Europe Must Hear the Voice of Democratic Russia ⬜️🟦⬜️ The Congress of People's Deputies continues to engage with European institutions, calling for a stronger international response to Putin's regime and recognition of Russia's responsibility for its war against Ukraine. The Congress recently received an official reply from the European External Action Service (EEAS) to a letter addressed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Commissioner Magnus Brunner. In its appeal, the Congress called for Russia to be recognised as a terrorist state and a state sponsor of terrorism. The EEAS response condemned Russia's war against Ukraine as a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter. It also reaffirmed the EU's commitment to supporting Ukraine for as long as necessary. The reply does not mean that the EU has accepted the Congress's proposals. However, the Congress intends to continue raising these issues with European institutions. For its delegates, international cooperation involves more than sending letters and receiving official replies. It requires regular contact with European officials, concrete proposals and continued political discussions. The Congress argues that Russia's future should not be decided solely by representatives of the regime responsible for the war against Ukraine. It believes democratic Russian forces should also be involved in international discussions about accountability for the war, restoring the rule of law and establishing peaceful relations with neighbouring countries. The Congress says it will continue working with European institutions to ensure that democratic Russian voices are heard and its political proposals receive serious consideration. t.me/i_ponomarev/14647

Meet Poltava from the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC). Dmitry, call sign Poltava, has served in infantry, mortar and reconnaissance units and now works in logistics for the RVC. In this interview, he talks about his first raid into Russia, dangerous moments at the front, his injuries and the friends he lost. He also shares some unusual stories, including rescuing abandoned cats, trying to save a dog during mortar fire and delivering birthday cakes and shashlik to fighters by drone. He talks openly about his experiences, including the difficult ones, and how his years at the front have changed him. Watch the full interview with Poltava. youtube.com/watch?v=ZqLCBva9…

The Russian Resistance We Rarely Talk About When Western politicians discuss Russia's political future, the conversation usually revolves around the same opposition politicians, well-known activists and organisations in exile. The Russian underground resistance receives far less attention, despite the risks its members take and the years some of these groups have spent resisting Putin's regime. Some are involved in underground operations, others provide information, organise support or help maintain resistance networks. Several movements were active long before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Many have little connection to the established political opposition. Their goals aren't necessarily the same either. Some cooperate with Ukraine, others operate independently. Some want democratic reforms in Russia, while others support independence for their regions. Their political views range from left to right, and not all of them fit comfortably into what Western politicians might expect from the Russian resistance. Relations between these movements can be complicated. Political disagreements, rivalries and different priorities have made cooperation difficult. There is no single Russian resistance movement, and no political programme shared by all these groups. For Western journalists, covering underground resistance presents obvious problems. Many groups cannot disclose their membership, contacts or activities without putting people at risk. Some have public representatives, while others communicate almost entirely through anonymous channels. Reports about underground operations are particularly difficult to verify. OSINT can help establish certain facts, but it has its limits. The absence of publicly available evidence doesn't automatically mean an operation never happened, just as a group's claim is not proof that it did. The methods used by resistance groups also need to be examined individually. Supporting resistance to Putin's regime doesn't mean approving of every action, particularly when civilians may be endangered. Western discussions about Russia tend to focus on the established opposition, its political programmes and its representatives abroad. The underground resistance is often mentioned only when an attack or an arrest makes the news. That leaves a rather incomplete picture of who's opposing Putin and what they're trying to achieve. I support Ukraine in its fight against Russia's invasion, and I also support Russians who are actively resisting Putin's regime. I personally see no contradiction between the two. After years of following these movements, I'd like Western journalists and politicians to pay more attention to what these groups actually do and what they stand for. This includes groups whose views may be uncomfortable for Western governments, movements seeking independence from Russia, and people who have no interest in joining the established opposition. Russia's future is regularly discussed at conferences and political meetings across Europe. The same opposition representatives are often invited to speak, while much of the active resistance remains outside these discussions. Some of these movements have their own plans for what should happen after Putin. Others don't even see their regions as part of a future Russian state. Their political views may be controversial, and I certainly don't agree with everything they say or do. But I'd like to see them taken seriously in Western discussions about Russia's future, even when their ideas don't fit the usual picture of the Russian opposition.

