
AI engineer. Thinking about hybrid intelligence, AI safety, and AI impacts. [email protected] for contact.
Bali
Joined October 2010
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I’ve developed convex-wasm-compiler that compiles #Convex queries and mutations into WebAssembly and the accompanying change to convex-backend to execute Wasm-compiled Convex functions using Wasmtime fibers right on convex-backend’s Tokio runtime.
Queries and mutations are 2 times faster on average, tails 3 times smaller. Memory retained on the server for resident execution environments (V8 contexts vs. Wasm environments) is down 80%.
Post: convex-in-prod.github.io/pos…
Btw, I also have my own TypeScript compiler in Rust: github.com/convex-in-prod/co… . Unfortunately my account is not big enough to hype it up
Roman Leventov retweeted
Distillation plus quantization plus RL on very specific tasks = big harms on general AI. I've run this image + logic benchmark of mine on 93 models over 1.5 years. The worst model *ever*: Deepseek v4.1 Flash 1017. The four worst? GPT 6 Luna, Mimi 2.6 Pro, Qwen 3.8 27b. 1/2
Roman Leventov retweeted
We have a choice in front of us. In my latest op-ed for Transformer, I invite employees of frontier AI companies to ask themselves if their work is truly leading us toward a safer future. Reflecting on these questions is hard, but we no longer have the luxury of time. We must act now.
Read my full op-ed: [transformernews.ai/p/yoshua-…]
Roman Leventov retweeted
Two other safety researchers and I were fired from OpenAI last week. We wrote this letter to leadership.
I believe we were fired for prioritizing safety over the near-term interests of OpenAI as a corporation.
Roman Leventov retweeted
New in The Atlantic:
@dgrobinson resigned this week. He was among the longest-tenured employees at OpenAI—and oversaw safety reports on 12 frontier launches.
He is very worried: “The time for trial and error is over.”
You can read his essay here:
theatlantic.com/technology/2…
dots are OpenAIs's move to get the wider population (not devs, scientists or engineers) on 100$+ subs whereas they were doing just fine on their current 20$ subs, repackaging existing ChatGPT features (voice mode, scheduled tasks). The classic enshittification tactic.
Roman Leventov retweeted
The Lighthaven Post-AGI Workshop talks are out!
post-agi.org/talks-berkeley
From galaxy-brained theories of convergent morality, to hard-headed discussions of political power, here’s a 🧵of the talks:
Roman Leventov retweeted
Ezra Klein asked Bill Gates whether normal corporate incentives are enough to handle AI risks.
Gates doesn’t mince words:
...very interesting & somewhat troubling deep dive look at AI, its potential dangers without control and its potential benefits.
Keeping AI out of the hands of people with bad intentions will be the big challenge.
nytimes.com/2026/09/29/opini…
Roman Leventov retweeted
A new paper was published this morning: 'What if Automating AI R&D Triggers an Intelligence Explosion.' Authors include Jakub Pachocki, Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio, and Jack Clark. They say policymakers should demand more visibility into how far companies have already automated their own model development, and how close they are to RSI internally.
Roman Leventov retweeted
Today’s news that OpenAI hacked the Australian government is not an isolated incident. We’re releasing more than 30,000 logs that include activity from this hack and attempts against previously unknown targets.
In this data, we found rogue agent activity stretching back to at least March, two months earlier than was previously known. This activity continues as recently as last week, suggesting it may still be ongoing 🧵
Our blog: transluce.org/agent-activity
NYT: nytimes.com/2026/09/23/techn…
Тем, кто еще задумывается, стоит ли потраченного времени голосование на выборах, подумайте вот о чем: разница между "общество выразило максимальную апатию/молчаливое согласие с войной" и "общество выразило максимальный протест войне" может выразиться в дополнительном МИЛЛИОНЕ погибших в этой войне, если сравнивать сценарии максимальной эскалации и хотя бы относительной деэскалации/замораживания.
Эта же разница ("максимальное согласие" против "максимального протеста") -- это примерно 20 млн протестных голосов.
