Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222) profile picture

3rd ones now since X, speech police everywhere.

Joined October 2023
Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)Photo by Jennifer Tsai (@jtht222)
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對於民進黨台北市長候選人沈伯洋接受王偉忠訪問,前政務委員張景森今(11)日表示, 原來王偉忠還在,當年王偉忠用文化軟暴力,嘲笑民進黨口音、長相、草根性,「我們幾乎沒有能力還手」,但是他們倖存下來,「 但是那個王偉忠們可以決定誰是小丑的台灣,已經不在了」 原來王偉忠還在!最近沈伯洋接受王偉忠訪問,引起沈伯洋支持者的一些討論。我看到消息的第一個反應居然是:喔,原來王偉忠還在主持節目。 張景森說我已經很久沒有注意這個人,甚至差不多把他忘了。現在許多年輕人可能也不知道他是誰了! 但是對我們這些從威權年代一路走過來、曾經參與反抗國民黨政治運動的人而言,王偉忠曾經是一個很難忘記、甚至令人非常痛恨的人。不是因為他站出來跟我們正面打仗。恰恰相反。 張景森說,國民黨跟你正面打,你至少知道敵人在哪裡,可以跟他辯論、抗議、對抗。王偉忠厲害的地方,是他不跟你正面打。他利用自己在電視、娛樂與流行文化上的能力,從側面打你的小腹。他用的不是拳頭,而是嘲諷。他不用跟你辯論,而是直接把你變成笑話。 口音可以拿來笑,動作可以拿來笑,長相可以拿來笑,草根性可以拿來笑。民進黨的政治人物原本有他的理念、論述與政治運動的歷史,但經過他的娛樂節目不斷選擇、誇張、模仿,最後剩下一個個滑稽的人格符號,和一個可笑的政黨。我把這種東西叫做文化的軟暴力。它不會讓你流血,卻可以摧毀一個人和一個政黨的公共人格。更不公平的是,那個年代的我們幾乎沒有能力還手。 張景森說,今天的年輕人可能很難想像當年的媒體環境。電視台數量有限,媒體權力高度集中,國民黨長期累積下來的政治、媒體與文化勢力十分巨大。反對運動即使逐漸取得選票,文化力量仍然非常弱。 我們沒有自己的娛樂工業,沒有社群媒體,沒有YouTube,也沒有一支手機就可以直接面對幾十萬人的傳播工具。 張景森說,人家把你做成小丑,你甚至沒有地方可以去解釋自己不是小丑。你如果要上他的節目,除非你自己就自己扮成小丑。 所以對我們那個年代的一些綠營人士來說,王偉忠所代表的東西,比正面攻擊我們的國民黨更令人憤怒。至少國民黨站在你面前跟你打;這種文化力量卻站在旁邊笑你,讓整個社會跟著笑你,而你連反擊的舞台都沒有。 張景森說,但是三十年過去了。我們居然也從那個年代倖存下來了。 民進黨沒有被那些嘲笑聲消滅,反而繼續成長,甚至兩度執政。而台灣社會也完全改變了。媒體不再由少數電視台壟斷,每個政治人物都有自己的發言管道,每個公民也都有反駁的能力。 張景森說,王偉忠所擁有的那種文化霸權也隨著那個時代一起消退了。所以我才會慢慢把他忘掉。 張景森說,這次看到沈伯洋去接受他的訪問,我才突然想起:喔,原來王偉忠還在。但是我已經不太擔心了。 因為今天的沈伯洋,也不是我們當年那一代可以被幾個電視節目抓過來,揉一揉、捏一捏,就塑造成某種滑稽人物的政治人物。 張景森說,沈伯洋有自己的論述,有自己的支持者,也有自己的傳播管道。你可以批評他、反駁他、嘲笑他,他也可以立刻回答你。誰有道理,人民有機會自己判斷。這才是最大的不同。 張景森說,我寫這些,倒不是要重新找王偉忠算一筆三十年前的帳。只是看到他,突然想起了那個年代,有一種悲傷的激動:我們居然活過來了!真正值得高興的是,我們居然已經活過了那個任人嘲弄、卻沒有能力還手的年代。王偉忠還在。但是那個王偉忠們可以決定誰是小丑的台灣,已經不在了!天佑台灣!
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The contrast between Apple's Tim Cook and Musk as well as Huang is that the latter are borderline autistic. Cook was sensitive enough to appearances to walk up to the line without stepping over it. As technologists jealous of their creations, Musk and Huang were less circumspect.
This is why Rubio said he’s on America’s side. American dream starts with one stands on America’s side. This is unnegotiable. Ppl like Huang thinks wealth exempt one from it, so are Musk.
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A joint statement from 🇺🇸 Department of Commerce and 🇺🇸 Department of Justice on their Megaspeed investigation… “Based on the Department of Commerce's investigation, agents from the Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, in conjunction with Singaporean law enforcement officials, conducted an on-site, in-person, end-use check at Megaspeed in June 2025 and interviewed CEO Alice Huang.” teapawt.org/commercegov/status/212…
💥 Alice Huang and her husband Kang Wei (康伟) operated on two tracks pointed at the same goal of vaulting China’s AI capabilities ahead of the US. Her job: cultivating a relationship — one that turned romantic — with Nvidia then-CEO Jensen Huang and securing a pipeline of the company’s advanced-computing chips that Washington has sought to keep from China. His job: building a sprawling network of government-backed data centers across China. The scale of Kang’s data-center business was striking. From 2021 to 2024, the proposed investments tied to Kang’s network topped $9 billion, all built with government backing. Chinese government officials hailed Kang’s projects as part of China’s national push to ramp up computing power across the country. The couple’s work has spilled out into the open after news broke that Jensen Huang and Alice Huang were romantically involved and that the US suspected that she was providing information to Chinese intelligence agencies. Jensen Huang has since resigned from Nvidia as US authorities investigate whether export controls on Nvidia’s most powerful chips were violated. At least some Nvidia chips obtained by Alice Huang’s company, Megaspeed, were shipped to China. Chinese public records, including securities filings and government announcements, don’t establish that Beijing directed Megaspeed’s procurement of Nvidia chips or that the chips ended up in data centers linked to Kang. But the records illustrate that the couple operated on both sides of the US-China technology divide: Chinese state money was invested in Kang’s domestic ventures as his wife’s overseas company gained access to the chips Washington was trying to keep out of China. Kang connected those worlds, having known Jensen Huang from both men’s days in the videogame industry. Kang told people who know the couple that he had introduced his wife to Jensen and that he appeared to accept their romantic relationship. The roots of Kang’s China data-center business trace to late 2021, well before the US began restricting sales of advanced AI chips to China. At the center was Century Longteng, a company headquartered in Shanghai. In late 2021, Century Longteng’s investors included a local Shanghai government body with a 10% stake and a 27% stake for an investment vehicle for the private-equity arm of Kang’s main business venture, Hexi Capital. A controlling stake of 63% was held by Century Huatong, a Shenzhen-listed conglomerate known primarily for online gaming that has also expanded into data-center infrastructure. Kang later assumed an executive role in Century Longteng. In early 2022, Century Longteng signed a framework agreement with Huawei to collaborate on cloud data centers, energy infrastructure and computing. At a signing ceremony, Kang stood alongside Huawei’s senior executives. By then, the US had already blacklisted Huawei. The Huawei agreement was the first in a series of business deals that gave Century Longteng a sprawling portfolio of data-center investment backed by the Chinese government.  One publicly announced project in the summer of 2022 was with Wuhu, Anhui province. Century Longteng agreed to build what government records describe as an intelligent-computing industrial park.  The $4.5 billion planned complex was enormous: 8 data-center buildings spread across nearly 4.1 million square feet — larger than 70 football fields — housing some 24,000 server racks. The project received state support on electricity and infrastructure as part of Beijing’s “East Data, West Computing” strategy, a plan to spread computing capacity across the country, Wuhu government records show.  As of April this year, at least one data-center building, roughly 500,000 square feet, had been registered as completed in Wuhu. 1/n wsj.com/world/china/alice-hu…