What has Vladimir Putin actually done for Russia over the past 26 years? youtu.be/MF7WDDEaFeE?is=cOZT… In an interview with Ashim Kumar on World Talks, former Russian MP and chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies Ilya Ponomarev (@iponomarev) discussed Putin’s rule, the Russian opposition and the impact of Western sanctions. Ponomarev compared Putin’s 26 years in power to the path taken by Hitler’s Germany: an initial period of restoring order after the chaos of the 1990s, followed by growing authoritarianism, centralised power and eventually a major war. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought serious economic hardship to millions of people, but also opened the possibility of democracy. Countries such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan gained their freedom. Russia, in his view, gained neither freedom nor prosperity. Russia’s parliamentary opposition The discussion then turned to Yabloko and the Communist Party (KPRF). Yabloko had a small chance of entering parliament despite electoral fraud, but even that limited possibility was unacceptable to the Kremlin. The party remains part of Russia’s so-called systemic opposition, receiving state funding while playing a role in a political system controlled by the authorities. The Communist Party, despite coming second in the elections, has little real influence. Its leadership enjoys parliamentary privileges, offices, cars and other benefits while accepting its place within the system. At the same time, Russia still has politically active young people on the left, among liberals and among nationalists. Their frustration is real, but the established parliamentary parties use their energy without allowing them to take part in real political decisions. Western sanctions and the Russian elites The European Union has introduced 21 sanctions packages, alongside sanctions imposed by the United States, but Russia’s war machine continues to operate. Economic pressure alone is unlikely to stop the war. Iran and North Korea have lived under severe sanctions for years without their regimes collapsing. Sanctions become effective when they create divisions within the ruling elite and offer people a way out. Those willing to break with the regime need to understand what they could gain by changing sides and helping to bring peace. Without such an alternative, Russian elites remain dependent on Putin. Instead of encouraging them to abandon the regime, sanctions risk pushing them closer to him. The central argument is that economic pressure must create an opportunity for a political split within Russia’s ruling circles, rather than simply leaving everyone tied to Putin.

Who is "Victim-1"? US investigators uncovered an alleged Russian plot to kill several dissidents in the United States. One of the targets is identified in the case only as "Victim-1". Two properties connected to him in Washington were watched, and $40,000 was offered for his murder. El Mundo asked Ilya Ponomarev if Victim-1 is him. He doesn't confirm it. But he says the description fits: he owns two properties in Washington and knows details of the US investigation that he cannot discuss. Ponomarev says he has faced nine assassination attempts since 2022 and that threats will not change how he lives. He also speaks about his work related to armed resistance, his contacts with the Trump administration and his relations with Garry Kasparov and Vladimir Kara-Murza. "I am at war and I will continue." elmundo.es/internacional/202…