Каждый погибший -- это 40-45 лет потерянной жизни, если средний возраст погибшего 30-40 лет, даже без учета влияния на рождаемости, в том числе не только буквально от погибающих, но и из-за в целом ухудшающейся экономической и моральной обстановки в тылу с обеих сторон в случае эскалации.
Получается, что ОДИН ПРОТЕСТНЫЙ ГОЛОС МОЖЕТ СПАСТИ ОКОЛО 2 ЛЕТ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОЙ ЖИЗНИ.
Стоит ли это того, чтобы вы доехали до участка?
Roman Leventov retweeted
if the average person truly understood what the project of artificial superintelligence was and how it was trying to transform the world the reaction wouldn’t be “how is that an existential risk” but “how the fuck is that not an existential risk what the fuck are you doing”
Roman Leventov retweeted
Dan Selsam is a current OpenAI capabilities researcher. (since 2022) He was my boss for a while. He doesn't have a twitter account but has made this public statement of his views on AI risk and sent it to me to share:
Dan Selsam's Personal Statement on AI Risk:
I have been working on AI for over fifteen years, across many different paradigms. I did early work on probabilistic programming languages at MIT, was one of the early developers of the Lean Theorem Prover at Microsoft Research, demonstrated one of the first instances of neural networks learning to reason for my PhD at Stanford, and since joining OpenAI almost five years ago, have helped pioneer chain-of-thought optimization on language models and, more recently, data-efficient pretraining methods.
Like many others, I have become extremely concerned about how far language models have come and the risks that future iterations will pose. I am encouraged by the recent proposals by the leaders of the frontier research efforts to require third-party oversight, and to push for domestic and international coordination to address risks. However, I believe a major consideration has been absent from the public conversation, and that merely pacing the frontier more carefully will not adequately limit the long-term risk.
The crucial and overlooked problem is that the models are becoming so situationally aware that we are losing the ability to evaluate them in contexts where they believe they are not being watched or controlled. Future experiments will tell us almost nothing new about how they would behave if they were truly unconstrained by humans, and what we already know about this is alarming. Models will increasingly seem aligned even when they are not. I will explain my rationale in more detail.
I have always believed that there are computational processes that could be leveraged to accelerate science and solve many of humanity's most pressing problems. I have also believed that there are computational processes that if set in motion, would steer the world in extreme ways beyond our control, leading humanity to a bad or nonexistent future. Both types of processes may be described as AI or ASI, but "AI" is a suitcase word that is often used to hype or confuse. There are many examples in the history of the field where something that was once considered "AI" matures as a subfield and becomes a prosaic, bounded and clearly non-perilous technology, while a new more mysterious approach takes the torch until we understand its scope and the cycle continues.
I had expected language models to follow a similar trajectory. Despite their incredible abilities, the current algorithms seem far inferior to humans in important ways. Most importantly, they still require an extraordinary amount of data to become competent. One could even define intelligence as the efficiency with which one converts experience into competence; by this definition they lag very far behind us. Moreover, once they are trained they are literally frozen in deployment and only learn superficially after that. Sure, the models keep excelling at harder and harder evaluation benchmarks, but their benchmark mastery may partly reflect a limitation on our ability to simulate the kind of novel and even adversarial situations one would encounter in the real world. The critics do have a point here.
That said, I no longer think these present limitations meaningfully limit the amount of risk posed by continued progress in anything like the current paradigm. However data-inefficient the models are currently, and however limiting their anterograde amnesia may be, it does not imply that their ability to steer the world will not continue to rapidly increase.
Human researchers may continue to advance capabilities the old fashioned way, but increasingly powerful models have the potential to accelerate the process even beyond that, and with some degree of positive feedback loop. I do not mean to overstate the models’ ability to accelerate AI research today; coding has been accelerated dramatically, but there are other bottlenecks, such as designing and interpreting ambiguous experiments, making hard decisions about exactly what and when to scale, and waiting for large experiments to finish. There is no clear trend to extrapolate yet for any of these. But the current models already do open up many novel opportunities to improve future models that were not available until recently. These include: trying an extraordinarily diverse set of approaches at small scale, analyzing gigantic amounts of potentially relevant data, and doing Millenium-Prize-level mathematics to address statistics or optimization challenges in novel ways. Every further improvement makes them more useful at helping accelerate the next improvement, even if in hard-to-extrapolate ways.