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黄仁勋下台后英伟达拟收紧AI融资!今年参与129笔创投交易,初创企业庆幸赶在换帅前拿到巨资 美国《华尔街日报》11月15日披露,随着英伟达(NVIDIA)创始人黄仁勋辞去执行长职务,临时执行长科莱特·克雷斯(Colette Kress)预计将大幅收紧公司此前激进的AI算力融资、信用担保及初创企业投资。英伟达过去一年大举为AI产业提供资金,甚至为采购自家GPU的客户承担融资风险,如今这种扩张模式正面临重大调整。 根据PitchBook统计,截至11月10日,英伟达今年已参与创纪录的129笔风险投资交易,涉及交易金额占全球风险投资交易总额的27%。瑞银集团分析师蒂姆·阿库里(Tim Arcuri)估计,如果英伟达减少融资支持,可能使AI市场失去至少500亿美元资金来源。 部分已经获得英伟达投资的初创企业执行长,为交易赶在黄仁勋下台前完成而感到庆幸;尚未签约的企业则面临资金落空的风险。其中,AI搜索公司Perplexity已完成一笔30亿美元的英伟达投资,而Reflection AI、Thinking Machines Lab等企业的重大交易仍存在不确定性。 与此同时,路透社11月16日最新分析指出,英伟达此前建立的庞大AI融资体系不仅涉及股权投资,还包括数千亿美元的未来采购、租赁及信用担保承诺。克雷斯若开始收缩融资,受到冲击最大的可能是高度依赖英伟达支持的新兴云计算公司。 英伟达今年参与129笔创投交易,融资规模远超一般芯片厂商 过去3年,黄仁勋将英伟达从一家芯片供应商,扩张为全球AI产业最重要的投资者和融资支持者之一。 根据《华尔街日报》援引的PitchBook数据,英伟达2023年参与49笔创投交易,到2026年11月10日已增加至129笔。 英伟达不仅直接购买AI初创企业股权,还通过信用担保、承诺租用算力及支持数据中心债务融资等方式,为客户获取资金创造条件。部分接受支持的企业同时又是英伟达GPU的重要采购商。 《华尔街日报》指出,英伟达甚至承诺在部分客户未能找到其他算力租户时,由自己承担相关算力租用义务,以帮助客户获得银行及其他机构融资。 路透社Breakingviews 11月16日进一步披露,截至今年7月,英伟达拥有约4220亿美元的未来采购、投资及租赁承诺,另有最高1650亿美元的或有信用及租赁担保。这些是不同性质的财务承诺,并不意味着英伟达已经实际支付了相同数额的现金。 这套体系帮助AI数据中心迅速扩张,也使英伟达同时承担芯片供应商、投资者及融资支持者的多重角色。 已拿到30亿美元投资!Perplexity等初创企业庆幸赶在黄仁勋下台前完成交易 《华尔街日报》披露,随着黄仁勋离任,一些已经完成英伟达融资交易的初创企业执行长明显松了一口气,因为他们赶在公司管理层发生重大变化之前,锁定了关键资金。 其中最典型的是AI搜索公司Perplexity。 知情人士透露,Perplexity执行长阿拉文德·斯里尼瓦斯(Aravind Srinivas)10月30日在公司旧金山总部举行的每周全员会议上,向员工宣布英伟达已完成对该公司30亿美元的投资。 就在前一天,外界刚曝出黄仁勋可能成为中共情报行动目标的消息。 Perplexity目前还在寻求新一轮融资,拟融资前估值达到380亿美元。 相较之下,尚未完成交易的初创企业处境更加不确定。部分企业每月消耗大量资金购买算力,却还没有形成足以支撑运营的稳定收入。一旦失去英伟达的资金支持,它们不仅可能无法继续快速扩张,还可能难以完成下一轮融资。 Reflection AI与Thinking Machines交易未完成,融资前景出现变数 《华尔街日报》进一步披露,至少两家重要AI企业的交易尚未完全落实。 Reflection AI: 这家开源AI模型开发商估值约250亿美元。英伟达此前向其提出技术授权及人才引进方案,黄仁勋本人也曾公开赞赏该公司的技术,但直到黄仁勋离任,双方仍未达成最终协议。 Thinking Machines Lab: 英伟达正在敲定对这家AI模型企业的大规模投资,交易对应的公司估值约400亿美元。知情人士表示,Thinking Machines方面仍有信心完成交易,但投资尚未最终落实。 此外,英国新兴云计算企业Nscale正在与英伟达及其他投资者谈判,希望为美国西弗吉尼亚州一座服务Anthropic、总投资约450亿美元的数据中心项目获得融资支持。 这些交易处于不同阶段,不能简单视为已经被取消。但它们面临同一个问题:失去黄仁勋亲自推动后,克雷斯是否还愿意按照原来的速度、条件和风险规模提供支持? 黄仁勋离任前已开始收紧融资,在柏林警告云计算公司必须让客户预付款 《华尔街日报》还披露,英伟达融资模式的调整并非从黄仁勋辞职后才开始。 今年10月,在德国柏林举行的英伟达GTC活动期间,黄仁勋召集多家新兴云计算公司执行长,要求他们改变依赖英伟达提供融资支持的经营方式。 黄仁勋告诉这些企业,必须先取得客户预付款,才能更容易获得融资,而不能一味依靠英伟达的资产负债表。 根据两名现场高管及一名事后获悉谈话内容的人士转述,黄仁勋当时批评这些云计算公司没有充分提高算力租赁价格,甚至表示,马斯克愿意以更好的价格租用英伟达芯片,因此英伟达没有必要继续依赖这些中间商。 事实上,早在今年8月,黄仁勋和克雷斯就已经开始质疑部分融资交易的投资回报。 当时,大型云计算公司正考虑采用其他厂商的AI芯片,而英伟达已经提前承诺采购大量晶圆及内存。黄仁勋要求财务团队重新评估,向客户提供巨额融资担保究竟能为公司带来多少实际芯片销售。 英伟达随后暂停部分融资交易,并缩减对OpenAI俄亥俄州数据中心项目的支持。 这说明,黄仁勋离任前已意识到激进融资的风险;克雷斯接掌公司后,可能进一步加快原本已经开始的收缩。 克雷斯长期反对高风险融资,英伟达董事会加强交易审查 我之前已在相关帖子中,追踪黄仁勋女婿尼科·卡普雷斯(Nico Caprez)参与推动英伟达巨额AI融资交易,以及克雷斯试图限制公司担保风险、与黄仁勋发生冲突的经过。 此次新披露进一步说明,克雷斯此前反对的并非个别投资项目,而是英伟达长期依靠巨额资金支持客户采购GPU的整体扩张方式。 路透社11月12日报道,克雷斯担任英伟达财务长期间,多次反对黄仁勋与销售团队推动的高风险融资交易。 《华尔街日报》此前也披露,在部分交易被暂停后,卡普雷斯等高管曾告知客户,相关融资方案正受到英伟达执行团队及董事会更严格的审查,导致交易更难迅速完成。 随着克雷斯成为临时执行长,这种原本受到黄仁勋个人影响的内部制衡,可能转变为新管理层的正式经营政策。 路透社警告:“黄仁勋银行”开始收缩,AI产业可能失去重要资金来源 11月16日,路透社Breakingviews发表题为《现在不是拆解“黄仁勋银行”的好时机》的分析,指出英伟达的资金支持已经成为众多AI基础设施项目融资的重要条件。 报道披露,英伟达目前承诺在特定条件下,向CoreWeave等云服务商购买约360亿美元的算力服务,并支持约200亿美元的第三方数据中心租赁安排。 此外,英伟达针对软银旗下SB Energy与OpenAI相关项目承担最高约1050亿美元的担保责任。 路透社指出,现有合同未必受到直接影响,真正面临压力的是需要通过英伟达提供新担保,才能继续获得银行贷款和其他融资的企业。 与此同时,利率上升、数据中心建设成本增加以及市场对AI投资回报的质疑,正在使外部融资环境变得更加困难。 对于尚未建立稳定客户收入、持续依靠融资购买GPU的新兴云计算企业而言,英伟达若停止提供新的融资担保,它们可能被迫缩减数据中心建设,要求客户提前支付租金,或接受更昂贵的融资条件。 不过,路透社11月16日的另一篇报道指出,英伟达与Apollo、BlackRock、Brookfield、高盛及KKR等金融机构的融资合作讨论仍在继续,尚无迹象表明公司已全面暂停相关计划。市场预期的变化主要集中于未来交易的规模、审查和风险承担条件。 英伟达面临的变化,已经不只是更换执行长。黄仁勋时代,公司利用自身资本实力为AI客户提供投资、融资及担保,推动客户持续采购英伟达GPU。如今,克雷斯准备重新审查这套模式的风险与回报。 此前凭借英伟达支持获得资金的企业,已经完成交易者暂时保住了融资;尚未签约者则必须面对一个新的现实:未来能否继续扩张,将更多取决于自身客户收入及独立融资能力,而不再只是黄仁勋是否愿意为其提供资金。
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
Ahead of the Trump–Xi–Putin trilateral at APEC Shenzhen: this will be the clearest test yet of my concept of "Triangle of Happiness", the functional triumvirate of realpolitik between the three nuclear powers with the deepest fingerprints on the two proxy wars, Ukraine and Iran. First takeaway: We are not in WW3 and this is not Yalta 2.0: no carve-up into strategic spheres of interest (Western Hemisphere for the US, Europe for Russia, the South and East China Seas for China). We are at the very beginning of this new strategic competition, not its end. And we know that the US wants to emerge victorious, so do China and Russia. Second takeaway: This is not 19th concert of global powers either. Middle powers bridge the two systems (security with the US, economy with China), hedge against all (India) or balance as hubs through geography, tech leverage or raw materials as they do not accept the bifurcation of the global system and do not want to get caught in a new binary world. Third takeaway: It is a new Cold War of global grayzone warfare. The US wants to win the AI-steered 4IR and establish a Pax Americana 2.0. China and Russia want to prevent it and build an order on their own terms, structures and formats. Most of the competition takes place below the treshhold of a conventional and nuclear exchange between the US and the DragonBear as the modus operandi of strategic coordination between China and Russia. Fourth takeaway: Iran is the most acute file as it has triggered a fourth systemic risk-driven global crisis through the destruction of the critical infrastructure in the Gulf and the closure of Hormuz. China and Russia sustain Tehran, so any durable deal runs through them. Two proxy wars plus the greatest