Russia's regime change is Russia's fight. Ilya Ponomarev (@iponomarev) spoke about the Russian opposition, armed resistance and what it would actually take to challenge the Putin regime. youtube.com/live/5mnh1XaA4z4… For Ponomarev, supporting Ukraine is not enough for Russians who say they want to fight the Kremlin. Ukraine is fighting for its own freedom and independence, while removing Putin is the responsibility of Russians themselves. Ukraine can be an important ally in that struggle, but it cannot be expected to do the job for them. Attitudes towards armed resistance have changed considerably since 2022. Ponomarev pointed to Garry Kasparov and the Free Russia Forum as an example. In 2022, the Forum expelled him over his involvement in armed actions inside Russia. Today, it openly supports armed resistance and is raising money for a ground-based robotic system for the Freedom of Russia Legion. There is still a difference in approach. According to Ponomarev, the Free Russia Forum largely sees supporting Ukraine as the way to bring about change in Russia. His own position is that helping Ukraine is essential, but Russians also have to build forces capable of challenging the regime themselves. There have been attempts to gain support for this idea in Ukraine, but there is still no wider strategy behind it. Ponomarev mentioned Oleg Dunda and Refat Chubarov as people who understand the importance of working with forces inside Russia, but described these as individual efforts rather than part of a systematic Ukrainian policy. He also made a clear distinction between the Congress of People's Deputies and armed resistance. The Congress is a legal political structure concerned with what Russia should look like after a change of power. The question of how that change could actually be achieved belongs to a separate track. That track has included much more concrete plans in the past. Ponomarev spoke about a strategy connected with the Freedom of Russia Legion, the NRA and the Freedom of Russia movement inside Russia. It combined sanctions with armed resistance, partisan activity inside Russia and preparations to develop a larger military force. He said there was a roughly 30-page plan agreed at a high level, but it was never implemented. The separation between political and armed structures is deliberate. Ponomarev compared it to earlier revolutionary movements, where legal political organisations and combat structures existed separately rather than operating openly as one organisation. The Congress, meanwhile, continues to prepare for the possibility of revolutionary change. Ponomarev does not consider revolution inevitable, but he believes the possibility is real enough to prepare for. If change eventually comes gradually from within the existing system, the Congress may have little institutional role. If a revolutionary situation develops, however, there would already be a political structure working on what should come next. That leaves two different questions at the centre of his approach: what Russia should look like after Putin, and how the Putin regime can actually be replaced.

Сопротивление - не терроризм Обсуждение российского Сопротивления часто начинается не с того вопроса: законны ли его действия? В России многие из них, очевидно, незаконны, да и подпольное сопротивление вряд ли может действовать исключительно в рамках, установленных властями, которым оно противостоит. Но сам по себе этот факт ничего не говорит о том, с чем мы имеем дело - с политическим сопротивлением, саботажем, повстанческой деятельностью или терроризмом. Эти понятия слишком часто смешивают, словно они означают одно и то же. Особенно важно помнить об этом, когда мерилом становится само российское законодательство. Государство может криминализировать выступления против войны, сотрудничество с Украиной или поддержку организаций, которые оно считает экстремистскими. Человек, преследуемый по таким законам, действительно нарушил российское законодательство. Делает ли это его террористом - совсем другой вопрос. Романтизировать подпольное сопротивление тоже не стоит. Операции могут быть плохо спланированы, люди могут совершать ошибки, могут пострадать мирные жители. Такие случаи требуют внимательного разбора и, когда это оправданно, критики. Но непреднамеренные последствия операции - не то же самое, что сознательный выбор мирных жителей в качестве цели, как и атака на военную инфраструктуру не может автоматически ставиться в один ряд с нападением, целью которого является запугивание гражданского населения. При этом не нужно принимать на веру и то, как сами участники сопротивления себя определяют. Терминология Кремля не должна автоматически определять нашу оценку, но то же самое относится и к терминологии самих групп. Гораздо разумнее смотреть на их методы, цели и конкретные действия. Для тех, кто следит за российским Сопротивлением из-за рубежа, это не просто вопрос терминологии. Отдельные акты саботажа часто доходят до западной аудитории почти без контекста: кто их совершил, что было целью, за что выступает эта группа и почему она выбрала именно такую форму сопротивления. Без этого контекста совершенно разные организации и совершенно разные действия легко оказываются под одним и тем же ярлыком.