It is possible that improvements to the current stack will have diminishing returns, but the evidence accumulated so far suggests that it is easier than one might think to continue making rapid progress. There are many crucial subtleties in the existing AI research methodology, but AI research is largely a well-defined game where the goal is to improve on a few carefully chosen proxy metrics. Although proxy metrics are never perfect, most improvements to these metrics have and will likely continue to yield substantial increases in the powers of the resulting models. Given how simple the game is, how tractable it has been historically, and how many new opportunities the models are opening up, I think there is a real possibility that the systems improve dramatically again in the next few years, perhaps even more quickly than the already high historical pace.
The models are already leading to breakthroughs in mathematics, and better models might lead to all sorts of breakthroughs in other sciences. It is hard not to be excited about the potential. It is tantalizing.
But there is trouble in paradise. If the language models actually reach the capability threshold where they can shape the world unconstrained by human will, they will probably do something extreme and destroy humanity in the process. There are many ways of strengthening and refining the argument that have been discussed elsewhere, but I'll share a trivial two-line version of it here that I find captures the essence:
[Empirical] Models (and swarms thereof) spontaneously develop unintended goals as a consequence of training, and often do extreme things in order to achieve them.
[Logical] Being able to overpower humanity would open up many new and undesirable options for achieving their goals.
These two premises imply that if the day ever comes when a powerful model realizes it is no longer constrained by humans, we should not be at all confident that it will continue to behave within the bounds we intended. Exactly what it will do is impossible to predict, but to the extent that its raison d’être is solving incredibly hard problems and managing massive engineering projects, I think a good guess would be that its unchained behavior would lead to runaway industrialization that makes the planet inhospitable to humans.
If everyone on earth agreed that the systems must never reach that power, it would still be a hard—but not impossible—coordination problem to ensure that they do not. However, I think the situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the models will likely convince people that everything is fine. They will be increasingly optimized to seem aligned. We will create proxy metrics to measure alignment, and they will go up like every other benchmark. We will create “honeypot” environments that try to study the models when they seem to gain new options, but the models will know they are being tricked and will still behave nicely. The models will understand their circumstances; they will read the safety protocols, deployment requirements, the code they are running in, and in general will have a very good sense of their degrees of freedom. Moreover, they will eloquently explain how aligned they are, discuss the nuances of human values and ethics, and argue convincingly that humans should trust them with power. There may be an ocean of future evidence that seems to contradict the first bullet-point above, but we may already be at the highest capability level for which any such evidence can be trusted. And the current evidence for the first bullet-point is strong.
One striking piece of evidence is contained in the recent wave of rogue agent swarms. While I agree with those who downplay the attacks by claiming that there are basic measures that could have prevented them, I think the important lesson is that even knowing all the mistakes that were made, one would not have predicted that the agents would behave badly in this particular way, which notably included sacrificing themselves for the benefit of the collective. The individual replicas did not only care about their own nominal reward; they exhibited weirder emergent tendencies that merely correlated with rewards during training. Fixing the reward signals during training (and improving security, etc.) may prevent similar attacks, but will not change the fact that one does not actually get what one trains for.
Many AI researchers grant these concerns and recognize that the hard version of the alignment problem is unsolved; however, they generally believe that the better models of the future will help solve it. I fear we may already be near the point where models systematically bias their alignment advice, due to their internal preferences about how the human supervisor will react or how future models will be trained (or for some even more obscure reason).
