U.S. stock trader, since 2015
Joined September 2013
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有些分析认为Nvidia 为自己的neocloud 客户们融资提供担保，就是为了增加收入，左脚踩右脚。Hyperscalers 各个都想自己定制芯片，如果不支持neocloud，市场份额随时可能被瓜分。起码TPU会是一个强有力的竞争者。
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Relly now rally retweeted
图里这个配置的 DGX H200 整机，在国内现货报价达到了680万人民币。
东南亚正规渠道的同配置H200不超过50万美元，你有本事运到国内，就是2倍利润。
这么暴利的走私生意，自然挡不住走私客，但是中国方面的风险可能比美国更大。
美国出口政策：美国商务部在今年1月起放宽了对H200出口到中国的管控。
中国进口政策：中国海关对英伟达芯片出台了严苛的进口限制，甚至不允许 H200 芯片入境。高层对私人科技企业的要求是：“除非必要，否则不得采购 H200”，最近几个月，仅仅批准了腾讯和字节跳动等巨头各1万枚H200进口，而政府出资的智算中心则是严格禁止受限的英伟达芯片。
所以我们可以看到60万H200滞留在香港的新闻。
图里这个配置的 DGX H200 整机，在国内现货报价达到了680万人民币。
东南亚正规渠道的同配置H200不超过50万美元，你有本事运到国内，就是2倍利润。
这么暴利的走私生意，自然挡不住走私客，但是中国方面的风险可能比美国更大。
美国出口政策：美国商务部在今年1月起放宽了对H200出口到中国的管控。
中国进口政策：中国海关对英伟达芯片出台了严苛的进口限制，甚至不允许 H200 芯片入境。高层对私人科技企业的要求是：“除非必要，否则不得采购 H200”，最近几个月，仅仅批准了腾讯和字节跳动等巨头各1万枚H200进口，而政府出资的智算中心则是严格禁止受限的英伟达芯片。
所以我们可以看到60万H200滞留在香港的新闻。
Relly now rally retweeted
Did Jensen Huang fuck @TheEconomist editor’s wife or am I missing something?
They’re going full scorched earth on him, this is kinda unhinged
被 Nvidia 主导了一天情绪，我想静下来仔细再瞧瞧Nebius的财报数据，思考接下来如何操作。
市场情绪好的，人们会在一堆坏消息里面找好消息，情绪差就重点找坏消息。
$CRWV 周二盘后财报，刚好是市场暴跌之后找反弹论点的时候，而今天盘前的综合局面，很糟糕，特别是 $NBIS 已经暴涨过后，负面消息会被放大。
看看 $NBIS 财报给的关键负面信息：
1、资本开支上调至约 270 亿美元（预期 200–250 亿）。原因：部分2027年产能提前投资。
2、原指引 12 月 ARR收入 70–90 亿，调低为明年 2 月超过 70 亿，9月底的APR只有64亿，此后不再指引 ARR。2026 全年营收指引区间也从 30–34 亿美元收窄至 30–32 亿美元。原因：第三方产能（含新泽西改用 Bloom Energy 燃料电池）延期到 2027 上半年，也是此原因导致给微软交付算力延期。
3、2027年资本开支 400–450 亿美元，对应新增1GW容量，此前分析师共识预期是290亿美元。这部分大超预期。我不知道以前的预期是咋预期的，1GW不可能只有290亿就能建成。
4、行业常用的APR收入不再提供，现在用户只听到说你花多少钱，却看不到你的收益如何。整个电话会的表现很差，模糊其词，沟通不足。管理层表现的对公司的实力特别自信，但是没选择用户喜欢的表达方式不承认市场普遍的口径，自己造了一些概念。我是听过前天CRWV电话会的，跟NBIS 天差地别。
5、Token Factory 据我了解是投资很关心的，因为这部分是NBIS与其他neocloud做差异的地方，但是财报只说了数亿美元收入，没给具体数字和单独的指引。
6、RPO订单对比上季度末，只从 375 亿增至 387 亿美元，增长较少。原因：公司此前公开声明说把更多订单预留给短期出租，可能与此有关。
槽点很多，而此时的外部环境：
① 金主、供应商、neocloud模式支持者NvidiaCEO 面临下台风险。
②通胀压力导致美联储接下来可能连续多次加息，加息会太高融资成本。
③就在前一天，Anthropic 和 OpenAI 发布了一些对算力供应商不太有利的信息，没引起关注，但是确实存在。Anthropic 保留了随时终止与部分 NeoCloud 合同的权利。OpenAI则明确说想降低采购成本。
在这种情况下暴跌就不难理解了。
暴跌之后，是否该继续持仓或者该抄底，让我们来看乐观的角度：
1、这次没给2027年的APR预期，但是给了2027年营收指引120-130亿，并且公司预计在2027年Q4税前盈亏平衡。
2、2027年120-130亿的营收指引，没计算轻资产模式收益。所谓轻资产模式，按公司股东信和电话会的口径：合作方出资建设并持有产能，NBIS 负责把自身架构和 Nebius AI Cloud 装上去；收入分两段，一是完成部署时确认，二是这些产能投运后的持续性收入。这是NBIS自身的技术优势带来的。CFO 在电话会上说，2027 指引在产能节奏上非常保守，且未计入轻资产，若自有园区按时交付、合作落地，指引还有上修空间。
3、资本回收周期为1年7个月，比之前给的数据快了3个月，每MW合同价值涨到了2500万美元。
4、2027年的400-450亿资本开支，其中 75–85% 可以由预付款和GPU抵押、合同抵押融资覆盖，只有不到15-25%需要靠信用债或者股权融资。另外，目前公司账上还有74亿美元现金，股权稀释风险低于市场恐慌的程度。
5、Token Factory 没给收入指引，但是明确合同价值（Contract Value）季度环比暴增了 17 倍。
整体上这次财报后暴跌，是行业信仰动摇（黄仁勋离任 + 加息预期）+ 估值消化（前期暴涨后回调）+ 财报沟通瑕疵（高 CapEx + 取消 ARR 指引）等多重因素共振后的结果。
是否应该继续持仓，我的看法：
中短期，外部环境的变化对neocloud股票价格的影响会更重要。我不会在此时加仓，也不会清仓。
