
co-founder Ultimate Security Games @USGOfficials | co-organizer @theTrustX | mentor @thesecureum | prev: @code4rena @rareskills_io @vyperlang
Joined August 2020
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Get your popcorn ready! The third edition of the live smart contract hacking competition is happening on November 20th in Buenos Aires. More info coming soon 🙂
Ultimate Security Games 🛡️
On the evening of November 20th, RareSkills will launch...
Ultimate Security Games
Live in Argentina.
Smart contract hacking + esports = Ultimate Security Games
The hackers will share their screens live, so you'll see their thought process and strategy as they break the contracts. If the terminal looks a little scary, no worries, @Jeyffre will explain what is happening in understandable terms.
The contracts will be hosted on @monad (which-net? can't say yet!).
We'd also like to thank @sigp_io and @immunefi for making the event possible.
Over the next few days we'll more details about the rules, teams and more. Watch this space...
Sign up in the Luma next!
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Your iPhone's charging port has its own computer inside it.
Send the right packet over a single pin and that chip rewires the port into a hardware debugger for the main processor.
A modern USB-C connector packs 24 symmetrical pins. Even the cable has silicon in it. Any USB-C cable rated above 60W charging or faster than USB 2.0 speeds hides an e-Marker microcontroller inside the plug. Before high power or data moves, your device supplies voltage to that tiny chip over the unused Configuration Channel (CC) pin using VCONN and reads its spec sheet: max current (3A or 5A), Extended Power Range voltage up to 48V (240W), max data rate, and passive or active wiring.
Inside the iPhone 15 and newer Macs, those 24 pins run straight into a custom Texas Instruments microcontroller Apple calls the ACE3 (replacing the older CD3217 / ACE2 controller).
ACE3 runs a full USB stack and connects directly to internal system buses. It negotiates charging profiles, sits on the internal SPMI bus, handles forced DFU reboots, and controls hardware JTAG and SWD access to the main application processor
All USB Power Delivery traffic rides over the CC1/CC2 pins, separate from the normal data lines. Apple takes advantage of that channel with proprietary Vendor Defined Messages (VDMs) sent inside SOP'DEBUG and SOP"DEBUG packets under Apple's vendor ID (0x05ac).
Using open-source tools like Asahi Linux's macvdmtool or DIY boards like Marc Zyngier's Central Scrutinizer, a researcher can query the controller (0x10 Get Action List) and send remux commands (0x12 Perform Action). On command, the ACE chip flips internal multiplexers and turns the Sideband Use (SBU1/SBU2) pins or secondary D+/D- pair into a 1.2V serial debug UART, a DFU port, a hard reboot trigger, or SWD/JTAG lines.
On the previous generation ACE2 chip inside MacBooks, security researcher Thomas Roth (stacksmashing) paired a hardware flaw with a custom macOS kernel module to plant a persistent backdoor directly on the USB-C controller. It survived full system restores.
Apple locked ACE3 down much harder. Firmware updates are cryptographically personalized to each device, external debug interfaces are disabled, and the external SPI flash is validated and only holds part of the firmware. The rest sits inside internal ROM.
At DEF CON 32 and 38C3, Roth showed how he cracked it open anyway. He combined reverse engineering with RF side-channel analysis to map the chip's execution timing, then used electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) to glitch the silicon during boot, achieve code execution on the charging controller, and dump its internal ROM.
This attack requires opening the hardware on a workbench with EMFI probes. Nobody is hijacking your ACE3 chip through an airport charging cable.
The big shift is visibility. For years, the microcontroller guarding the physical front door to Apple's internal buses ran completely undocumented code. With the ROM dumped and ready to analyze, the USB-PD packet parser sitting directly in front of your phone's JTAG pins can finally be audited.
(Images gotten from Thomas Rotherham presentation. Link to video below)
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Web3 security morning digest!
1. Chainflip, ~$4.86M drained from its Ethereum vault.
The attacker withdrew 520.2 ETH, 3.25M USDC and 758K USDT. The withdrawal carried a valid signature from the vault's aggregate key, which suggests a leaked private key. The ETH is already moving into Tornado; reportedly all 2,909 ETH reached Tornado within 8 minutes of the drain. Chainflip hasn't made an official statement yet.
2. Arkham's report on the CryptoBilis Ledger Drainer: $95.35M.
Attackers compromised an official Ledger reseller and stole funds from 1,486 user addresses between October 7 and 9. Tether froze $10M. The rest was scattered, including 25,017 ETH that went into Tornado.
