Angus Martin (@sec_shift_oz) header
Angus Martin (@sec_shift_oz) profile picture

Founder | Security Shift Australia National Security awareness & education program for high school students in Australia. BBus (QUT), MIR (UQ), AIIA member.

Brisbane, Queensland
Joined July 2019
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“We need to engender a sense in the community that we are entering into a very different world. The world we are moving into is much more complicated. We are going to have to be prepared to make significant adjustments.” Peter Varghese AO podcasts.apple.com/au/podcas…
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Interesting summary points/theory on difficulty Chinese AI firms face vs. US ones.
Just read a Chinese article calling this "the darkest moment for Chinese AI." Seeing pushback in the comments, but basically it lays out the bear case quite extensively: 1. Getting compute is harder whichever way you go. Buying advanced NVIDIA chips is difficult, renting GPUs overseas is coming under pressure, and proposed restrictions on chipmaking equipment could make domestic alternatives harder to produce too. 2. Catching up could get a lot more expensive. If learning from leading models’ outputs aka distillaion becomes harder, Chinese labs have to spend more on their own data, experiments and training. That gets uncomfortable if investors are also losing patience. Independent labs don’t have an advertising or e-commerce business to pay the bills. 3. Robot-brain startups could find their advantage disappearing. Frontier labs are moving into robotics, potentially eating into what specialist models can offer. Meanwhile, robots still have to make economic sense against China’s relatively low labor costs. 4. More users don’t necessarily mean enough revenue. China has huge digital audiences, but getting people and businesses to pay sustainably for AI is another question. Everyone is competing on price, American models are getting cheaper too, and research isn’t getting cheaper. 5. Even the areas where China already leads face risks. Optical-component suppliers are benefiting from AI infrastructure spending, but proposed US restrictions could threaten access to major customers. That’s a lot hitting at once. The worry is that companies keep making better models while needing more money to stay competitive, without earning enough to fund the next round. Now, it feels like every six months it is a "darkest moment" for Chinese AI. But I think these are real concerns. We'll focus on this topic at @techbuzzchina (and present some hope, I think) next week.
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Given the history of this conflict, this seems a good summary of the current situation. I just can’t seem to make out what this US administration’s end game is. What exactly are they hoping to achieve? And what is their ideal ‘day after’ scenario for 🇺🇦 (& therefore Europe)?
The peace talks are failing because Putin still believes he can win the war, and because Trump, Kushner and Witkoff encourage this belief. By pressuring Ukraine, not Russia, they are prolonging the conflict, which will kill more people.
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This article also does a very good job explaining what economic security is, why it matters, and why it is now viewed as central to a nation-state’s national security (including 🇦🇺).
This is an excellent essay that lays out clearly the security dilemma that major states have found themselves in, here in this era of chokepoints and Mutually Assured Disruption. Great overview. foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
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Yep agree. If you have an interest in the writings and reports produced by Australia’s top FP think tanks, but have only ever observed from the outside in, this is a particularly insightful episode! And first-rate guests, as ever.
An important episode of Australia in the World for our think tank community, and for those in foreign countries who want to understand the finer dynamics at play in our ecosystem, especially right now. Chuffed to be name dropped in the discussion on impact!australiaintheworld.podbean.…
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Angus Martin retweeted
The American people have had their say. The midterms are a reminder of the resilience of American democracy, but a bigger question remains. My thoughts at the State of Asia Conference in Zurich.
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If you’re interested in learning more about AUKUS, and the the arguments for and against nuclear powered subs for Australia, this Lowy discussion (@JAParker29 & @SamRoggeveen) is a very good place to start. podcasts.apple.com/au/podcas…
Some thoughts on yesterday’s #AUKUS "report" from Peter Garrett & his team. Much has been made of the pre-determined headline recommendation, but the deeper problems are the report’s treatment of capability, strategy and the assumptions underpinning 🇦🇺’s sub choices. Pleased to have been asked to offer some thoughts for @ConversationEDU 🔗theconversation.com/australi…
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“…“realism” has evolved. Yet for all the nuance & assumptions added by political scientists, real-world events have a rich texture & too regularly defy any single theory. At best, a robust theory captures a significant chunk of reality. At worst, it obfuscates the truth.”