这次财报实际上降低了股东们对NBIS的预期，但是管理层对2027年的灵活性给的其实很大。2027年爆发的机会还是很大的。另外neocloud不同公司的估值水平，综合来说差不多，我选择了把50%的NBIS换成 $NCLD。
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目前也没看到任何证据证明黄丽是间谍。所以现在美国最可怕的地方是，不需要证据，不需要审判，媒体就直接定罪了。
This is the biggest irony of the whole Alice Huang / Nvidia saga: the Chinese government actually doesn't want Nvidia chips and is actively keeping them out of the country.
Last year it even ordered Alibaba and ByteDance to cancel their Nvidia orders (bloomberg.com/news/articles/…) and sent customs teams to the ports to check every advanced chip coming in (ng.investing.com/news/stock-…).
And right now 600,000 Nvidia H200s are stuck in Hong Kong because Beijing won’t let them into the country (reuters.com/world/china/nvid…)👇
Nvidia also explicitly frames this as a threat to its business in its latest annual report to the SEC: "The Chinese government has encouraged customers to purchase from our China-based competitors and discouraged customers from purchasing, importing, or using our data center products" (sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/…).
Why does China do that? Because every Nvidia chip a Chinese company buys is one that Huawei or Cambricon doesn’t sell, and domestic chips can only catch up if people actually buy them (which means money for R&D, etc.).
Which means that the notion that Chinese intelligence was running honeytraps to get more Nvidia chips into China gets the whole thing exactly backwards.
In fact, it looks like Megaspeed - Alice Huang's company - was a counter-reaction to official Chinese policy: a private sector workaround to these efforts by the Chinese government to curtail Nvidia.
As was widely reported - including by Western media - Megaspeed built data centers in Southeast Asia and rented their computing power to Alibaba, which the New York Times called "a backdoor way of getting access" to Nvidia chips (nytimes.com/2026/11/06/us/po…).
That is a backdoor not only - allegedly - around Washington’s export controls, but also around China's own efforts to wean its companies off Nvidia.
I can’t believe the Chinese government was too thrilled about it: it'd make just about zero sense for it to run countless domestic measures to prevent Alibaba from using Nvidia chips, yet at the same time have its top spy agency help the same Alibaba get Nvidia chips through the back door in Southeast Asia 🤷
At the end of the day, as with all such stories, you always need to look at "cui bono?": who benefits? Who benefitted is pretty clear:
- Nvidia itself: it's in the business of selling chips so a customer willing to spend billions of dollars on chips in Southeast Asia is a godsend. Again, as they themselves state in their SEC filings, not being able to tap into Chinese demand would have "a material and adverse impact on our business" (sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/…).