chokepoint disruption - this might result in this fourth systemic risk after 2007, 2020 and 2022, what I define as a Global System Rupture, a possible fourth systemic global crisis. The Iran war can flare again within weeks. Fifth takeaway: Russia’s logic is unchanged. In December 2021 I outlined the three dimensions of Russia’s comprehensive war: subjugating Ukraine, destroying the European security order, and taking pole position as the wild card in the US–China rivalry. Putin went to war precisely to put Russia on the same level as Washington and Beijing. A three-way photo in Shenzhen is part of that payoff, even though Ukraine is officially off the trilateral agenda. Sixth takeaway: Each side comes to Shenzhen for something different: - Russia drives the format. It wants global status and the image of strategic parity with Washington and Beijing. - China hosts and gains prestige. It sets the terms, avoids owning any failure, and still rejects three-way nuclear limits. - The US wants an opening on arms control now that New START has expired, and it wants help on Iran. Trump arrives weakened by the midterms and in a hurry to make deals before the new Congress sits in January - Unexpected wild card could be Korea talks and setting the stage for a political settlement of the armistice between North and South Korea within the Triangle of Happiness. Seventh takeaway: The triumvirate’s task is minimal: agree on transparent rules of engagement that prevent kinetic or nuclear war (CSBMs, direct channels of communication, etc.), keep the global system afloat, and manage the cascading risks. Other files can’t be ignored either: the AI revolution (openly a front of the new Cold War since the Nvidia affair), nuclear proliferation, and keeping humans in control of nuclear weapons. Bottomline: Managed confrontation for the sake of the strategic stability amid MAD 2.0, not any grand bargain, separation of spheres of influcence or Yalta 2.0. Stay tuned.
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People completely missed this, but Alice Huang was reportedly added to an Interested Persons list for Five Eyes intelligence sharing. She applied for a job with HSBC, to be the assistant to the president of the bank. "The application was unusual: it came from outside the formal hiring channels, at the insistence of an executive at the bank." More here from this story, below. asianvalueinvestor.com/news/…
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So Commerce is out with a statement and it frames the focus in a couple of key ways. 1. Whether Alice Huang was a spy or not is not worth mentioning. As I've told you take out the salacious aspects of alleged spies and sex and you still have a very real problem for NVIDIA. 2. Notice what the Commerce statement is doing around dates and notifications. This reads to me like this is setting up NVIDIA for a real hammer drop. Let me explain: a) In "May 2025" Commerce requested records and in "June 2025" Megaspeed was put on the no-sell list. This is the legal public record equivalent of throwing down and locking in what happened and when it happened. Why does that matter? b) As the NYT is reporting Megaspeed's Malaysian subsidiary continued receiving chips well into 2026. teapawt.org/AnaSwanson/status/2122… We also know that Alice Huang was photographed out and about with Jensen well beyond June 2025. Commerce is effectively planting the flag on specific dates and actions that should have a mountain of paperwork behind it and what it told and sent documentation to NVIDIA. Think of what Commerce did listing the dates and actions as the opening shot that I will assume is very well documented. 3. So tie this together assuming Commerce is accurate on the dates and actions. NVIDIA is on the face of it in big trouble. Big big trouble. Let's even assume, there is some technicality by which NVIDIA might be technically correct about selling chips to the Megaspeed Malaysian company, maybe for instance Megaspeed was only a minority owner and Alice Huang was the majority owner so the restriction on Megaspeed in their view was not applicable so they made the sale, this is not a fight NVIDIA is going to win at the end of the day. In other words, if NVIDIA thinks they can escape real trouble by potentially arguing a technicality, they are in all probability very mistaken. If they were as flagrant and willful as they appear at this point, NVIDIA and individuals are very likely facing criminal charges. On a brief side note, my sense of how Jensen is reacting and who he is hiring seems as much designed to prepare for the possibility of facing a lot more than a PR problem shall we say. Please note, NVIDIA board is clearly reading the room for a change and create a compliance department: teapawt.org/annmarie/status/212264… It seems quite likely they are finally doing their job and realizing there are some major issues here and that Jensen either did not conduct basic functions a company leader should do or lied to the board about material information. 4. Let's also strongly note none of this absolves the Commerce or Justice Departments OR the Trump administration. Commerce makes the rules and passes them to NVIDIA so they are not responsible for what NVIDIA did, though you can expect ultimate settlement talks to include USG personnel inside NVIDIA to ensure compliance. Where Commerce, Justice, and Trump administration should be questioned is given the dates on the actions, why hasn't this been pursued more rapidly when public information clearly demonstrates at best Jensen and NVIDIA were not taking warnings about Alice Huang and Megaspeed seriously and quite possibly playing games around export control violations? It's great NVIDIA was notified but this is the definition of a slow walk and do nothing
Joint Statement from Department of Commerce and Department of Justice on Megaspeed Investigation.