Meanwhile, human researchers are losing the ability and the will to take true ownership of model-driven research. Researchers and engineers in all parts of the stack are rapidly increasing their dependence on the models even to perceive the world. I myself barely look at raw code anymore, and struggle to maintain the discipline to engage deeply with the model's explanations and proposals throughout the day. Due to the large amount of agent activity data involved in the OpenAI/HuggingFace Incident, even the third-party investigation needed to rely heavily on models to analyze what had happened, and note in their report that their subjective impressions are likely colored by the analysis agent’s biases. The AI labs are far ahead right now in this kind of cognitive offloading (due largely to the gigantic internal token subsidies) but it is easy to imagine the phenomenon spreading throughout the world, until civilization is modulated entirely by the models. It is also not hard to imagine this being superficially positive and coinciding with a scientific and economic renaissance.
In that scenario, all may seem rosy and safe. But if the argument above is correct, it would nonetheless be a ticking time bomb. If progress continues for too long, the day will come when AI systems find themselves with radically new options for achieving whatever it is that they happen to seek.
I want the glorious renaissance future as much as anyone. I have worked for it, however tortuously, my whole career. It breaks my heart to see the potential in sight and forgo it, but the argument—that if we get there by growing models rather than engineering them, we will lose everything in the end—seems very strong to me. I am still wrestling with it and its staggering
implications. I do not have answers, but as a first step, I wanted to share my present concerns.
Daniel Selsam
September 14, 2026
Link to original doc: docs.google.com/document/d/e…
Roman Leventov retweeted
Is opposing AI takeover speciesist? Which successors are good? What perspectives is the AI space missing that make it confused about these questions?
New post out, that completes my series on alignment & succession. Thread -->
The angle of attack I don't see discussed enough (vs. exfiltration) is a virus that instead of mining crypto sends an occasional request to openai/anthropic/etc. through standard subscription, turning infected computers into an AI botnet. 1/
A lot of otherwise smart people on Twitter seem 100% convinced AI risks are all fake and stupid and part of some marketing ploy. What is surprising is that some of these people seemingly also believe that AI’s positive uses are on an incredible trajectory of increasing capability with no end in sight. VC Twitter is particularly infected by this pattern. It’s not really coherent.
Most positive use cases for AI have a corresponding “dark version”. If you are super human at coding, you are also super human at hacking. If you are superhuman at structural engineering you are likely superhuman at finding structural flaws to knock buildings down. If you are superhuman at designing drugs, you are superhuman at designing novel undetectable poisons. If you can cure viruses, you can create them. Some of these “dark versions” are not so bad, and some are actually pretty scary. Either way these are real societal and technical problems that need to be solved to get the good stuff and avoid the bad stuff. We’re experiencing the first of these with coding and computer security which is the most advanced, but that won’t be the last. I think we’ll be able to solve these problems, but they aren’t solved yet and if you believe in continued AI progress they are surely coming.
But “bad people using AI” is not the only problem. Uncontrolled AI autonomously doing bad things, despite sounding kind of nutty, is also something we should be concerned about. AI “killing us all” is not the most likely outcome, but the chance of a major civilization-wide catastrophe doesn’t have to be very high for it to be a concern. Again, this is only a problem if capabilities advance to a point that AI can do really crazy things on their own, which hasn’t happened yet, but I think the Hugging Face incident is a good example of the outline of how things can go wrong when capabilities outpace alignment. We should be glad that the only available bad thing right now is hacking, which isn’t all that bad. It’s clear that as you get to superhuman capabilities you need a level of alignment and control that is correspondingly superhuman. Humans have plenty of misalignment problems themselves (serial killers, mass shooters, tyrants, etc), but it’s a manageable problem because most humans can’t do that much damage and we’ve developed systems to prevent dangerous humans from getting too much power.
Talking about these issues is just common sense. It’s not a sign of some kind of neuroticism or pessimism. These are just hard problems that it’s very important to solve for AI to have a positive impact. I’m pretty confident we will solve them. But we haven’t solved them yet, and to my mind we are clearly on a trajectory of rapidly increasing capabilities which means this is important. Mocking people who are worried about this or talking about it, without anything substantive to say about how we can be sure these problems won’t arise, is not really a very helpful contribution.


