Ilya Ponomarev (@iponomarev) talked about what happened around the RVC, HUR and SBU, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, the pressure on Putin, and bringing the war back onto Russian territory. youtu.be/SKNImbfImvQ?is=x-Sg… 🔹 The situation around the RVC, HUR and SBU is worrying. Hopefully it will be resolved quickly and the work of the RVC will not suffer because of internal disputes. 🔹 Any violation of the law has to be investigated, even when it involves people who have fought for Ukraine. Fighting at the front doesn’t put anyone above the law. 🔹 Rivalry, jealousy, intrigues and fights between different Ukrainian structures are another matter. Internal disputes shouldn’t interfere with the work of people fighting Russia. 🔹 Russia keeps hitting Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. Jet-powered Shaheds are becoming a bigger problem too. Ukraine can shoot them down, but it needs many more interceptors, and production needs to increase quickly. 🔹 These attacks also force Ukraine to spend more resources on air defence and leave less for long-range strikes against Russian refineries, logistics and other targets. 🔹 Strikes inside Russia are especially important. Many Russians can distance themselves from a war fought somewhere else and from soldiers dying in Ukraine. Drones over Russia, closed airports and disruptions at home are much harder to ignore. 🔹 Not every strike is only about military or economic damage. There is a psychological side to the war as well, and Ukraine could make much more use of it. 🔹 Russians can forgive their leaders a lot. Weakness is harder to forgive. Putin has spent years presenting himself as a strong leader who has everything under control. Making him look helpless, unable to protect Russia or deliver what he promised hits him where it hurts. 🔹 More Russians now want the war to end, but that shouldn’t be confused with wanting Russia to lose. Many still want victory, or at least an end that doesn’t feel like defeat or humiliation. The longer the war continues without either, the more pressure this puts on Putin. 🔹 Putin isn’t only worried about pressure from outside Russia. He is afraid of his own people too. If economic pressure becomes severe enough, people around him may start wondering how much they are willing to lose to keep him in power.

On August 30, hang the flag of Tatarstan on your window or balcony. Let the green-white-red banner become a symbol of our unity. We will be together. Let everyone see: Tatars are everywhere, and we remember our homeland. Let's show the whole world that we exist, we are together, and there are many of us!

What could actually weaken Putin's regime? In a new interview, Ilya Ponomarev (@iponomarev) spoke about Ukrainian strikes inside Russia, the Kremlin, a possible new mobilization and why making the war more expensive won't be sufficient to end it. youtu.be/sJaRvAoZ1cM?is=h7dE… 🔹 Strikes on refineries, warehouses and other large facilities have a serious economic effect, but they won't bring down the regime. Symbolic strikes are underestimated. The Kremlin's power also depends on the belief that Russia cannot be defeated and that the authorities are able to protect themselves. Targets matter. State and military symbols are one thing. Cultural or religious sites are another and could instead push more Russians behind the war. 🔹 Russian elites fear Putin more than they fear the war. Plotting against the regime still carries a much greater personal risk than doing nothing. Ukraine and the West are increasing the cost of the war, but are not working towards regime change in Russia. Russia won't simply stop because the war becomes more expensive. 🔹 A new mobilization is possible after the elections, but another public campaign like 2022 is less likely. Recruitment quotas can simply be increased, with more pressure on conscripts and prisoners and more money offered for contracts. The 2022 mobilization caused serious discontent. Until then, many Russians could see the war as something fought by people who had chosen to sign contracts. Mobilization meant they could be sent themselves. 🔹 Russia is barely hitting Ukraine's energy infrastructure at the moment. This could change once the cold weather begins. Ukraine is heading into autumn and winter without enough air defence missiles. 🔹 Nikolai Bondarenko is popular, charismatic and difficult to control. Keeping him out of the State Duma removes an unnecessary risk for the Kremlin. Yabloko could potentially have received around 5–7% and entered the State Duma. That wasn't part of the planned scenario. 🔹 More than half of Russians now say they want peace, but many mean peace on Russian terms. The group prepared to accept Russia losing the war remains at around 20%. There will be no lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine while the current regime remains in Moscow.

Four years ago, I started writing about the Russian Resistance for a Western audience. A lot has happened since then, but one thing hasn't changed: I still believe the West knows far too little about the people who are resisting Putin, inside and outside Russia. I don't want to decide Russia's future for them. I just want people here to know who they are. My latest article for OSM STATEČNÝCH @RuskyOdboj8 🫡 osmstatecnych.cz/en/i-wish-t… Thank you 🙏