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A verifiable political agreement, or politics by other means…
The Middle East Is Once Again Approaching a Moment of Decision: Can Washington and Tehran Reach a Deal Before Another War? As Qatar intensifies its diplomatic efforts to broker an agreement between the United States and Iran, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: the risk of another military confrontation remains high, but the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough should not be dismissed. At the same time, if the current negotiations collapse, the likelihood of renewed escalation could increase dramatically. To understand where things are heading, we need to recognize several important factors. First, neither Washington nor Tehran necessarily wants another war. Both would, in principle, prefer a diplomatic solution that protects their fundamental interests. But neither appears willing to make the concessions the other side considers essential, and both seem prepared to accept the risks of military confrontation rather than compromise on what they regard as core national interests. Second, There are regional actors, particularly Qatar, that have both the motivation and the diplomatic channels necessary to influence the two sides. The Gulf states have compelling reasons to prevent another war. They understand that any major confrontation with Iran could quickly spread beyond Iranian territory, threatening their own security, energy infrastructure, and economic stability. Their involvement therefore represents an important opportunity for diplomacy. Yet the obstacles remain enormous. The fundamental problem is not simply the disagreement over the nuclear issue. It is the profound lack of trust between Washington and Tehran. Each side expects the other to make the first meaningful concession. Both are using military pressure to strengthen their negotiating positions. The talks remain indirect, and the two governments have fundamentally different interpretations of the strategic balance and what the previous rounds of fighting actually achieved. From Tehran's perspective, there is another critical consideration. The last two negotiating processes were followed by American and/or Israeli military strikes. This experience has reinforced the Iranian leadership's suspicion that diplomacy could once again serve as a cover for military preparations. Consequently, Iranian negotiators are not merely seeking American commitments. They want credible guarantees that those commitments will actually be implemented. This is where Qatar's diplomatic challenge becomes particularly complicated. The objective is to construct an agreement that allows both sides to claim victory. For Tehran, this means demonstrating that Washington has fulfilled Iran's seven conditions and that its resistance to American military and economic pressure has produced tangible results. For the Trump administration, it means securing a meaningful Iranian nuclear commitment that President Trump can present as proof that his pressure campaign succeeded in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In theory, these objectives are not necessarily incompatible. A carefully structured agreement, with clearly defined sequencing, reciprocal commitments, and credible implementation mechanisms, could potentially bridge at least some of the differences. One possibility is an interim ceasefire arrangement that creates additional diplomatic space for more substantive negotiations. But such an arrangement would only be useful if it establishes a credible pathway toward resolving the underlying disputes. Otherwise, it would merely postpone the next confrontation rather than prevent it. The challenge, therefore, is not only reaching an agreement on paper. It is ensuring that the agreement survives its first encounter with political and strategic reality. Even if negotiators manage to formulate a set of understandings, the depth of mutual suspicion could undermine their implementation almost immediately. Every delay, every ambiguous commitment, and every military move could be interpreted as evidence that the other side is negotiating in bad faith. There is also a dangerous psychological dimension to the current crisis. Both Washington and Tehran appear to believe that their military capabilities provide them with significant leverage. Both may also calculate that another round of fighting could improve their negotiating positions. This creates a particularly dangerous situation in which neither side necessarily seeks war, but both may convince themselves that escalation is preferable to accepting an unfavorable agreement. But, there is little reason to believe that another military confrontation would automatically produce better diplomatic conditions. Washington may hope that additional strikes would force Tehran to reconsider its position, but the Iranian leadership has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to absorb considerable military and economic costs rather than accept what it perceives as capitulation. Yes, another war could make negotiations even more difficult, particularly if Iran responds with a broader regional campaign that raises the costs for the United States and its Gulf partners. For now, the balance still tilts toward escalation, particularly if the Qatari-led diplomatic initiative fails. But this is not an inevitable outcome. As long as the diplomatic channels remain open and both sides continue exploring possible compromises, there is still a realistic opportunity to reach an understanding. The difficulty is that time is running short, expectations remain fundamentally incompatible, and mutual distrust is so deeply entrenched that even an agreement in principle could collapse during implementation. Ultimately, two questions will determine the outcome. Can Washington and Tehran reach an agreement that allows each side to believe it has prevailed without requiring the other to surrender its fundamental interests? And perhaps more importantly, do decision-makers in Washington genuinely believe that another round of military escalation would produce a better agreement, despite the considerable risk that Tehran would respond by escalating rather than capitulating? These questions are particularly important because, from the Iranian leadership's perspective, another confrontation would not necessarily change its fundamental negotiating position. If anything, a more destructive war could reinforce its determination not to yield under military pressure. The Middle East is once again approaching a critical crossroads. Diplomacy remains possible, but the window for achieving a sustainable agreement may be narrowing. The greatest danger is not that either side necessarily wants another war. It is that both may come to believe that another war is the only remaining way to achieve the agreement they want. #IranWar #iran
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“The hard part for our allies is if somebody that's responsive & receptive comes in '28, who's going to be there 4 years later? Are we going to get Trump 3.0? I think it's going to take 4-8 years before our allies begin to believe that we are the America they can trust again.”
