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Turkey's National Intelligence Academy (MİA), which operates under the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), has recently published a report titled The Anatomy of Israeli Expansionism. The report shows that some of Ankara's leading decision makers see Israel as an adversary that needs to be countered, regardless of who is in charge in Tel Aviv. Published in Turkish, the report is an open source that reflects the thinking of some influential pro-government circles in Turkish intelligence and the ruling AKP. It is also the most recent and most detailed public account to date of how Turkish intelligence views Israel. The academy is part of Turkey's intelligence service, MİT, which has gained considerable influence over the country's domestic and foreign policy over the past decade. The report provides a diagnosis. It finds that Israeli politics itself has shifted. In its words, the radical right, once on the margins of the political system, "has settled at the center of Israeli politics," and its growing appeal among younger generations "shows that expansionism will not be limited to a particular leadership." A possible change of government, the report adds, "will not on its own resolve the legal violations on the ground." It then describes the rivalry between Turkey and Israel as a clash between two views of regional order. According to the report, Ankara wants neighbors that are strong and control their own territory, while Israel prefers weak and divided neighbors that allow it to intervene when it chooses. As a result, every gain in Turkish influence limits Israel's freedom of action. The report therefore treats the rivalry as lasting rather than temporary, identifying Syria as the place where the two views clash most directly. It also points to competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Horn of Africa, where Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland, and over trade routes such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Based on this diagnosis, the report sets out general principles for Turkey. First, Turkey should not answer every Israeli move in kind. Second, it should not try to replace Israel as the dominant power in the region. Instead, it should help neighboring countries build stronger states and security forces, support closer regional cooperation, and prevent ethnic and religious divisions from inviting foreign intervention. The report then turns to specific countries. On Palestine, Turkey should continue supporting a two-state solution and help protect the land, people, and institutions a future Palestinian state would need. On Lebanon, it should support the country's borders and its government's authority. On Syria, it should help rebuild a central government strong enough to control its own territory. The report also links Israel to Turkey's domestic "Terror-Free Turkey" peace process with the PKK. It argues that better relations among Turks, Kurds, and Arabs would make it harder for Israel to exploit ethnic divisions in the region. Finally, the report looks at the wider region. It warns that regional security could come to depend entirely on networks built around Israel, such as US support, normalization agreements with Arab states, and Israel's integration into US Central Command. Turkey should ensure that no security, energy, or trade arrangement that excludes it becomes the only option. The aim is to prevent Israel from turning its military power and US backing into unlimited freedom of action. The report argues that Israel's aggressive policies make this easier by pushing other countries to seek new partners. One example is the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, which Turkey signed with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August. According to the report, Turkey's advantage is its ability to work with several partners at once, from NATO to the Gulf states and Pakistan. On trade, it recommends competing with IMEC through Turkey's own routes, the Development Road through Iraq and the Middle Corridor to Central Asia. As the National Intelligence Academy's report argues, a change of leadership in Israel is unlikely to alter its foreign policy. (For Israel, however, a change of leadership in Ankara would make all the difference.) Tensions between Turkey and Israel are therefore likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Syria, where both countries are active and pursue opposing goals, remains the most dangerous arena. Preventing an escalation there will require sustained American engagement with both sides, rather than dismissing the dispute between Turkey and Israel as mere political theater.