Can the war end while Putin remains in power? Sanctions are hurting Russia. Ukrainian strikes are reaching deeper into the country and the economy is getting worse. But Putin is still in the Kremlin and the war continues. In a new interview (English) with Ilya Ponomarev (@IPonomarev) for Silicon Curtain, the discussion turns to regime change in Russia and why it may be the only way to finally end the war. Some of the main points: 🔹️Putin is in a lose-lose situation. If he ends the war without victory, he risks losing power. If he continues, he only delays the end. Between an immediate end and a delayed one, he chooses the delayed one. 🔹️Wildberries has become a major distribution hub for defence-related goods, including supplies coming from China. The strikes on its warehouses hit a logistics network that is helping the Russian war effort and also send a message to other companies doing the same. 🔹️A man travelling to Russia recently had his flight diverted because of a drone attack and spent around 20 hours at the airport. Everyone was angry, but nobody blamed Putin or the war. They blamed Ukraine. More disruption inside Russia doesn't automatically mean more opposition to the Kremlin. 🔹️Many Russians want the war to end, but on Russian terms. They don't want Russia to lose. The number of people who believe Russia should lose because this is a criminal war has remained at around 20%. 🔹️Russia is getting poorer and the budget is under pressure, but economic problems alone are unlikely to bring the system down. Russia still has a large domestic market and continues trading with China, India and other countries. A real economic collapse in the next one to three years is unlikely. 🔹️The Russian elites may be much more important. They have the influence to trigger change, but for now they fear the regime more than they fear the consequences of staying with it. That would have to change. 🔹️And there has to be a way out for those who turn against Putin. They need to know that they and their families will be safe and that there is a future for them afterwards. Without this, there is little reason to take the risk. 🔹️Putin is careful with repression. People can disagree quietly or stay away from serious political activity. Even the fake opposition in the State Duma has its place. He understands that pushing too hard could create more resistance. 🔹️He uses fear in the West in much the same way. Threats and provocations make politicians hesitate. More hybrid attacks are likely, but a direct military attack would be a very different step. An unfulfilled threat can be more useful than one actually carried out. Change has to come from inside Russia, but waiting for sanctions, economic problems or public anger to bring it about is not enough. As long as Putin remains in power, he has every reason to continue the war. Ending the war therefore also means dealing with the question of who rules Russia.

Tragic news from Warsaw: Sergei Vlasenko, a delegate of the Congress of People's Deputies, has died. The body of Sergei Vlasenko was found in Warsaw. His roommate discovered him with a head injury. The circumstances of his death are currently unknown. The Congress doesn't rule out the possibility that his death may have been violent, but stresses that it's important to wait for the results of the official investigation and not draw premature conclusions. Sergei was a former deputy from the Russian Far East. After the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he left Russia, obtained political asylum in Poland and continued to participate in the Russian democratic movement. It's now especially important to establish what happened to Sergei and to ensure a thorough and objective investigation into his death. Darya Krasovskaya, co-chair of the Congress of People's Deputies, said: “It is difficult to talk about him in the past tense. Sergei was our colleague and a delegate to the Congress of People's Deputies. He participated in our joint work, meetings and discussions, and dedicated his energy, time and life experience to it. His contribution will remain a part of what we created together. But Sergei was more than just a delegate and a participant in political work. He was a person we knew, with whom we talked, argued, met and made plans. He will be remembered, and he will be missed among us. On behalf of myself and the Congress, we express our deepest condolences to Sergei's family, relatives and friends. We share your grief. May his memory be eternal.” The Congress says it will continue to follow the release of official information regarding the circumstances of Sergei's death. My deepest condolences to Sergei's family, friends and colleagues🕯️ t.me/roskongress/27248 Rosdep.org