“If people feel like our values don’t matter anymore—our values as war fighters, our values as Americans—then they’re not going to be there when we need them,” says William McRaven. foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/…
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This is definitely a worthwhile read and, importantly, highly accessible. Gideon’s access to the ‘corridors of power’ must surely be unparalleled. If you find yourself suddenly interested in the big political, economic & strategic forces shaping our world today, start here 👇🏼
My new book - out on October 22nd.
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“Mbappé being cancelled by Chinese commercial partners, state-owned broadcasters & sports platform..shows how the CCPs influence can be extended beyond 🇨🇳 borders, with the 🇨🇳 market serving as a source of pressure on foreign individuals & institutions.” abc.net.au/news/2026-11-01/c…
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Boy, was Samuel Huntington wrong about this prediction regarding Russia and Ukraine: "In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, pri marily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainian." jstor.org/stable/20045621?se…
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This is very good.
“Whoever produces and controls frontier models acquires global leverage over innovation, production, science, culture, and, ultimately, advanced thought.” Read @nfergus, Lisa Klaassen, and @ericschmidt on the imperial nature of AI: foreignaffairs.com/china/emp…
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Angus Martin retweeted
Pretty hard to find a better example of a tariff that is causing more harm to US industry (and consumers) for less strategic or economic gain than the steep tariff on Canadian aluminum 1/2
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Angus Martin retweeted
Since 2022, 72% of the world’s AI compute has ended up in the US and about 10% in China. And the US share keeps growing. It acquired around 60% of new compute each year from 2022 to 2024, then 72% in 2025, and 78% in the first half of 2026. This data comes from our interactive AI Chip Imports explorer, which estimates and visualizes national compute shares using customs records. It’s the latest piece in our project to map the AI chip supply chain, which also provides data on the components used to manufacture chips, sales volumes, the data centers that house chips, and the companies that own and use them. More on this new data and what we’ve learned below.
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Very interesting discussion. John argues 🇦🇺 economic relations with 🇨🇳 & rest of Asia are not incompatible with maintaining its deep security & cultural ties with 🇺🇸. 🇦🇺 should focus on opportunities emerging across Asia, particularly Indonesia 🇮🇩.
What if Washington asked Australia why it sells iron ore to China? Economist John Edwards tells @SamRoggeveen Australia would refuse to choose, because its economic ties with China matter far more than those with the US. 👉Watch the podcast here: youtu.be/3bgsF4jC394
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Another great interview by Joe Walker. Janet Egan @janet_e_egan explains the links between a rapid AI build out in Australia and our national (incl economic) security. NB: there is a whole lot of “ummm thinking time” dead air in this episode - not a bad thing!
The geostrategic case for compute in Australia: Janet Egan (@janet_e_egan) has been doing a bunch of quiet work trying to nudge Australian policymakers to think more seriously about AI. She works at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, but was back home in Australia over the past month. Was lucky to catch her on the day before she returned to the US. We pressure-test various strategic arguments for a large-scale compute industry and talk about the steps we would need to take to enable it. Watch below, or wherever you get your podcasts! Timestamps: (0:00:00) – Introduction (0:00:33) – Lessons from the AdBlue crisis (0:09:02) – How seriously do Australian policymakers take AI? (0:12:48) – How much does frontier access matter? (0:28:55) – Compute-for-access (0:43:08) – What does sufficient leverage look like? (0:53:00) – What does AI sovereignty actually mean? (1:03:15) – Taiwan, undersea cables and data centres as military targets (1:10:30) – Could compute buy Australia influence over AI safety? (1:15:19) – Verifying international AI agreements (1:24:00) – Copyright: the red line? (1:37:49) – The maximally ambitious path
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