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
揭露安然公司丑闻的调查记者警告:英伟达危机可能比历次重大企业丑闻更加庞大、更加丑陋! 曾揭露美国安然公司(Enron)财务丑闻的知名调查记者贝瑟妮·麦克莱恩(Bethany McLean),11月14日在英国《金融时报》发表题为《英伟达的个人崇拜注定以灾难收场》的评论文章,警告英伟达当前的危机可能演变成规模更大、性质更加恶劣的企业丑闻。 麦克莱恩将英伟达与安然、泰科国际(Tyco)、房利美(Fannie Mae)及制药公司Valeant等曾深陷重大丑闻的企业相提并论,认为黄仁勋长期以来获得的个人崇拜、英伟达对市值增长的执着,以及围绕AI芯片建立的庞大融资网络,都存在值得警惕的危险信号。 她写道: 英伟达目前的丑闻与这些公司当年的丑闻并不相同。它是一家盈利能力强、拥有真实产品的公司。然而,这场丑闻最终可能更加庞大、更加丑陋。 这篇文章于11月15日受到美国财经媒体人卡尔·昆塔尼利亚(Carl Quintanilla)等人的转发,11月16日再次在社交媒体上引发关注。 曾揭露安然丑闻的记者,警告英伟达出现企业傲慢的危险信号 麦克莱恩是美国知名财经调查记者,也是《房间里最聪明的人:安然公司的惊人崛起与丑闻式崩塌》(The Smartest Guys in the Room)的合著者之一。 她对英伟达的警告,并非简单地将黄仁勋与安然公司高管进行类比,而是指出多起重大企业丑闻背后反复出现的共同问题:企业取得巨大成功后,高管越来越相信自身永远正确,投资者和董事会则逐渐失去独立审视管理层的能力。 麦克莱恩尤其关注黄仁勋围绕英伟达建立的个人崇拜文化。 在她看来,企业领导人对市值、规模以及自身影响力的过度迷恋,往往是危险的早期信号。 她提到,黄仁勋曾在播客采访中宣称,英伟达必然会先于其他公司达到10万亿美元市值。他还公开强调,公司投入的每1美元能够带来100美元的回报。 麦克莱恩认为,这种对公司规模和资本回报的夸张表述,以及黄仁勋对依赖英伟达的AI企业所表现出的傲慢态度,都值得投资者警惕。 麦克莱恩此前已调查英伟达融资网络,梳理出5305亿美元承诺与担保 麦克莱恩对英伟达的质疑并不止于公司治理。 11月6日,她作为作者之一,在调查媒体Hunterbrook发表《英伟达银行全面指南》(The Comprehensive Guide to the Bank of Nvidia),系统梳理英伟达与AI初创企业、云计算公司及数据中心之间的资金关系。 该调查指出,英伟达早已不只是销售GPU芯片的制造商,还通过股权投资、算力采购、租赁担保及供应链预付款,成为整个AI产业融资体系的重要支撑者。 Hunterbrook根据英伟达财务披露计算,公司的未来承诺与担保合计达到约5305亿美元,包括供应链采购承诺、云计算服务协议及相关投资和担保安排。 这一数字并不意味着5305亿美元全部已经支付,也不代表全部属于向客户提供的贷款。 调查同时指出,英伟达曾提出向OpenAI投资最高1000亿美元的初步安排,并未包含在上述5305亿美元之中。 麦克莱恩特别关注一个问题:当英伟达向AI公司提供资金,而这些公司又使用资金购买英伟达GPU,或向其他使用英伟达GPU的企业租赁算力时,究竟有多少需求能够脱离英伟达自身的资金支持而持续存在? 这种相互依赖的关系一旦受到冲击,风险便可能从个别企业扩散到整个AI基础设施市场。 黄仁勋公开炫耀循环融资:投入1美元,收回100美元 在此前的Hunterbrook调查中,麦克莱恩还引用了黄仁勋2026年9月出席高盛会议时的一段讲话。 黄仁勋当时公开谈论英伟达投资AI企业的回报模式,声称公司每投入1美元,就能够带来100美元的收入,并表示,如果这被称为循环融资,那就应该继续扩大这种模式。 这番讲话说明,黄仁勋不仅了解英伟达投资客户、再由客户购买英伟达产品的资金循环,还将其视为推动公司增长的重要战略。 Hunterbrook的调查警告,一旦AI算力需求减弱、竞争对手技术取得突破,或者依赖英伟达融资支持的客户出现财务困难,这些相互关联的投资、采购与担保安排就可能形成连锁风险。 调查特别指出,谷歌TPU、亚马逊Trainium等替代芯片,以及AI计算需求结构的变化,都可能对英伟达原有的商业模式构成冲击。 从黄乐情报调查到芯片出口管制,英伟达危机已超出一般商业丑闻 麦克莱恩在《金融时报》的文章中,还将围绕黄仁勋与黄乐的关系、Megaspeed芯片交易,以及美国对中共国先进芯片出口管制的调查,列为英伟达面临的重大问题。 美国有关部门正在追查英伟达先进芯片是否通过第三方企业转入受到出口限制的中共国客户手中,以及相关企业高管是否了解或者参与这些交易。 英伟达董事会已经聘请外部律师开展调查。调查涉及高管行为、公司治理以及是否存在违反美国出口管制的问题。 与此同时,美国财政部长贝森特公开质疑英伟达的企业文化,追问公司是否为提高营收和利润而推动存在违规风险的芯片交易。 11月16日,美国战略与国际问题研究中心(CSIS)也发表分析,指出黄仁勋离任所引发的公司领导层危机,已经具有重大国家安全影响。 这意味着英伟达所面对的风险,已经从黄仁勋个人行为,延伸至公司内部管理、芯片交易合规,以及美国关键技术的国家安全保护。 安然丑闻揭露者的核心警告:巨大的成功可能使整个公司失去警觉 麦克莱恩对英伟达的评价之所以受到关注,与她此前揭露安然财务问题的经历密切相关。 2001年,她在《财富》杂志发表文章,公开质疑安然公司的估值与商业模式。随后,安然隐藏债务、虚增业绩等重大财务问题相继曝光,公司最终破产。 在英伟达事件中,麦克莱恩并未认定这家公司已经发生与安然相同的财务欺诈。她强调,两家公司的商业基础存在重要差异。 但她认为,围绕杰出企业领导人形成的个人神话,往往会让董事会、投资者以及外界忽视已经出现的危险信号。 麦克莱恩所提出的更深层问题,是英伟达此前的成功究竟在多大程度上掩盖了内部治理、资金循环和出口管制方面的风险。 对于已经失去黄仁勋领导的英伟达而言,接任管理层需要面对的,不仅是恢复投资者信心,还包括重新审查黄仁勋时代留下的庞大交易网络,以及厘清董事会和管理层在这些交易中的责任。
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
Literally took the scandal coming out for this big strong man who screamed at his employees to turn into a sullen teenager saying “whatever” and “I don’t care.” Jensen Huang is a monumental coward
Some Nvidia staffers described Jensen Huang as a demanding and difficult boss, who was known to dress people down in meetings and berate those around him for what he saw as subpar ideas or a lack of urgency. on.wsj.com/3X97RS4
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
黃仁勳!🤌🤌🤌🤌 ========== 根據2026年11月釋出的報告,即使在Nvidia在2025年6月將MegaSpeed列入「禁銷」名單後,Megaspeed仍繼續收到大量Nvidia AI晶片。 最重要的區別是,Nvidia禁止直接向Megaspeed銷售,但透過第三方製造商及其馬來西亞子公司Speedmatrix的發貨顯然仍在繼續。 According to reports published in November 2026, Megaspeed continued receiving substantial quantities of Nvidia AI chips even after Nvidia placed it on its “no-sell” list in June 2025. The most important distinction is that Nvidia banned direct sales to Megaspeed, but shipments through third-party manufacturers and its Malaysian subsidiary, Speedmatrix, apparently continued.