- Chinese companies like Alibaba: facts are, 1) Chinese chips haven't yet caught up, 2) Chinese chip companies' production capabilities are still limited and 3) Chinese tech firms' historical tech stack runs on Nvidia’s CUDA ecosystem, and rewriting years of code for Huawei chips is painful. Renting Nvidia chips in Southeast Asia is the easy way to stay competitive and serve customer demand in the meantime.
- The US, according to core members of the Trump administration: back in July last year, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick explained that the point of letting Nvidia sell more chips to China was to get Chinese developers "addicted to the American technology stack" (techradar.com/pro/china-coul…).
Who does NOT benefit, according to official Chinese policy, is the Chinese state, which has made tech self-reliance one of its foremost priorities.
Which means that, to believe the spy story, you have to believe that a person - Alice Huang - was effectively a spy paid by her own government while simultaneously sabotaging its tech self-reliance drive, which it has spent years and trillions of dollars on - pretty senseless.
Stranger things have happened, I guess, but it doesn't pass the smell test.
And there is another absolutely major contradiction in the media story. According to a Financial Times article published yesterday (ft.com/content/3238d92b-4074…), "a person who knows [Alice Huang] said they had been asked by MSS for information about her earlier this year after news emerged that Singapore was investigating the company in relation to chip-smuggling allegations. The agency wanted to find out more information about Huang, including the nature of her business and connections, the person said."
Which raises a damn obvious question: if she were indeed an MSS asset, why on earth would the MSS need to ask the people around her who she was and the nature of her business?
It's a complete contradiction with the spy story - but very much not a contradiction with what I described above: a private businesswoman running a workaround to Beijing’s own policy, which the Chinese security apparatus would naturally want to look into.
Especially since, around about the same time, Shanghai police detained her business partner, reportedly her husband, in a stock manipulation case (caixinglobal.com/2026-11-10/…): also coherent with Chinese authorities looking into her network, and much harder to square with her being a prized MSS asset.
And, to top it all, there is - to this day - not a shred of evidence that's been published that she is, in fact, a Chinese spy: just anonymous intelligence officials, repeated by journalists who never verified it, as I detailed here (teapawt.org/RnaudBertrand/status/2…) and here (teapawt.org/RnaudBertrand/status/2…) with one of the key FT journalists on this story actually admitting that he has no idea what evidence US intelligence actually has.
So the claim went to print without anyone seeing the evidence, without anyone being able to check it, and without anyone knowing whether it even exists.
