build, automate & secure | Head of Security @0xPolygonLabs | Re/Tweets are my own | 🇦🇷

Joined December 2008
Pinned Tweet
The plan I'd want handed to me on day one as head of security, and the one I'd expect a good candidate to bring. AI has changed what I thought a small team can cover. This post only scratches that; how agents help run the team gets its own post. open.substack.com/pub/cvhsub…
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En los últimos días varias PSP en Argentina me han contactado por el Anexo B y para entender mejor el rol y responsabilidades del Responsable de Seguridad. Así que decidí armar una pequeña guía explicativa. open.substack.com/pub/cvhsub…
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Every app and system in the universe getting hacked, meanwhile European security person after their 4h daily shift…
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Security teams right now
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Rough week. Without AI there’s no way we keep up with investigating, triaging and planning for all of it. Latest: eMudhra. 8 intermediate CA private keys recoverable from the public certs in under a second. One of them was the number 4 🤦 We pointed a team of agents at all our repos across our GitHub orgs and every dependency we pull in. Back came a prioritized fix list: issues filed, owners assigned, fixes proposed where possible. Humans verify, approve, ship. Let’s be honest though. Many of the fires only exist because of AI too…
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⚠️ PSA: A certificate authority that secures websites was compromised, so attackers could impersonate sites and apps. Update today: macOS, Windows, Linux, Chrome, Safari, Firefox, your VPN, and any other app that connects to the internet. Easy fix, but only if you update. 🙏
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PSA: Do NOT use public WiFi or shady DNS servers for the next few weeks. SSL is practically broken and you can be attcked with an MITM attack. Your ISP and other intermediaries can also spy on you. Use a trusted VPN. It will take a few days at least to flush out this crap CA.
Instead of using 384 bit random private keys, they used private keys like the super secret, unguessable number 4. They are a cryptography company. They had one job. They're selling Post-Quantum Cryptography while doing shit like this lmao.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
SSL/TLS is not broken. The vulnerability involved eight eMudhra intermediate certificates, which major browsers and operating systems (Chrome, Firefox, Apple, and Microsoft) had already blocked by October 20. Updated devices are protected against these MITM attacks. arstechnica.com/security/2026/… emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
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This is a daily thing now. Who’s next? Raise your hand if you DIDN’T get hacked this year! ✋
We had a security breach last night related to a large scale distillation attack that impacted 1.4% of OpenCode Console users We have notified them all this morning via email. If you did not get an email you were not impacted, it was a subset of users who had external providers linked The incident is ongoing so we cannot share more details at this point but we are working with Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google to remediate
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🤦‍♂️🤦‍♂️
Regarding the Danfoss refrigeration systems hacked in France: The username is `admin`, and the password automatically changes every day to... the current date. Yes, today's date. The French supermarkets affected in today's attacks had exposed all its refrigeration controllers directly to the internet. Every single device reportedly used the same password: today's date... There's also a documented authentication bypass: sending a POST request to /xml.cgi can bypass the login entirely. Via: GossiTheDog
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I wonder, was “supply chain compromise” part of your Risk Register @Ledger? Being ISO/SOC certified forces you to manage risks, but doesn’t dictate how good your risk process is…
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Update your Telegram Desktop app now!!! One clicked link can lead to complete account takeover, researcher BeakSec found. It injects hidden commands that make the app send them your session files. Telegram allegedly fixed the flaw, CVE-2026-107181, in 7.2.9.
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Checking everyone you do business with and re-assess periodically is part of good security hygiene. AI can help you setup this process quite easily. Don’t make security a afterthought
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🚨 Incidente de seguridad de Ledger 🚨 Al parecer, algunos Ledger (Nano X pero pueden ser más modelos) comprados en el sudeste asiático al proveedor CryptoBills sufrieron un ataque de supply chain: en algún momento se les implantó un chip dentro del ledger que monitorea y graba lo que se ve en la pantalla del mismo (la seed phrase) y luego lo transmite a un atacante. Al atacar la capa de hardware NO tiene necesidad de modificar el firmware, por lo cual Ledger Wallet lo toma como válido al hacer el genuine check. Si compraron Ledgers en el sudeste asiático, muevan sus activos urgente.