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
💥 This is a detailed report on Megaspeed from Dec 2025. The risk has been known for a long time, but 🇺🇸 Commerce Department didn’t take any decisive action against Megaspeed while Jensen Huang has been vouching for the company. gift link 👉🏻 bloomberg.com/news/features/…
‼️ Most of the Nvidia hardware bought ‌by ⁠Megaspeed’s Indonesian entity was likely transported to China, possibly via private jet after arriving in Indonesia ‼️ Indonesian police have searched the office of PT Megaspeed International Indonesia, a locally incorporated company owned by Singapore-based Megaspeed International. The move, carried out earlier in 2026, was part of an inquiry requested by the FBI to trace Nvidia chips bought by Megaspeed. Officers from Indonesian National Police’s Criminal Investigation Department (Bareskrim) who inspected the premises found server racks at the site but no GPUs. The racks appeared never to have been unpacked or used, suggesting that the chips were never installed there. The raid, which was conducted before the recent Jensen Huang scandal, was the first known enforcement action in Indonesia linked to the case. The official alleged that most of the Nvidia hardware bought by Megaspeed entities was likely shipped to Indonesia. Investigators believe much of it was then sent to China, possibly by private jet. Shipping records show Megaspeed's Indonesian subsidiary imported Nvidia hardware between 2024 and 2026, including ⁠H100 processors and related components. The hardware was delivered in shipments from suppliers including Gigabyte subsidiary Giga Computing. PT Megaspeed International Indonesia has a listed address on the fifth floor of Cyber 1 building at No. 8 Jalan Kuningan Barat in South Jakarta, but the company is not on the building’s tenant list. A building receptionist said that PT Megaspeed instead operates out of the office of PT MettaDC Teknologi Indonesia (MettaDC), an Indonesian carrier-neutral data center and sovereign AI infrastructure provider. An officer at MettaDC confirmed that Megaspeed uses its office, which is enclosed by tinted glass walls near the lift on that floor. The officer said Megaspeed also rents space in the Jababeka Industrial Estate in Cikarang, Bekasi, West Java. The facility is owned by PT HDC, a hyperscale data centre operator. Megaspeed's Indonesian subsidiary was created in May 2024. Singapore's home affairs ⁠ministry said 🇺🇸 Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security carried out a shipment verification check at Megaspeed in June 2025. US officials suspect Megaspeed’s former managing director, Alice Huang, who had a relationship with Jensen Huang, of passing information to Beijing. Jensen Huang resigned on Nov 12. The Huang scandal has sparked calls for a clampdown on the export of cutting-edge US chips, which would complicate Southeast Asia’s AI infrastructure build-out. 🇺🇸 Commerce Department is working on rules that would add Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to a group of countries subject to export restrictions. These rules would make it compulsory for companies exporting advanced chips such as Nvidia’s Blackwell series to those countries to get a license that would prohibit Chinese customers from remotely accessing the computing power. Singapore and the US have discussed the Megaspeed case at a senior-level meeting in Washington, with both countries committing to continue discussions on the matter. In Indonesia, Nvidia-linked data centers, which are clustered in West Java and Batam, with Jakarta as the main hub, could come under greater scrutiny. Much of the capacity for these centres is still being planned or under construction. In Purwakarta, West Java, Raia Grid, a joint digital infrastructure venture of Indonesian investment conglomerate Arsari Group and telecommunications provider Indosat, is due to begin assembling 140 to 150 Nvidia GPUs in Dec. In Batam, Australian AI start-up Firmus and Singapore-based data center operator DayOne are planning a 360MW Nvidia AI Factory campus. It is set to receive up to 170,000 GPUs in 2027 and 2028, with initial operations targeted for 2027. Nvidia is reportedly exploring a US$4.5 billion investment in Batam. straitstimes.com/asia/se-asi… reuters.com/world/asia-pacif…
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
‼️ Most of the Nvidia hardware bought ‌by ⁠Megaspeed’s Indonesian entity was likely transported to China, possibly via private jet after arriving in Indonesia ‼️ Indonesian police have searched the office of PT Megaspeed International Indonesia, a locally incorporated company owned by Singapore-based Megaspeed International. The move, carried out earlier in 2026, was part of an inquiry requested by the FBI to trace Nvidia chips bought by Megaspeed. Officers from Indonesian National Police’s Criminal Investigation Department (Bareskrim) who inspected the premises found server racks at the site but no GPUs. The racks appeared never to have been unpacked or used, suggesting that the chips were never installed there. The raid, which was conducted before the recent Jensen Huang scandal, was the first known enforcement action in Indonesia linked to the case. The official alleged that most of the Nvidia hardware bought by Megaspeed entities was likely shipped to Indonesia. Investigators believe much of it was then sent to China, possibly by private jet. Shipping records show Megaspeed's Indonesian subsidiary imported Nvidia hardware between 2024 and 2026, including ⁠H100 processors and related components. The hardware was delivered in shipments from suppliers including Gigabyte subsidiary Giga Computing. PT Megaspeed International Indonesia has a listed address on the fifth floor of Cyber 1 building at No. 8 Jalan Kuningan Barat in South Jakarta, but the company is not on the building’s tenant list. A building receptionist said that PT Megaspeed instead operates out of the office of PT MettaDC Teknologi Indonesia (MettaDC), an Indonesian carrier-neutral data center and sovereign AI infrastructure provider. An officer at MettaDC confirmed that Megaspeed uses its office, which is enclosed by tinted glass walls near the lift on that floor. The officer said Megaspeed also rents space in the Jababeka Industrial Estate in Cikarang, Bekasi, West Java. The facility is owned by PT HDC, a hyperscale data centre operator. Megaspeed's Indonesian subsidiary was created in May 2024. Singapore's home affairs ⁠ministry said 🇺🇸 Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security carried out a shipment verification check at Megaspeed in June 2025. US officials suspect Megaspeed’s former managing director, Alice Huang, who had a relationship with Jensen Huang, of passing information to Beijing. Jensen Huang resigned on Nov 12. The Huang scandal has sparked calls for a clampdown on the export of cutting-edge US chips, which would complicate Southeast Asia’s AI infrastructure build-out. 🇺🇸 Commerce Department is working on rules that would add Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to a group of countries subject to export restrictions. These rules would make it compulsory for companies exporting advanced chips such as Nvidia’s Blackwell series to those countries to get a license that would prohibit Chinese customers from remotely accessing the computing power. Singapore and the US have discussed the Megaspeed case at a senior-level meeting in Washington, with both countries committing to continue discussions on the matter. In Indonesia, Nvidia-linked data centers, which are clustered in West Java and Batam, with Jakarta as the main hub, could come under greater scrutiny. Much of the capacity for these centres is still being planned or under construction. In Purwakarta, West Java, Raia Grid, a joint digital infrastructure venture of Indonesian investment conglomerate Arsari Group and telecommunications provider Indosat, is due to begin assembling 140 to 150 Nvidia GPUs in Dec. In Batam, Australian AI start-up Firmus and Singapore-based data center operator DayOne are planning a 360MW Nvidia AI Factory campus. It is set to receive up to 170,000 GPUs in 2027 and 2028, with initial operations targeted for 2027. Nvidia is reportedly exploring a US$4.5 billion investment in Batam. straitstimes.com/asia/se-asi… reuters.com/world/asia-pacif…
💥 Thanks to Chinese customers, Malaysia could become the second-largest data center hub in the world, after Virginia, packed with top-of-the-line Nvidia chips China’s leading AI companies can use to challenge American dominance. Jensen Huang built a multibillion-dollar business to feed the ravenous appetite of Chinese customers for American chips, cultivating a network of Asian partners who could serve the Chinese far from Washington. He made a friend of President Trump and lobbied Washington hard to keep the backdoor to China open. China jumped to take advantage of the avenues Trump didn’t close. Its AI developers exploited the Nvidia chips they desperately needed to catch up with America’s leaders, either using smuggled chips or accessing them remotely in places like Malaysia. Revelations about Huang’s affair with an executive at one of those Asian partners now threaten to implode the entire lucrative ecosystem he built in Asia to get China the chips it needed. Nvidia reported $12.4 billion in China revenue in the six months through July 26 of this year, or 7% of its global revenue, and analysts say that countless more billions of dollars ultimately trace back to Chinese customers. It’s been estimated that more than 20% of Nvidia’s revenues last fiscal year were driven by China. In Southeast Asia, Chinese demand is responsible for the massive scale of data centers. Megaspeed, Alice Huang’s company, arranged to send nearly $12 billion worth of top-of-the-line Nvidia chips to companies in China between Mar 2024 and June 2025. Shipment records show orders for several hundred thousand export-controlled chips, though the records don’t show how much of the hardware was actually delivered or where it originated. Huang was unapologetic in pushing to sell as many chips to Chinese customers as possible even as his American customers were racing to stay ahead of Chinese rivals. The CEO’s effort to persuade Trump to allow direct exports of Nvidia’s high-end chips to China was mostly unsuccessful, despite policy flip-flops and headlines on the subject. But the workarounds, including remote access to overseas data centers, made up much of the gap. Huang’s logic: Better to keep customers hooked on American tech and keep high-paying jobs at home than give an opening to rival Chinese chip makers such as Huawei.  Chinese companies quickly figured out the best two routes — smuggling and remote access — to sidestep export bans. By physically bringing Nvidia chips into China, Chinese AI developers keep their computing power nearby, making it easier to test, train and fine-tune powerful AI models. While Megaspeed’s Alice Huang was carrying on an affair with Jensen Huang, her firm sent chips to buyers in China that had years of business ties with local tech companies. A case in March gives a glimpse of smuggling tactics. A co-founder of Super Micro Computer, a longtime Nvidia partner, and others participated in a conspiracy to ship servers to a Southeast Asian company, then onward to China. When inspectors from Super Micro asked to pay a visit to the Southeast Asian company’s facilities to ensure the servers it ordered were in its possession, the conspirators had a problem: the servers had already been sent to China. To pass their audits, the conspirators arranged to build a Potemkin server warehouse that supposedly contained Nvidia chips. To fool a visiting US government inspector, a hair dryer was used to remove and affix serial number stickers. Such prosecutions likely touch only a small fraction of smugglers. Still, with the legal risks growing, many Chinese companies are spending billions of dollars on a legal alternative. Data centers outside China can freely import Nvidia chips and rent the computing power to Chinese customers. In May 2025, the Trump administration opened the floodgates to the tactic by revoking a Biden administration plan to limit how many chips countries in Southeast Asia and 1/n wsj.com/tech/jensen-huang-ba…