3. Binance's $6.4B hack: where the money went.
According to @somaxbt , token issuers have frozen $2.82B. The attacker still holds $2.67B: 18,270 BTC that have never moved, plus 335K ETH spread across 28 fresh wallets. Funds are being swapped to BTC through THORChain and then run through CoinJoin. @elliptic data puts 2,310+ BTC in CoinJoin so far. Reportedly only $32M has actually been recovered.
4. @zachxbt unmasks the phisher behind @delusional.
He says this person runs phishing through Google Ads and once pulled off a $55M drain. ZachXBT describes him as a US-based actor from The Com who goes by "Single". The @delusional account has since been deactivated. The threat actor also seems to be posting his photos from Florida.
5. Reental / RNT Lend (Polygon), update.
Losses from the admin-key exploit are now estimated at about $955K, up from the ~$454K in the Nov 19 digest. That figure is reported only; there's no official confirmation yet.
Stay safe!
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
We're living in an economy where a guy with a master's degree is delivering groceries to a 23 year old who made $4 million filming himself screaming at video games. And we're still telling kids to study hard.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Crypto fear and greed has now matched the all time low extreme fear number of 5.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
BREAKING: The FBI's national crime database has been hacked in a "major cybersecurity breach," per CNN.
The hacked database includes on nationwide information regarding criminal warrants, stolen property, and background checks.
This comes amid several other outages and hacks over the last 10 days.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Web3 hacks this week:
- Lighter $10.4M: nonce reuse leaked API keys
- Safe multisig $6.45M: suspected compromised Zodiac Roles key
- Kava Lend $3.7M: interest tracking bug in a dormant market
- K3 Capital $3.43M: vault never checked what the router spent
- Keplr / Web3Auth $1.82M+: weak social-login key system
- Fluidkey ~$1.58M: its own relayer drained accounts on 6 chains, cause TBD
- Gonka bridge $1.05M: BLS key rotation abuse (funds reportedly returned)
- Reental $955K: malicious admin upgrade
- LUKSO ~$495K: email recovery backend abuse
- B18TimeBank $405K: reward voucher bug
- MORE Markets $308K: e-mode switch inside a flash loan
- Proxima $200K+: private keys leaked in debug logs
Also: Luxor hashrate hijack, tampered Ledgers from resellers, and a wallet-swapping script in Optimizely and Kissmetrics.
$30M+ gone. Only 4 of 12 were clear contract bugs. Keys, infra and admin powers did the rest. 🫡
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
New features:
Swap inside your private balance.
Your tokens on @RAILGUN_Project go out, swap on Uniswap and come back in, in one transaction. Your account is never on it.
Send to someone’s private Railgun balance.
With a note only they can read.
Keep it Moving, Privately.
apps.apple.com/us/app/casber…
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
BREAKING: @coinbase-OWNED CRYPTO DERIVATIVES EXCHANGE @DeribitOfficial HAS LOCKED TRADING ACROSS ALL ITS MARKETS
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
The Wagyu lore takes another wild turn:
After $13.5M was drained and XMR1 crashed 99.8%, PerpetualCow just posted:
"Whoever was MMing XMR1 and lost money will be refunded fully obviously. Nobody will have lost money on this hack (except me 😢). Give me some time to cook and re-launch."
Two possible realities:
1. Chad founder eats an eight-figure loss out of pocket to save his reputation and bridge.
2. The classic "I will make everyone whole, please don't sue me yet" stall tactic.
CT is waiting to see the first refund transaction on-chain.
Exit scam or hack?
Wagyu saga timeline:
1. October: “No-KYC bridge” Wagyu hacked; order database leaked online.
2. Nov 16: Safe drainer uses Wagyu to buy XMR1, washing $4M+ into Monero.
3. Today: Official deployer key dumps 5.2M XMR1, draining $13.5M from Hyperliquid market makers. XMR1 crashes 99.8% ($490 → $1).
Founder’s response: “Hi. Not sure what happened yet. MMs got hit. Whoever did this, I’m open to negotiations.”
Perfect timing for whatever this is.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Exit scam or hack?
Wagyu saga timeline:
1. October: “No-KYC bridge” Wagyu hacked; order database leaked online.
2. Nov 16: Safe drainer uses Wagyu to buy XMR1, washing $4M+ into Monero.
3. Today: Official deployer key dumps 5.2M XMR1, draining $13.5M from Hyperliquid market makers. XMR1 crashes 99.8% ($490 → $1).
Founder’s response: “Hi. Not sure what happened yet. MMs got hit. Whoever did this, I’m open to negotiations.”
