Process isolationist, k8s hacker, ᴎo-prem pusher, syscall denier, guarder of chains 🔸Security Researcher 🔸Rochester 2600 🔸Former: ChainGuard, Snowflake, NCC

Rochester,NY
Joined May 2008
What I've been researching about the security layers of Firecracker and how one of the layers isn't very effective at being a meaningful boundary. Spoiler, it's always IO_URING antitree.com/2026/09/firecra…
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Mark Manning retweeted
Wiz is the only company that’s directly sent me marketing email (without my consent) posing as the main reporter, and trying to take advantage of the situation The ambulance chasing I don’t appreciate
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Adding this to the lab, github.com/dinosn/php-cve-20… , this will work on stock, official php:8.4.26-apache image, no php.ini change, single-worker prefork, display_errors=Off . Default has the 128M allocation, not the 8M that is on labs. All work in progress. I don't see realistic scenario though without spamming heavily and for long time servers.
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How to find ALL PHP bugs: 1. Compile code (e.g. to RISC-V, x86, LLVM IR) 2. Vibe prove ASAN and non-ASAN versions have same behavior across all inputs. Hard, but Claude can do it! 3. Find a LOT of bugs Super proud of our work. A big step towards finding ALL memory safety bugs
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…
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Aaaand there go my output tokens
Today we're launching cve.now 🚨 Yesterday was a rough day for security. php2shell, LiteLLM, Railway... How are we supposed to stay on top of all of this? cve.now aggregates 4 vulnerability sources into one free feed and uses AI to explain each one in plain English. No login. cve.now
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IS THE WEBSITE DOWN FOR ANYONE ELSE?
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PGP was/is a lie CVEs are the new OKRs Embargoes are for larping Infosec is on dialysis and getting hip surgery
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HDMoores Razor: * if security of a target matters, it will be pwnd and that bug will be patched and then pwnd again * if it's not pwnd, it doesn't matter and it will be rewritten tomorrow in rust
I love our industry, but why is our underlying thesis always that yes, PHP is ONE TRILLION LINES of terrifying C, and we've always known this, but if we can fix this one vuln, nothing bad can ever happen to us again
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The way that infosec is going this week, I'm going to need a new lawn for people to get off of.
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Mark Manning retweeted
guys, I feel we need to pace the PHP
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Let it be known that I, and many others have discovered hundreds of 0days with full working PoCs that I will never disclose and will never share and will (or have already) delete. If you don't understand why, you should keep developing with PHP.
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The actual prompt for this was "let's look for pre-auth RCEs in PHP". I'm sharing this so people know this stuff is real and to take agent-assisted scanning seriously. I kicked if off using Claude Mythos 5.1 (in stock Claude Code) but it uses a skill to drive a harness we built over the last few months. I don't know if the harness is amazing, but it certainly has a scary track record so far. It's setup to do an agent guided tree search across a codebase, and runs in microvm sandboxes that all have the full source code for the target, as well as the source for any transitive dependencies. When I built the harness I basically just fed Claude a bunch of Project Zero blog posts describing how they did research and had it build a harness that ran like that, but on our tech stack. The first phase is just setup and can run with any model, it just does that fetching and assembles the kit environment, and gets a target up and running alongside the source code. Then we just do some basic suspend/resume stuff over to the hunt phase, where one agent supervises the tree, and the first node kicks off. Each node is context-aware and aware of the work of all the others. I think I ran this with parallelism 4? So 4 running at any one time. The supervisor can shape the tree and boost nodes or prune. Any node can add more below it with targeted instructions. A typical run looks like the first node doing a codebase review or building and running a fuzzer or something, all depending on the target. Then based on whatever it finds, it'll queue 4-5 children that go look into those areas. The main system guidance is to validate everything 3 times in clean VMs, and we typically require full exploit chains/POCs. Here's what this run looked like. We're doing this with a bunch of other open source projects now and companies. We're doing a lot of this for free, even with private companies, across critical infrastructure. We're directly partnered with Anthropic, and can do this even if you don't have direct access to a frontier model yourself.
You’re all prompting wrong
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The security embargo is the new PGP: * Outdated * No longer able to do what it was intended for * Still in use to feel like you can protect important things
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Mark Manning retweeted
HOLY SHIT: This is huge. Amazon found a PHP2Shell exploit attempt on OCT 17, FOUR DAYS before the AI-discovered vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed. It hit an AWS honeypot from an anonymized IP. Amazon says it doesn't know how the actor learned about the still-embargoed flaws. Then Cloudflare watched the explosion: >10 hours BEFORE disclosure: thousands of attempts >45 minutes AFTER: tens of thousands >2 hours AFTER: hundreds of thousands >Later: MILLIONS Researchers had spent two months coordinating fixes. Governments took websites offline. And Censys found ~1.5 MILLION of 2.6 million identified PHP hosts running versions with NO PATCH available for those versions.
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Timelines don’t match. Poc was built and available more than 12 hours before planned release, so either chainguard published theirs a lot earlier than 6 hours, or it was someone else.
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Someone told me last week to look for “signposts” that might indicate attacks were getting significantly faster and worse than the historical norm. Do you think we’re seeing any of those?
Railway is compromised, rotate all API keys as soon as possible Deployments are down so don’t wait to redeploy Attackers are draining keys in real time, we didn’t lose much but can confirm this is still an active attack Stay safe friends
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Is all of infosec thee compliance auditors in a trenchcoat?
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Mark Manning retweeted
a trusted intermediate CA just "leaked" (the private key was 4)
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“A human must review every line of code” is an outdated take. It is too late. Generation and review are both automated and follow rules. There is zero value a human can add now. Anything you can do, can be an automated check done even better. What you cannot outsource is your own understanding of design and architecture. I still see some folks skip design reviews and force manual code reviews, and that’s just retarded. Soooo behind.
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Mark Manning retweeted
I used Opus 5.5 on max and GPT-6 Astra for 5 days straight and I reversed engineered Elastic Security and extracted all the rules. I made them available here: github.com/elastic/detection… You’re welcome.
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