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
💥 Alice Huang and her husband Kang Wei (康伟) operated on two tracks pointed at the same goal of vaulting China’s AI capabilities ahead of the US. Her job: cultivating a relationship — one that turned romantic — with Nvidia then-CEO Jensen Huang and securing a pipeline of the company’s advanced-computing chips that Washington has sought to keep from China. His job: building a sprawling network of government-backed data centers across China. The scale of Kang’s data-center business was striking. From 2021 to 2024, the proposed investments tied to Kang’s network topped $9 billion, all built with government backing. Chinese government officials hailed Kang’s projects as part of China’s national push to ramp up computing power across the country. The couple’s work has spilled out into the open after news broke that Jensen Huang and Alice Huang were romantically involved and that the US suspected that she was providing information to Chinese intelligence agencies. Jensen Huang has since resigned from Nvidia as US authorities investigate whether export controls on Nvidia’s most powerful chips were violated. At least some Nvidia chips obtained by Alice Huang’s company, Megaspeed, were shipped to China. Chinese public records, including securities filings and government announcements, don’t establish that Beijing directed Megaspeed’s procurement of Nvidia chips or that the chips ended up in data centers linked to Kang. But the records illustrate that the couple operated on both sides of the US-China technology divide: Chinese state money was invested in Kang’s domestic ventures as his wife’s overseas company gained access to the chips Washington was trying to keep out of China. Kang connected those worlds, having known Jensen Huang from both men’s days in the videogame industry. Kang told people who know the couple that he had introduced his wife to Jensen and that he appeared to accept their romantic relationship. The roots of Kang’s China data-center business trace to late 2021, well before the US began restricting sales of advanced AI chips to China. At the center was Century Longteng, a company headquartered in Shanghai. In late 2021, Century Longteng’s investors included a local Shanghai government body with a 10% stake and a 27% stake for an investment vehicle for the private-equity arm of Kang’s main business venture, Hexi Capital. A controlling stake of 63% was held by Century Huatong, a Shenzhen-listed conglomerate known primarily for online gaming that has also expanded into data-center infrastructure. Kang later assumed an executive role in Century Longteng. In early 2022, Century Longteng signed a framework agreement with Huawei to collaborate on cloud data centers, energy infrastructure and computing. At a signing ceremony, Kang stood alongside Huawei’s senior executives. By then, the US had already blacklisted Huawei. The Huawei agreement was the first in a series of business deals that gave Century Longteng a sprawling portfolio of data-center investment backed by the Chinese government.  One publicly announced project in the summer of 2022 was with Wuhu, Anhui province. Century Longteng agreed to build what government records describe as an intelligent-computing industrial park.  The $4.5 billion planned complex was enormous: 8 data-center buildings spread across nearly 4.1 million square feet — larger than 70 football fields — housing some 24,000 server racks. The project received state support on electricity and infrastructure as part of Beijing’s “East Data, West Computing” strategy, a plan to spread computing capacity across the country, Wuhu government records show.  As of April this year, at least one data-center building, roughly 500,000 square feet, had been registered as completed in Wuhu. 1/n wsj.com/world/china/alice-hu…
💥 This is a detailed report on Megaspeed from Dec 2025. The risk has been known for a long time, but 🇺🇸 Commerce Department didn’t take any decisive action against Megaspeed while Jensen Huang has been vouching for the company. gift link 👉🏻 bloomberg.com/news/features/…
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
sad, excellent piece from @benthompson . This line should not be ignored. “There are whispers that Megaspeed’s ultimate customer was not, or not just, Alibaba, but also the Chinese military. These are whispers, to be clear; it was the affairs that were enough, at least publicly, to lead to Huang’s resignation.”
Obituaries The demise of Jensen Huang was the end of a great many things, including Nvidia’s long-term prospects, the AI bubble, and the exceptional way in which the U.S. viewed itself in the world. stratechery.com/2026/obituar…
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This piece by @benthompson is going viral and for good reason. It's a very well-written historical narrative of why Nvidia is a creature of U.S. strategy, and how the fall of Jensen Huang represents a fundamental break from it. It's wrong, but an important statement on just how most business leaders understand our current context. The thesis is that "Nvidia was, by the powers that be, considered a defense contractor, and Huang never adjusted." The chip industry, Thompson argues, had from its inception focused on global sales, and not being subject to government control. It was organized by venture capitalists to do so, consistent with a tradition going back hundreds of years. The sharp break to a new model model of competing with China, "pursuing the route of bans and forced compliance, instead of innovation and openness," ends American exceptionalism. That's the argument. It's wrong, and obviously so. Let me point out that the U.S. didn't set up chip fabs or any infrastructure or transfer technology to the USSR or the Eastern bloc. Why not? Well there was this thing called the Cold War. To argue that bans and forced compliance are new requires overlooking the entire history of the chip industry until 1989! The chip industry was not created by venture capitalists, it was created, nurtured, and organized at virtually every stage by the U.S. government. It was AT&T that discovered the foundational technology, and military contracts and antitrust cases mandated AT&T share those technologies with U.S. small firms for a small fee. The government then bought from those firms - Motorola and Texas Instruments are the now-famous ones. And the government was the biggest customer for all of the early years, and actively sought to have the customer base widen. The commercialization was not a result of Robert Noyce, but of U.S. policy. There were also always restrictions, and obvious ones. I mentioned the Cold War. But the transfers of technology were also government choices. You can read Alfred Chandler's The Electronic Century, but there's a reason that most of the keychip supply chain went to countries like Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, West Germany and Taiwan, who were all under U.S. military protection. There's a reason that the U.S. government created Sematech in the 1980s and threatened import quotas on Japan, and had IBM source memory from Korea. Semiconductors were *always* a strategic industry and were *always* treated as such. The other point is that the U.S. government has always treated our industries as strategic, and has always used bans and forced compliance as one set of tools to organize our industrial capacity. Alexander Hamilton laid it out his Report on Manufacturers, he did not want the U.S. to be at the mercy of the industrial powerhouse of English, and explicitly sought protection for manufacturing. Thomas Jefferson literally banned U.S. exports. High tariffs were a bulwark of 19th century industrial policy, and that's not even getting into the creation of the 20th century administrative state and very deliberate control over radio technology. The reasons for all of these controls were exposed during the pandemic, when limited sourcing over everything from chips to personal protective equipment to certain kinds of plastic to baby formula subjected all of us to meaningful risk. Are "innovation and openness" also part of that toolkit? Of course. But even those words are too flabby to even parse. Take innovation. Our laws until the 1960s made it clear that innovation in immoral devices, like gambling, was not protected by patents. We sought to channel capital into "useful arts and sciences," not *any* arts and sciences. Similarly, "openness" was useful when we needed what other countries provided, but not when it fostered risks. We were open to sending information to the USSR, we were not open to letting them build our space program because they knew how to get a man into space first. If any American policymaker or business leader prior to the 1980s had looked at Nvidia circa 2026, they would have been horrified and shocked. Ben Thompson just kind of hand waves away how we have put our entire country at risk via the Taiwan strait, or how the whole goal of the company was to coordinate a supply chain outside the control of the U.S. on something that is absolutely vital to the American way of life. We *never* would have allowed anything remotely close to that in previous eras. Thompson does argue that it was not a good idea to risk the country over Taiwan or send all those factories to China.' But that was the point of Nvidia and the entire chip strategy from the 1990s onward. You can't disentangle the two. Nvidia is the manifestation of the post-Cold War view among U.S. elites suggesting that America would always be the preeminent hyper-power and we could all just focus on getting rich with capital light cream-skimming and then go on our wellness routines. The only way anyone could see Jensen Huang and Nvidia as a great American and a great American company is if they have an ideologically driven view of U.S. history that airbrushes out how we've always dealt with domestic risk, prosperity, and production. Thompson's argument is important and well-written, because it does reflect the basic lack of understanding pervasive among so many of the talented and insightful people who have learned their trade in modern business. You can see that in the tension where Thompson does wrestle with the Taiwan problem, or the mass offshoring of factories. But ultimately he doesn't have a compelling way to understand those problems. After all, how are you going to deal with them without "bans and forced compliance"? How would anyone have stopped that mass offshoring without "bans and forced compliance"? If basic tools of statecraft to protect the U.S. people are rendered un-American, the necessary consequence is the risk built up in the Taiwan strait and the offshoring Thompson decries. It is a series of short-term sales of U.S. capacity to foreign entities, something that profits CEOs, consultants and financiers but fosters immense risk. It's not that there's a pecuniary interest among that class, it's just that it's very hard to break with the ideological system that built the success they now have. I do hope this obituary for Jensen Huang's way of doing business is an actual end of that way of doing business and a return to traditional American statecraft. Or perhaps we are too far coddled by the brief era of American hyperpower to even understand our own traditions that built it. I don't know. Anyway, the piece is worth reading.