No ceasefire, a war of attrition and a growing security problem for Europe youtu.be/FlTxaXqZmwg?is=glZd… In a new interview, Ilya Ponomarev (@iponomarev) discussed why there is little reason to expect a ceasefire in the near future, what could actually put pressure on the Kremlin, Ukraine-US defense cooperation and the growing Russian threat inside Europe. ▪️ A ceasefire before Russia’s September elections looks increasingly unlikely. The Kremlin is not only dealing with the war itself, but also with pressure from parties and political forces demanding an even harder line against Ukraine. Any compromise now could easily be used against the ruling party during the election campaign. The increasingly aggressive rhetoric coming from Moscow is also part of this domestic political picture. ▪️ Russia is still betting on a long war of attrition. Moscow appears to believe it can absorb Ukrainian strikes on refineries, ports and other infrastructure while causing far greater damage inside Ukraine. But the two societies are fighting very different wars. For Ukrainians, this is a fight for survival. Russians are not facing the same existential threat, which makes the Kremlin’s calculation much less certain over time. ▪️ Destroying infrastructure can make the war increasingly expensive for Russia, but that alone may not be enough to stop it. Putin has tied his own political survival too closely to the war to simply walk away from it. The more important question is what happens around him. For now, much of the strategy still depends on the hope that enough economic and political pressure will eventually push parts of the Russian elite to act. ▪️ Ukraine-US defense cooperation is slowly moving beyond simply asking Washington for weapons. American Patriot stocks are limited, while Ukrainian drone and interceptor technology is increasingly interesting to the US. Joint production, licensing and eventually combining cheaper Ukrainian systems with more advanced Western air defense could become much more important than traditional weapons deliveries alone. ▪️ The security problem is no longer limited to Ukraine. European countries are dealing with suspected sabotage, covert operations and other forms of Russian hybrid activity, while their security services still operate largely within national borders despite the open Schengen area. Poland, Germany and the Baltic states are already taking the threat more seriously, but Europe still has considerable gaps in its ability to respond. The full interview is worth watching, especially because several of these questions now go far beyond the battlefield: how long Russia can sustain the war, what could actually produce political change inside the country, and whether Europe is prepared for a confrontation that is already reaching beyond Ukraine.

"Russians do not forgive weakness in their leaders." Ilya Ponomarev (@iponomarev), Chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies Fires in Moscow and the Moscow region, fuel shortages, strikes on logistics centers, and disruptions to transportation - the war that the Kremlin promised to keep "far away" is increasingly reaching Russia's own rear. But does this mean that society is ready to change its attitude toward the authorities? Not necessarily. Economic difficulties alone rarely lead to political change. On the contrary, history shows that under external pressure, part of society tends to rally around the regime. However, there is one factor that is truly dangerous for an authoritarian system - the loss of its image of strength and omnipotence. That is why the Kremlin's main challenge today is not only the strikes on infrastructure, but also the erosion of the myth of its own invulnerability. Once the state no longer appears capable of protecting the country, it begins to lose its main source of legitimacy - the perception of strength. As former State Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev notes, recent sociological trends show that support for Vladimir Putin is declining most noticeably within the pro-war camp. And the reason is telling: a significant portion of the regime's supporters see what is happening as a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities. For authoritarian regimes, it is often weakness - not economic hardship- that marks the beginning of a political crisis. Congress of People's Deputies t.me/i_ponomarev/14585

"The future has been stolen from Russian youth," stated Vladimir Zalishchak, a member of the "Congress of People's Deputies" and a former deputy of one of Moscow's municipalities. The delegate of the "Congress of People's Deputies" observes that during Vladimir Putin's years in power, the country has found itself in a deep crisis: the standard of living is declining, young people are increasingly facing a lack of opportunities, the internet and freedom of speech are being restricted, and instead of opportunities for development, the younger generation is being offered the fear of mobilization and war. Zalishchak believes that the current authorities have deprived young people of the right to a free future, education, decent work, and an open world. He called on Russians to unite in order to achieve political change and build a country where young people will once again have hope for a normal life. Congress of People's Deputies t.me/roskongress Rosdep.org

IX Сессия Съезда народных депутатов - Варшава, Польша В преддверии IX Сессии были опубликованы несколько интервью с участниками Съезда, посвящённых ключевым инициативам и актуальным вопросам. Представленные ниже карточки содержат краткое изложение основных тем, обсуждавшихся в этих интервью, и предназначены в качестве удобного обзора для широкой аудитории. Интервью: 🔹️ Илья Пономарёв youtube.com/live/xdROc2blqUA… 🔹️ Андрей Сарафанов youtube.com/live/ITeP4P3V9Uk… 🔹️ Андрий Моисеев youtube.com/live/0LFqcXsme5A…