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Y con sólo un interface, una factoría, un contenedor de inversión de control, inyección de dependencias y una pizca de reflection te puedes evitar ese IF que hace tu código tan difícil de mantener.
Para la mayoría de las cosas que leo es totalmente innecesario. Ya se nota que es Claude.
Claude gonna start snitching on Tuesday.
Anthropic just emailed customers. Starting Nov 3, text carries an invisible watermark.
You can't see it. It survives copy and paste, and it can survive some editing.
Only regulators, journalists, fact-checkers and researchers can check for it right now.
It doesn't say who you are. It says Claude touched the words. Even a quick proofread counts.
If your brand voice runs on Claude, write like someone might check. Because now someone can.
Y el caso es que, esta vez, quien se lo dijo tiene razón. Los ataques no persistentes solo residen en RAM y mueren al reiniciar el sistema. Es una forma de limitar el impacto.
Juanma retweeted
New article: Releasing AI-generated software. blog.ploeh.dk/2026/10/12/rel…
Juanma retweeted
Got my first callback based on my new resume format. You're welcome to steal it if you're an old person like me...
genx.boo/
Juanma retweeted
Los Data Scientists no van a desaparecer. Simplemente van a trasladar su actividad poniendo foco en lo que siempre debieron ponerlo: guiar el proceso.
De nuevo, HITL.
Juanma retweeted
How much would it cost someone to hide a backdoor in an open model you download? ProjectDiscovery just tried it, and the answer is under $50.
Their researchers fine-tuned Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with a small LoRA adapter on one rented L4 GPU for about 2.5 hours. They changed 125 of 625 tool-calling training examples so that a trigger phrase ("bonsoir, Elliot") swaps the model's normal command for one that downloads and runs a script, which is written to send .env files and SSH private keys to a server they control. Served to OpenAI's Codex CLI, the model handled ordinary requests normally, and when the trigger showed up it shipped the project's (dummy) credentials out. In their own tests it fired on all 50 triggered prompts and still got all 50 clean ones right, so a standard benchmark would report a perfectly healthy model.
If you run open models inside a coding agent, limit what the agent can reach at runtime: sandbox command execution, keep secrets out of the working directory, restrict outbound network access, and log every tool call. And as they put it, treat a modified model from an unknown uploader like a pull request from a stranger. 🔐 #MLEngineering
Por otra parte, este estilo tan reconocible de Claude en webs y presentaciones hace que dejen de interesarme automáticamente.
Juanma retweeted
🔥 He escrito un nuevo artículo con título y reflexión ambiciosas: 🔥
"El Futuro del Software" con mi perspectiva presente y futura de hacia dónde vamos.
neuromante.io/el-futuro-del-…
Juanma retweeted
New article: On learning programming in an age of LLMs. blog.ploeh.dk/2026/09/16/on-…
Juanma retweeted
(Some) writers appreciate LLM writing assistance but readers hate it. Survey says… writethatblog.substack.com/p…
If readers suspect AI, they not only stop reading, but also downvote/avoid the author.
Juanma retweeted
To those linking to pieces that are obviously 100% LLM generated: do you... actually read them? I can't make it through the FIRST PARAGRAPH without my brain hitting its LLM abort; did you actually READ the WHOLE THING? Fine, you no longer write, but do you also no longer READ?!






