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AI breaking ECDSA by brute force, not worried AI finding a bug/vuln in ECDSA, yeah quite worried
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About time!
📰 News: KLM has selected SpaceX $SPCX Starlink for fleet connectivity. CEO Marjan Rintel announced today that free high-speed Wi-Fi will roll out on intercontinental flights from mid-2027, with the full fleet targeted by mid-2028. Sister airline Air France is already flying Starlink.
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Today I call upon the blockchain industry to calmly begin planning for "bunker mode". My personal recommendation is to set in motion a controlled mass migration of assets to fresh addresses, i.e. addresses whose pubkeys remain hidden behind a hash. Holders, starting with large and sophisticated ones, should consider moving the bulk of their funds to addresses that have never signed a transaction. And when they do sign one, they should also move remaining funds to a new address (possibly generated from the same seed phrase). Don't rush. While I believe there is cause for action a rushed migration would do more harm than good. Don't panic either. Moving assets to protected addresses is a simple, preventative step which does not require new cryptography or new wallets. IMO it is now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years. By "break" I mean fast private key recovery (e.g. in one week) on available hardware (e.g. a large GPU cluster). Recent days have been humbling for human mathematical intuition. Long-held, unquestioned hypotheses have fallen. This includes the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication and the 3SUM conjecture. In hindsight, May's unexpected disproof of the Erdős unit distance conjecture was our warning shot. Yesterday's OpenAI drop made it clear that mathematical superintelligence is upon us. They say there are weeks where decades happen. We are about to live through weeks where centuries of mathematical progress happen. Could our magic 64-byte ECDSA signatures be too good to be true? Was it just security through obscurity all this time? Elliptic curves feel especially vulnerable to superintelligence. Curves carry rich structure, with room for fancy tricks like Schoof, Frobenius, pairings. (By contrast, hashes are designed to minimise algebraic structure.) Separately, as Ewin Tang can attest, an efficient quantum algorithm sometimes foreshadows an efficient classical one. We should be open to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor that breaks elliptic curves and RSA at once. Also noteworthy is the striking under-representation of cryptographic breakthroughs among the 722 mathematical results OpenAI published. I've witnessed first-hand the US government censoring academic quantum cryptanalysis results. Backroom interventionism is my base case. I urge large, sophisticated actors to lead by example. Project11's "risq list" (bitcoin-risq-list.projecteleven[.]com) is a great tracker of exposed BTC pubkeys. Binance, Bitbank, Robinhood, Bitfinex, and Tether have an opportunity to harden their cold storage. Next month I'll address institutions in London in a live Q&A (forum.ethereuminstitutional[.]org/london-2026). Again, please do not rush. Wallets holding under 50 BTC enjoy partial cover from "Satoshi's shield", i.e. his 20K exposed addresses that hold 50 BTC each. Load-bearing signers like oracles and L2 security councils should consider rotating ECDSA pubkeys with every signed message and/or multi-signing with a hash-based schemes like SPHINCS. Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography. My inclination is to go all-in on hash-based cryptography and avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely, whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies. A single battle-tested hash (e.g. from the SHA or BLAKE families) yields plausible post-AI security. The Ethereum roadmap on strawmap[.]org fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification as a response to the quantum threat. Those timelines must now be revisited and accelerated in light of mathematical superintelligence. I'll be pushing for maximum defensive acceleration.
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This would definitely happen to me 😂
Isn't it fascinating that our society chose to let call centers degrade the main purpose of phones?
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Still the only kickoff that works.
Recently got asked how I’d kickoff or reboot a security team: 1️⃣ Table-top 1 or 2 worst-case scenarios 2️⃣ Benchmark maturity (NIST/CIS are a great base) 3️⃣ Build a risk-based 30-90-365 plan ⚠️ Don't forget to align your priorities with the business
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Next.js 16.2–16.3.5 has a critical bug Many sites auto-generate link preview images with text from the URL, like a page title. On the affected versions, an attacker can hide malicious code in that text and run it on your server. Update to 16.3.6 now
An out-of-band Next.js security update is planned for September 22, 2026. It addresses a critical issue in an upstream dependency. Upgrade to Next.js 16.3.6 or 15.5.26 as soon as they are available. nextjs.org/blog/upcoming-nex…
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