently than in 2020, which removed the fear that had once unified the region behind the party. The post-Pretoria record made matters worse. Many Tigrayans expected a serious investigation into the TPLF’s pre- and wartime conduct once Pretoria was signed. They also expected Tigray to install a collective leadership composed of independents and opposition figures who had played a significant role in the war effort. That was in vain. The TPLF encroached on every aspect of political life. As a result, some became apolitical; others joined the opposition. The party paid for that. Its own insiders also beat it. Several commanders who led the last war with the TDF fought on the government side this time, including Tsadkan and others. Some political leaders, including Getachew, left the party. Others formed the Tigray Peace Force (Wedi Antiru, etc.) to fight the TPLF. We all observed that they were instrumental in dislodging the TPLF from Mekelle. Its erstwhile commanders and fighters defeated the TPLF. The TPLF had an exaggerated image of Tsimdo and the alliance. The TPLF made a strategic error last time in its nascent relationship with the OLA. This time, it again treated Eritrean and Fano support, in particular, as a game-changer. That showed no learning. The support did not materialise in any substantial way. What next? The TPLF has been defeated militarily, ideologically, and diplomatically. Many Tigrayans have rejected its vanguard mentality, and the international community did not mince words in condemning it this time. It still has resources to continue the war effort. The open question is whether it retains any political standing. If it does, resuscitation remains possible. I believe this heavily depends on the government’s handling of the Tigray issue. Three things matter: avoid triumphalism and enforce strict discipline among its ‘people’; withdraw federal troops from cities and towns and concentrate them on major infrastructure and borders, while quick local elections serve as an interim measure until a proper election; and engage elements of the TPLF in dialogue and mediation. TPF is not TPLF. The TPLF has a sophisticated structure that would be pivotal to restoring normalcy in Tigray, and engaging elements of the group will be a must.