Perfect timing for whatever this is.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Post-mortem of the $13m XMR hack:
It's WORSE than I thought.
Turns out that the entire hosting provider of 1984.hosting got hacked with everyone's data + internal server files today.
The XMR1 deployer key was held on an OLD server on there that I DELETED, but somehow the logs/files were still kept.
Lesson to learn here is that these hosting providers keep your data/logs even after you delete your server with them.
Like I said before, everyone who lost money due to this will be refunded by me personally and Wagyu will re-launch at a later stage.
Give me some time please.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
WAGYU GOT HACKED !
It seems like centralized swap provider known as wagyu got hacked today. It was fairly popular among XMR crowd due to the ability to execute large XMR swaps quickly.
Note that Unstoppable doesn't use Wagyu provider in its swap aggregator in any way.
Our aggregator uses either :
>> DEXes (fully decentralized exchange protocols) that have no means to operate outside the programmed protocol
>> or CEXes (centralized swap providers) that operate under the regulatory framework.
Replying to @monerify
can't believe wagyu rugged
so surprising
only was predicted to happen by everyone given their architecture
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
据安全机构 Scam Sniffer 监测,Hyperliquid 上 XMR1 部署者钱包疑似被盗,将 520 万枚 XMR1 转入新地址并卖出约 1330 万美元 USDC,XMR1 在约 35 分钟内从约 494 美元跌至约 1 美元。所得资金被转换为约 7300 枚 ETH,大部分已跨链至以太坊。
wublock123.com/news/hyperliq…
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
got drained in the fluidkey hack yesterday
as an engineer I couldn't not dig into how it happened
~$1.6M+ gone across 7 chains in about 25 minutes. most of it already through tornado cash.
was it a contract bug? no.
every drain went through fluidkey's own relayer, with valid owner signatures.
the attacker didn't break anything. they signed as us.
and it stopped the exact minute fluidkey took their servers down.
so how did they get the keys?
my guesses:
- a copy of the keys stored somewhere on fluidkey's side
- keys that could be rebuilt from data fluidkey held
- a tampered web app or code package that leaked keys when people logged in
waiting on the post-mortem.
Update on today’s security incident: there have been no unauthorized transactions since 18:05 UTC, when we took all services offline.
We are working with SEAL 911 on the investigation and on tracing the funds, and will publish a full post-mortem once it is complete.
As a precaution, the web app and all APIs remain paused until our review is complete.
We will share further updates on this channel and in individual support chats.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Rekt. $1.32M. Key or signature compromise. Most funds already converted to ETH.
Operator: 0xdc70810d767b3109d8afa9678561738bdb4a2984
Collection wallets: 0x1986eccffaec96bd00f32516b87b3e5cfe934d3c
0xc061382b863d0cca31345169da41b94ab1deaf17
0xd5578310ad2b221e4433f67286849d46ae93f825
0xefdA52Af6848Ca8b08153A248B9d2A0bd488d247
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
We are aware of a security incident affecting Fluidkey users. We recommend not interacting with the Fluidkey website and app while we investigate the incident.
nftmerchant (USG) retweeted
Ethereum is preparing for a future where today's cryptographic assumptions may no longer be safe.
And the conversation is getting serious.
Three upcoming developments you will see in Ethereum.
➜ Glamsterdam: Scaling Ethereum L1
Ethereum's next major upgrade is targeting
- Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation (ePBS).
- Block-Level Access Lists (BALs).
- More efficient parallel transaction processing.
- Improved gas pricing.
The goal is to increase L1 execution capacity without compromising decentralisation.
➜ Hegotá: Stronger censorship resistance and account flexibility
The 2027 upgrade roadmap includes...
- FOCIL for stronger transaction inclusion guarantees.
- Frame transactions for more flexible account authorisation.
- A foundation for post-quantum account security.
➜ Post-Quantum Ethereum
A proposal published by Ethlabs is pushing for an accelerated post-quantum security timeline, targeting 2027 readiness.
The concern isn't that quantum computers have already broken Ethereum.
It's that cryptographic infrastructure takes years to redesign, test, and deploy safely.
Waiting until the threat becomes immediate would be a terrible strategy.
The bigger picture
Ethereum is working on three fundamental challenges,
- Scaling execution.
- Strengthening censorship resistance.
- Preparing cryptography for a post-quantum future.
The interesting part isn't just how many transactions Ethereum can process.
It's whether Ethereum can remain secure, decentralized, and useful as the underlying technology landscape changes.
Building for the future means preparing for threats that haven't arrived yet.

