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
This piece by @benthompson is going viral and for good reason. It's a very well-written historical narrative of why Nvidia is a creature of U.S. strategy, and how the fall of Jensen Huang represents a fundamental break from it. It's wrong, but an important statement on just how most business leaders understand our current context. The thesis is that "Nvidia was, by the powers that be, considered a defense contractor, and Huang never adjusted." The chip industry, Thompson argues, had from its inception focused on global sales, and not being subject to government control. It was organized by venture capitalists to do so, consistent with a tradition going back hundreds of years. The sharp break to a new model model of competing with China, "pursuing the route of bans and forced compliance, instead of innovation and openness," ends American exceptionalism. That's the argument. It's wrong, and obviously so. Let me point out that the U.S. didn't set up chip fabs or any infrastructure or transfer technology to the USSR or the Eastern bloc. Why not? Well there was this thing called the Cold War. To argue that bans and forced compliance are new requires overlooking the entire history of the chip industry until 1989! The chip industry was not created by venture capitalists, it was created, nurtured, and organized at virtually every stage by the U.S. government. It was AT&T that discovered the foundational technology, and military contracts and antitrust cases mandated AT&T share those technologies with U.S. small firms for a small fee. The government then bought from those firms - Motorola and Texas Instruments are the now-famous ones. And the government was the biggest customer for all of the early years, and actively sought to have the customer base widen. The commercialization was not a result of Robert Noyce, but of U.S. policy. There were also always restrictions, and obvious ones. I mentioned the Cold War. But the transfers of technology were also government choices. You can read Alfred Chandler's The Electronic Century, but there's a reason that most of the keychip supply chain went to countries like Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, West Germany and Taiwan, who were all under U.S. military protection. There's a reason that the U.S. government created Sematech in the 1980s and threatened import quotas on Japan, and had IBM source memory from Korea. Semiconductors were *always* a strategic industry and were *always* treated as such. The other point is that the U.S. government has always treated our industries as strategic, and has always used bans and forced compliance as one set of tools to organize our industrial capacity. Alexander Hamilton laid it out his Report on Manufacturers, he did not want the U.S. to be at the mercy of the industrial powerhouse of English, and explicitly sought protection for manufacturing. Thomas Jefferson literally banned U.S. exports. High tariffs were a bulwark of 19th century industrial policy, and that's not even getting into the creation of the 20th century administrative state and very deliberate control over radio technology. The reasons for all of these controls were exposed during the pandemic, when limited sourcing over everything from chips to personal protective equipment to certain kinds of plastic to baby formula subjected all of us to meaningful risk. Are "innovation and openness" also part of that toolkit? Of course. But even those words are too flabby to even parse. Take innovation. Our laws until the 1960s made it clear that innovation in immoral devices, like gambling, was not protected by patents. We sought to channel capital into "useful arts and sciences," not *any* arts and sciences. Similarly, "openness" was useful when we needed what other countries provided, but not when it fostered risks. We were open to sending information to the USSR, we were not open to letting them build our space program because they knew how to get a man into space first. If any American policymaker or business leader prior to the 1980s had looked at Nvidia circa 2026, they would have been horrified and shocked. Ben Thompson just kind of hand waves away how we have put our entire country at risk via the Taiwan strait, or how the whole goal of the company was to coordinate a supply chain outside the control of the U.S. on something that is absolutely vital to the American way of life. We *never* would have allowed anything remotely close to that in previous eras. Thompson does argue that it was not a good idea to risk the country over Taiwan or send all those factories to China.' But that was the point of Nvidia and the entire chip strategy from the 1990s onward. You can't disentangle the two. Nvidia is the manifestation of the post-Cold War view among U.S. elites suggesting that America would always be the preeminent hyper-power and we could all just focus on getting rich with capital light cream-skimming and then go on our wellness routines. The only way anyone could see Jensen Huang and Nvidia as a great American and a great American company is if they have an ideologically driven view of U.S. history that airbrushes out how we've always dealt with domestic risk, prosperity, and production. Thompson's argument is important and well-written, because it does reflect the basic lack of understanding pervasive among so many of the talented and insightful people who have learned their trade in modern business. You can see that in the tension where Thompson does wrestle with the Taiwan problem, or the mass offshoring of factories. But ultimately he doesn't have a compelling way to understand those problems. After all, how are you going to deal with them without "bans and forced compliance"? How would anyone have stopped that mass offshoring without "bans and forced compliance"? If basic tools of statecraft to protect the U.S. people are rendered un-American, the necessary consequence is the risk built up in the Taiwan strait and the offshoring Thompson decries. It is a series of short-term sales of U.S. capacity to foreign entities, something that profits CEOs, consultants and financiers but fosters immense risk. It's not that there's a pecuniary interest among that class, it's just that it's very hard to break with the ideological system that built the success they now have. I do hope this obituary for Jensen Huang's way of doing business is an actual end of that way of doing business and a return to traditional American statecraft. Or perhaps we are too far coddled by the brief era of American hyperpower to even understand our own traditions that built it. I don't know. Anyway, the piece is worth reading.
Obituaries The demise of Jensen Huang was the end of a great many things, including Nvidia’s long-term prospects, the AI bubble, and the exceptional way in which the U.S. viewed itself in the world. stratechery.com/2026/obituar…
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
Every civilization has its cental organ. NYC, Paris, Moscow, Tokyo, London, Rio. There's a misconception visiting this city will give you a skewed image of the nation. False. Only here will you meet people from every corner: talented, vibrant, varied in every way.
