Nick Hutton retweeted
Scaling Security: The 7 Pillars of Elite Cybersecurity teams is a management “operating system” for established CISOs, rising executives, CIOs, CEOs and Board members.
philvenables.com/post/scalin…
Nick Hutton retweeted
Way back in 2000, Marcus Ranum gave an unpopular talk in which he said “the Huns never knew how to build a Rome, they only knew how to sack one”.
He was warning against taking script-kiddys advice, but the same holds for listening to the AI vendors.
Nick Hutton retweeted
🚨 NEW POD ALERT: A conversation with Calif's Bruce Dang on hacking iPhones, breaking PHP, and the future of security engineering
youtube.com/watch?v=Jm4zCExa…
Nick Hutton retweeted
I need some people for this asap: jobs.ashbyhq.com/openai/be7b…
Nick Hutton retweeted
I would *love* to sit down with everyone who came up with this report.
I was the independent person responsible to do patch analysis for very large companies and facilities for many years. By that I mean I was at one point the single person responsible for pulling the $12+ million dollar switch for several Forbes 100 companies. Matter of fact that's how most of my old school followers know me, I used to dump the work in real time here on Twitter to get more customers (it worked).
So what does that mean?
Patch Tuesday is a great example, it used to drop 10AM PST Tuesday.
I would have an approx 50 page report Friday EoB to customers covering EVERY patch, ease of exploitation, profile the discovery team or person behind it, use in the wild, IoCs, weaponization likelihood in the next 24h, 72h, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days. No AI. Just IDA, DarunGrim, BinDiff, some tools I wrote and a dream. I would be in the office, Tuesday leave Friday, yes, that's correct, no home, straight working. I performed this service from 3 different companies to various customers. Sometimes it was with a select team, most of my career it was solo.
So what was the $12m switch? Well that was the cost it would be for just one of my customers to push out an emergency patch that wasn't in their already accepted patching procedures. That cost was electricity costs, server down time, service availability impact, employee costs, testing etc.
I was the person that said: this patch needs to be pushed and that break glass needs to happen due to impact being greater than X million in a 72h period.
I made that specific call maybe 11 times, in the 14 years that I did this service and I got that call twice.
The last time I got the call wrong was one of the TCP.sys icmp vulns, ping of death style. I failed to account that another vendors vulnerability would come out to put it to shame and be far more easier to exploit with a PoC.
The other time I got it wrong was exploitation happened about 96h instead of 72h.
The science to get this precision is hard, I got lucky a few times. What I will say is the goal of the attackers, what is at risk, and level of sophistication that attackers will use completely vary from target to target. Also there's a ton of this exploitation data is simply not visible, a lot of this data isn't public and requires lots of embedded resources, sources, and detailed tracking.
In almost all cases and scenarios during those 14 years: 0days are not kings, it's your trash exploits (auth bypass, file upload, hash leaks etc) that are 2 to 6 years old that got forgotten, unpatched, suddenly exposed to the Internet, or bridged over by a contractor that lead to massive incidents over and over.
For two decades, writing the exploit was the bottleneck in a cyberattack. AI made that step cheap, and patching hasn't gotten faster:
- On average, attacks went from landing 63 days after disclosure in 2018-19 to 7 days before it in 2025
- A working exploit went from a skilled person's month to a few hours of machine time
- The median time to fully fix a known-exploited bug rose to 43 days
a16z's @asafezra and @steph_zhang expect a long, expensive worm era, hitting hardest where systems can't update fast: hospitals, schools, small water systems.
"When attacking is nearly free, attackers no longer need to want a target."
Full piece from Asaf Ezra and Steph Zhang: a16z.news/p/the-exploit-was-…
Nick Hutton retweeted
Dead Internet Theory, LinkedIn is patient zero
Today we're launching the Imagine AI V2 agent that runs ur team's linkedin
Most startups know linkedin is powerful. The founders should post, the team should post, and someone should follow up with the people who engage. Nobody has the time so it doesn't happen
So we built an agent that does it. It has its own computer and browser and u talk to it like a teammate in slack or on our app
1. It writes posts and graphics in each person's voice from ur site, deck and past posts
2. It knows what works from our research on millions of b2b engagement data points
3. It tells u who engaged, if they fit ur icp and if they're already in ur crm
4. It sends messages, connection requests and comments for u once u approve
In the film the clone at my desk is my agent. The dark room is my network and he knows everyone in it
u never need to go on linkedin again
Nick Hutton retweeted
We’ve seen plenty of people try to vibe code the php exploit who have no experience in the domain. Failure. Over and over. Then people who know what they are doing in exploit dev, marginal success.
