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on a long enough time horizon everything is a shitco

New York, USA
Joined November 2013
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The bear thesis on fundamentals largely hinges on regulatory scrutinity and impending policy crackdowns. Keep in mind lawmakers have shallower pockets and shorter memories than a heroin addict.
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*HUANG SIGNALS WILLINGNESS TO RETURN AS NVIDIA CEO: WSJ "Since my departure, I've seen an outpouring of calls from Nvidia's employees, investors, business partners, and customers for me to return as CEO," Huang said in a short statement. "If the Board of Directors decides that my return is in the best interest of our shareholders, our employees, the company, and America, I would be honored to answer these calls and return as CEO."
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Semiconductor research firm SemiAnalysis has sharply LOWERED its global AI accelerator capital expenditure forecasts, with cuts of up to 41%: 2027: $770B → $627B (-19%) 2028: $1.054T → $758B (-28%) 2029: $1.352T → $796B (-41%) 2030: $1.531T → $923B (-40%) That's a $608 billion reduction in its 2030 forecast alone. SemiAnalysis also cut its cumulative 2026-2030 accelerator silicon shipment area forecast by 17%, with Nvidia accounting for 66% of that reduction. Its 2028 HBM shipment forecast was lowered from 9.0 to 6.4 exabytes, a 30% reduction, while projected 2030 AI accelerator power demand fell from 122.8 GW to 80.7 GW, down 34%. The firm cited slowing revenue growth at frontier AI labs, tighter capital markets, and lower assumptions for future chip and memory pricing. Importantly, even after these cuts, SemiAnalysis still expects annual AI accelerator spending to more than double from $392 billion in 2026 to $923 billion by 2030.
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Replying to @P_Remarks
Jensen’s pipeline might be the reason nobody can get laid in Silicon Valley
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Willingfully or not Jensen committed espionage Whether it was the right decision, Trump admin brushed it over in May Democratic Corporate oversights will not, hence the timeliness of the news flow What does this mean for your AI stonks, anon?
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🤖 Made with AI
$NVDA - *NVIDIA PREPARING TO OUST NVIDIA CEO JENSEN HUANG: WSJ
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Replying to @NiceQuarterGuys
Unlimited NIL budgets really killed the vibes
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Replying to @benjaminMlavine
Post ANT IPO peak for sure
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Things I’m confident in that have peaked: Fintwit Substack revenue <10B aum MM platforms 10Y treasury yields Anthropic pre-IPO valuation Not so confident: New DC permitting in Texas Private credit fundraising PPA pricing HF bro podcast appearances What did I miss?
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Bottlenecks may never go up again in our lifetimes
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Replying to @WaterworldCapi1
How it feels like logging into IBKR every morning
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Replying to @OnodaCapital
TPL
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Many complaining about open-weight models commoditizing the AI economy My brother in Christ what did you assume bidding NVDA to a 6 trillion Val would do
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Replying to @P_Remarks
8 month roundtrip
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2022 saas analyst daughter or 2027 semis hardware coverage son?
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Nothing about this differentiates from historical capex cycles Telco/fiber Shale boom RET Colossal $ value of forward commitments magnifies the trade but numbers always look too small on the way up and overstated in drawdowns
Replying to @joinyellowbrick
My main takeaway is that AI skeptics are anchored on the ~$1 trillion in unfunded MOUs being a massive risk and it is therefore upsetting to hear that no one in the supply chain takes them seriously. There are so many good, realistic bear cases. Such a strange one to focus on.
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Replying to @citrini
idk man the Citrini holiday party was pretty lit
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Alts can do well here Funding gap will be exemplified with rates higher for longer PC originations should tick up off the bottom
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Setup into YE is so funny Fast money largely sidelined with impending DNC sweep + AI sec & regulatory overhang Risk premia at 25 year high Max pain = stonks + rates ripping as everyone chances their watermark?
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lost me at emerging brand $BROS
We are short $SBUX with a PT of $70.76 and a 27% projected NTM IRR with 2.8x R/R. The Street believes Brian Niccol’s “Back to Starbucks” turnaround is a success, extrapolating accelerating SSSG into sustained demand and normalized margins. We disagree. Our geospatial imagery analysis, calls to 300 stores, scrape of 1.2M store-week operating-hour posts, permit filing analysis, scrape of 10,082 Glassdoor employee reviews and 80,777 Google reviews, credit card and foot traffic data covering 150M Americans, and survey of 293 customers reveals that 1) store closures are disproportionately concentrated in trade areas where demand can be transferred to nearby Starbucks locations, inflating SSSG by 483 bps, 2) Emerging beverage brands are increasingly locating directly within Starbucks’ trade areas, with competitor openings associated with 8-10% declines in Starbucks traffic, and 3) the Street erroneously models margins reverting to 2022 peak levels despite shops being drastically understaffed, all while employee sentiment declines precipitously. Our thesis is threefold: 1. Under Brian Niccol’s “Back to Starbucks” plan, Starbucks closed 627 North American company-operated shops in Q4 2025. Since then, SSSG has accelerated from 1.0% to 7.9%, which the Street views as sustained organic growth continuing into FY2027. We believe management has materially understated the customer transfer impact from store closures on transaction growth, with our analysis showing ~483bps of inorganic transaction tailwinds ending after this quarter, most of which management claims is organic. 2. Starbucks has historically dominated the U.S. specialty coffee and drive-thru beverage market. However, its competitive landscape is rapidly changing, as emerging brands ($BROS, 7 Brew) scale into Starbucks’ core markets. Our channel checks indicate 7 Brew will deliver 60%+ unit growth over the next two years, with 500 and 900 openings in FY2027 and FY2028 respectively, while Dutch continues to grow at 17%+. Our analysis of leasing documents shows that 73% of these emerging brand stores are scheduled to open within a mile of a Starbucks, which based on foot traffic alternative data has historically led to 8-10% volume declines at similar locations. 3. In FY2022, Starbucks averaged 26.8 employees/store before cutting North America employees/store to a trough of 19.8 in FY2024, well below competitors’ staffing. Despite Starbucks’ $500M labor investment, which has since increased employees/store to 21.3 in FY2025, we believe Starbucks’ current staffing levels are unsustainable as it adopts a more service-intensive operating model. Valuation: We model 483 bps of closure-driven SSSG unwinding as Starbucks laps the FY2025 closure cohort, with 181 bps of offset from the FY2026 cohort. This, combined with increasing competition, drives North American SSSG 174 bps below consensus in our base case and 286 bps in our bear case. This steps up by another ~280/420 bps respectively in FY 2028 as the 181 bps tailwind is lapped and competition intensifies. We model labor intensity remaining structurally elevated, forecasting Starbucks increasing employees/store from 21.3 to 24.0 through FY2027, driving FY2027 EBIT margins 263 bps below Street projections. Utilizing a conservative 18.5x/18.5x/20.0x NTM EBITDA multiple on FY2028 EBITDA, our bear/base/bull cases yield price targets of $48.48/$73.39/$113.95, respectively. Weighted at 35%/50%/15%, this yields a weighted average price target of $70.76. An in-depth breakdown of our primary research and full theses, along with a catalyst path will be published tomorrow.
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