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黃仁勳這場風波,真是越來越有意思了! 大家有沒有注意到,過去這一週,中共黨媒是如何報導這件事的? 不妨看看這些文章的標題,以及它們背後傳遞的訊息: 11月9日 —《環球時報》 〈對黃仁勳的調查究竟是反間諜,還是一場政治獵巫?〉 核心論述: 政治獵巫!先否定調查的正當性! 11月9日 —《湖南日報》 〈黃仁勳出軌、黨爭與全球化〉 核心論述: 美國政治內鬥!私人醜聞被當成地緣政治武器! 11月10日 —《環球時報》 〈美國議員藉輝達執行長私人爭議推動對華晶片限制,反映麥卡錫主義邏輯,將國家安全變成政治獵巫:專家〉 核心論述: 麥卡錫主義!國家安全只是藉口! 11月11日 —《環球時報》 〈黃仁勳事件與華裔美國人面臨的寒蟬效應〉 核心論述: 華裔美國人遭到針對!製造族裔迫害的恐懼! 11月12日 —《環球時報》 〈黃仁勳辭去輝達職務,爭議助長美國科技限制;中國外交部敦促美方停止編造間諜敘事,為科技限制尋找藉口〉 核心論述: 間諜指控是捏造的!美國正在科技圍堵中國! 11月14日 —《長安街知事》 〈黃仁勳的去留,不改變我們的方向〉 核心論述: 美國施壓阻擋不了中國!中國必須實現科技自主! 看出其中的套路了嗎? 在中國,媒體姓黨。而這正是一套有組織的宣傳攻勢如何運作的典型示範:先否定調查的正當性,再將族裔身分武器化,最後把企業問責包裝成美國對中國的政治迫害。 隨著這套組合拳一拳接著一拳打出來,公眾的注意力也被一步步引離那些真正重要的問題: 晶片究竟流向了哪裡?誰掌握著關鍵算力?這一切又涉及哪些國家安全風險? 與此同時,獨立媒體的記者們正在深入調查的,卻是數十億美元的 NVIDIA 高階晶片、海外資料中心、黃樂關聯企業據報對 DeepSeek 的投資,以及 DeepSeek 技術已被中國軍方採用的事實。 北京的宣傳機器聲量越大,我就越好奇:它究竟想用這些喧囂掩蓋什麼? 為什麼北京如此積極地把一場涉及 AI 晶片供應鏈與國家安全的調查,變成一場圍繞華裔身分與種族迫害的輿論戰? 它真的是在保護黃仁勳嗎?還是說,它真正想保護的,是那些可能隨著調查深入而曝光的、更龐大的商業與軍事利益? 當一部宣傳機器如此賣力地告訴我們應該為什麼感到憤怒時,或許最值得追問的,恰恰是它不希望我們提出的那些問題。 你們怎麼看?
The Jensen Huang saga is getting more interesting by the day! 👀 Has anyone noticed how Chinese Communist Party state media have been covering this story over the past week? Take a look at these headlines—and the messages behind them: Nov 9 — Global Times (《環球時報》) “Is investigation into Jensen Huang about counter-espionage, or is it a political witch hunt?” The message: Political witch hunt! Discredit the investigation! Nov 9 — Hunan Daily (《湖南日報》) 《黃仁勳出軌、黨爭與全球化》 “Jensen Huang’s Affair, Political Infighting, and Globalization” The message: American political infighting! A personal scandal turned into a geopolitical weapon! Nov 10 — Global Times (《環球時報》) “US lawmakers’ China chip push over Nvidia CEO’s personal controversy reflects McCarthyist logic, turns national security into witch hunt: expert” The message: McCarthyism! National security is just an excuse! Nov 11 — Global Times (《環球時報》) “The Jensen Huang case and the chilling effect on Chinese Americans” The message: Chinese Americans are being targeted! Fear and ethnic persecution! Nov 12 — Global Times (《環球時報》) “Jensen Huang resigns from Nvidia while controversy fuels US tech curb; Chinese FM urges US to stop fabricating espionage narratives for technological restrictions” The message: Fabricated espionage allegations! America’s technological containment of China! Nov 14 — Chang’an Street Insider (《長安街知事》) 《黃仁勳的去留,不改變我們的方向》 “Whether Jensen Huang Stays or Goes, Our Direction Remains Unchanged” The message: American pressure won’t stop China! Technological self-reliance! See the pattern? In China, the Party controls the media. And this is what a coordinated propaganda offensive looks like: first, discredit the investigation; then, weaponize ethnic identity; and finally, turn corporate accountability into a narrative of American persecution of China. With each successive move, public attention is drawn further away from the questions that actually matter: Where did the chips go? Who controls the computing power? And what are the national security implications? Meanwhile, independent journalists are digging into billions of dollars in advanced NVIDIA chips, overseas data centers, reported investments in DeepSeek by companies linked to Alice Huang, and the documented adoption of DeepSeek technology by China’s military. The louder Beijing’s propaganda machine gets, the more I wonder what it’s trying to drown out. Why is Beijing working so hard to turn an investigation into AI chip supply chains and national security into a battle over Chinese identity and racial persecution? Is it really trying to protect Jensen Huang? Or is it protecting something much bigger—commercial and military interests that could be exposed if investigators keep digging? When a propaganda machine works this hard to tell us what to be outraged about, perhaps the most important question is what it doesn’t want us asking. What do you think?
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
推薦閱讀↓ 記住一點,中共的報紙不是自己想怎麼寫就怎麼寫的。正好可以提供一些判斷的反面依據。
黃仁勳這場風波,真是越來越有意思了! 大家有沒有注意到,過去這一週,中共黨媒是如何報導這件事的? 不妨看看這些文章的標題,以及它們背後傳遞的訊息: 11月9日 —《環球時報》 〈對黃仁勳的調查究竟是反間諜,還是一場政治獵巫?〉 核心論述: 政治獵巫!先否定調查的正當性! 11月9日 —《湖南日報》 〈黃仁勳出軌、黨爭與全球化〉 核心論述: 美國政治內鬥!私人醜聞被當成地緣政治武器! 11月10日 —《環球時報》 〈美國議員藉輝達執行長私人爭議推動對華晶片限制,反映麥卡錫主義邏輯,將國家安全變成政治獵巫:專家〉 核心論述: 麥卡錫主義!國家安全只是藉口! 11月11日 —《環球時報》 〈黃仁勳事件與華裔美國人面臨的寒蟬效應〉 核心論述: 華裔美國人遭到針對!製造族裔迫害的恐懼! 11月12日 —《環球時報》 〈黃仁勳辭去輝達職務,爭議助長美國科技限制;中國外交部敦促美方停止編造間諜敘事,為科技限制尋找藉口〉 核心論述: 間諜指控是捏造的!美國正在科技圍堵中國! 11月14日 —《長安街知事》 〈黃仁勳的去留,不改變我們的方向〉 核心論述: 美國施壓阻擋不了中國!中國必須實現科技自主! 看出其中的套路了嗎? 在中國,媒體姓黨。而這正是一套有組織的宣傳攻勢如何運作的典型示範:先否定調查的正當性,再將族裔身分武器化,最後把企業問責包裝成美國對中國的政治迫害。 隨著這套組合拳一拳接著一拳打出來,公眾的注意力也被一步步引離那些真正重要的問題: 晶片究竟流向了哪裡?誰掌握著關鍵算力?這一切又涉及哪些國家安全風險? 與此同時,獨立媒體的記者們正在深入調查的,卻是數十億美元的 NVIDIA 高階晶片、海外資料中心、黃樂關聯企業據報對 DeepSeek 的投資,以及 DeepSeek 技術已被中國軍方採用的事實。 北京的宣傳機器聲量越大,我就越好奇:它究竟想用這些喧囂掩蓋什麼? 為什麼北京如此積極地把一場涉及 AI 晶片供應鏈與國家安全的調查,變成一場圍繞華裔身分與種族迫害的輿論戰? 它真的是在保護黃仁勳嗎?還是說,它真正想保護的,是那些可能隨著調查深入而曝光的、更龐大的商業與軍事利益? 當一部宣傳機器如此賣力地告訴我們應該為什麼感到憤怒時,或許最值得追問的,恰恰是它不希望我們提出的那些問題。 你們怎麼看?
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
odds of that effort to reinstate Jensen Huang succeeding close to 0 when the US Treasury Secretary says stuff like this "Bessent said Nvidia stopped breaking out Singapore revenue in its financial filings after direct sales to China fell and Singapore billings surged. He cited reports that only 1% of those chips actually stayed in Singapore. Had a bank committed similar compliance lapses, he added, federal regulators would have already forced out its executives" wsj.com/tech/ai/bessent-urge…
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Jennifer Tsai retweeted
硅谷和华尔街应该读一点卡尔施密特。
odds of that effort to reinstate Jensen Huang succeeding close to 0 when the US Treasury Secretary says stuff like this "Bessent said Nvidia stopped breaking out Singapore revenue in its financial filings after direct sales to China fell and Singapore billings surged. He cited reports that only 1% of those chips actually stayed in Singapore. Had a bank committed similar compliance lapses, he added, federal regulators would have already forced out its executives" wsj.com/tech/ai/bessent-urge…
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