People would say anyone with a frontier LLM can just say “hack this site, make no mistakes” and I won’t argue, some shallow bugs will fall out this way for a while. But the most successful applications of LLMs are coming from experts who at least know how to dissect the problem, change the models thought direction, and have put engineering into harnesses and skills. I’ve seen this across several sub sections of cyber. And that requirement will only get more mandatory as all the shallow bugs shake out. Just my 2c and observation.
🫶
(Also beware of influencers trolling with opinions on this topic. It’s often just for fake clout and clicks)
Nick Hutton retweeted
Perhaps something to consider if you work at OpenAI / Anthropic:
If your policies have produced an outcome like 'if a researcher wants to do software verification research then they have use a Chinese model', then perhaps your approach to 'safety' is net negative.
Nick Hutton retweeted
It should be expected that on a longer timeline more potent exploits emerge, but that's not the point, and if you got multiple days to patch before that, you're counting your blessings in 2026++
Nick Hutton retweeted
I have --- not making this up --- dreamed of this day since the late 1990s when I started arguing on Bugtraq that we should be doing full disclosure, rather than elaborate embargoes, so people could make exactly this decision (take the uptime hit to protect users).
Nick Hutton retweeted
Transition from vulpocalypse to breachpocalypse is here. IR firms are saturated & turning away work. Now one hacker unleashed AI agents on 1,200+ websites, compromising 100+ for ~$5,000 in tokens. $50 per hack. Agents won and compromised targets. reuters.com/legal/government…
Nick Hutton retweeted
OpenCode is currently under a sustained cyberattack, and mid-incident they ran into the same problem Hugging Face did: the frontier models they were using for defense began refusing to help fight attacking agents because analyzing the attacks started triggering safety guardrails.
Replying to @RhysSullivan
yes that was a bit frustrating mid incident when trying to investigate. they did quite a bit and then started refusing
we got access to daybreak blue now so it's better
Nick Hutton retweeted
Crawlers are a normal part of the web. Yandex runs a search engine; of course it generates bot traffic.
Bot traffic from Russia does not automatically mean Russian propaganda bots. Yet people here, including journalists, keep treating the two as interchangeable.
That Cloudflare chart shows automated web requests from Yandex’s network. Where’s the data showing that propaganda accounts stopped posting?
Journalists in particular need to understand this distinction. Precision matters when a misread traffic graph becomes the basis for a political narrative.
Nick Hutton retweeted
Cyberattack on French supermarkers. Someone remotely took over refrigeration controllers and made them to defrost. Target temperature set to 50°C. Staff opening freezers in the morning were hit by a wave of hot air. Millions of euros lost. France spent years debating food sovereignty to depend on a firmware update? bfmtv.com/economie/consommat…
Nick Hutton retweeted
This is one of the most underrated threats in cyber right now and it’s being done all over Europe and the Middle East. This targeting enables lethal follow-on activity and it’s especially alarming as missiles fall and gig economy terrorists are being used so heavily.
Cyber Operations against cameras can enable physical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the battlespace. @GreyNoiseIO identified a spike in targeting of cameras in Ukraine that coincided with an increase in kinetic strikes: greynoise.io/blog/hikvision-…
Nick Hutton retweeted
Security is maintained through the combination of
- people
- technology
- procedures
Fixation on bugs as the sole element of security (offensive and defensive) is a category error. A profound misunderstanding of how systems work, and how they fail.
Nick Hutton retweeted
The people that want to believe in "AI consciousness" largely want to believe in their own greatness, and given the unscientific and unfalsifiable nature of "consciousness", there's nothing that will convince them; this is about faith and creating idols, not science.
Nick Hutton retweeted
It is apparent that cybersecurity people are not the target audience of what the labs publish about cybersecurity.
They instead are weaponizing these narratives as fearmongering for non-security people, which would react to this very differently.
Excluding the experts from what you are writing about is very concerning.
Nick Hutton retweeted
It is happening.
China has expanded overseas travel restrictions for top AI professionals in private firms to include the families of key personnel bloomberg.com/news/articles/…





