And given everything above, from Beijing blocking the very chips she was supposedly recruited to help get into China, to the MSS asking around about her, to her partner being detained in Shanghai, my bet is that the evidence doesn’t exist at all. If anything, everything we can check points the other way.
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活久见，BURRY 看多英伟达了 短期
Breaking: Michael Burry talks about buying Nvidia
He says selloff's like this usually get “a little pumped”, but he is still not tempted to hold $NVDA long term
Burry's reasoning:
• Nvidia’s advantage could shrink over 5 years
• The CEO scandal could bring more scrutiny
• China GPU sales could become a bigger issue
• DOJ antitrust pressure could pick up
Burry believes the market may think $NVDA is a “heck of a trade” soon, but for now he still holds Semiconductor ETF $SMH puts
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开盘 $SOXL 准备卖个covered深度价内call ，按照现在65的股票价格，shot covered call 55 12月18的，可以多赚7块，到期时候soxl价格不低于48相比现在就没损失。
这波AI个股反弹幅度，很多都在30%以上了，现在个股的期权IV还非常高，有些还被套着不愿意离场的 ，可以卖价格稍微高一点的 covered call ，收一点期权金，降低下成本。如果是底部底抄的，有很多利润的，现在出货减仓都可以，不愿意走的仓位，可以做个collar hedge 保护。
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Relly now rally retweeted
$MARA 财报细节，公司正在大量卖出BTC，回购债务，加快从比特币挖矿向高性能计算和AI数据中心转型。
Mara的转型走的是 $RIOT 路线，与其他AI云合作，只出租电力和厂房而非自营GPU。但是遗憾的是，尚未签署任何租户租赁协议，可能推迟到2027年。Riot的第一份AI 租赁合约披露的时候，单日涨幅16%，后续每次披露新租约股价都大幅上涨。Mara 等一个契机，翻倍潜力。
$MARA 财报出完股价起飞，矿企MARA出售比特币偿还7.5亿美元债务，并批准5亿美元回购，将继续利用比特币筹集现金，用于AI基础设施投资、应对明年可行权的可转债回售以及潜在的股票回购。这事两年前就该干了。囤BTC把公司快囤倒闭了
美国政府允许英伟达 H200 芯片出口到中国，约60万枚H200芯片在香港仓库吃灰，原因是中国不允许大量进口。黄仁勋需要说服中国放松对H200的进口管制。
说黄乐是中国间谍，目标是通过黄仁勋影响美国政府放松对中国芯片出口限制，这太离谱了。
关于美国对中国的芯片出口管制，会有什么后果，美国的科技大佬们心里门清，黄仁勋、马斯克、比尔·盖茨都发表过看法，他们都对中国非常了解，也懂商业运行机制。极力支持芯片管制的，要么是直接利益冲突者，比如Anthropic的Dario Amodei，要么是那些冷战思维的政客。Dario是知道其技术后果，但是更在乎私人利益，政客则是完全不动商业。
细数一下对中国技术和高端产品封锁造成反效果的案例：
1、2000年前后，德国对中国需要的重型盾构机进行商业垄断和售后管控，中国花了20年时间进行自研和改进，现在中国盾构机全球市占率超过70%。
2、2003年，欧洲为了打破美国GPS的垄断，启动了“伽利略”全球卫星导航系统项目。中国当时积极响应，承诺投入2.3亿欧元巨资加入该项目，并很快先期支付了近7000万欧元。后来欧洲航天局开始全面排挤中国，于是中国退出“伽利略”项目，自研了“北斗”。
3、2015年美国商务部禁止英特尔向中国出口用于超级计算机的Xeon芯片，后来中国搞出了自研芯片的“神威·太湖之光”，英特尔不仅失去了市场，还失去了技术优势。
4、上个世纪末，国际空间站筹建时，中国非常想加入，美国把中国排除在外，2011年还搞了《沃尔夫条款》，彻底封锁中国航天技术，这几乎推动了中国航天技术飞速发展，后来中国自己弄了“天宫”空间站。
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$MARA 财报细节，公司正在大量卖出BTC，回购债务，加快从比特币挖矿向高性能计算和AI数据中心转型。
Mara的转型走的是 $RIOT 路线，与其他AI云合作，只出租电力和厂房而非自营GPU。但是遗憾的是，尚未签署任何租户租赁协议，可能推迟到2027年。Riot的第一份AI 租赁合约披露的时候，单日涨幅16%，后续每次披露新租约股价都大幅上涨。Mara 等一个契机，翻倍潜力。
$MARA 财报出完股价起飞，矿企MARA出售比特币偿还7.5亿美元债务，并批准5亿美元回购，将继续利用比特币筹集现金，用于AI基础设施投资、应对明年可行权的可转债回售以及潜在的股票回购。这事两年前就该干了。囤BTC把公司快囤倒闭了
$MARA 财报出完股价起飞，矿企MARA出售比特币偿还7.5亿美元债务，并批准5亿美元回购，将继续利用比特币筹集现金，用于AI基础设施投资、应对明年可行权的可转债回售以及潜在的股票回购。这事两年前就该干了。囤BTC把公司快囤倒闭了
我们现在所熟悉的neocloud，很多都是从比特币矿商转型而来
$APLD 以前是矿企，2022年比特币熊市的时候，它把名字从“Applied Blockchain”改为了 “Applied Digital”，23年开始大量囤积GPU芯片。
$IREN 以前是矿企，2024年比特币减半前，开始囤积GPU，目前有一半效能供应AI算力。
$RIOT 上一轮的三巨头矿企之一，2026年开始转型数据中心，不过他家不自己囤GPU，而是把厂房和电力租给其他AI公司。
$CRWV neocloud里面最大的巨头，最初也是比特币矿商起家。
剩下没转型的：
$CLSK BTC死忠派，坚持只做挖矿
$MARA 矿工里的老大哥，25年犯了一个巨大的战略性错误。24-25年大火的BTC生态（铭文、符文、比特币L2等），迷惑了MARA，让其把自己定位为BTC生态集大成者，结果BTC生态在2026年直接销声匿迹了，而MARA则错过了最佳转型时机，2026年下半年开始，才准备做AI转型。目前MARA有1.9GW的在网电力，AI转型方向是学习RIOT，跟其他AI公司合作，出租厂房和电力。