Georges Malbrunot

Iran’s Missile Program: The Limits of Airpower and the Illusion of a Military Solution Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are not simply the product of imported technology or foreign assistance. They are rooted in decades of indigenous knowledge, accumulated experience, and a national security doctrine built around asymmetric warfare. The belief that Israel and the United States can permanently prevent Iran from producing missiles and drones through airstrikes has repeatedly collided with reality. This does not mean that the military campaigns have failed to inflict significant damage. They have. Iranian production facilities, launchers, stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure have suffered substantial losses. But degrading a capability is not the same as eliminating it. Iran spent decades preparing for precisely this kind of confrontation. Its missile and drone programs were designed not only to survive attacks but also to recover from them. Factories can be destroyed, but engineering knowledge, technical expertise, operational experience, and the ability to rebuild supply chains are much harder to eliminate. Iran's recovery demonstrates that destroying production facilities does not necessarily destroy the industrial and technological foundations that allow those facilities to be rebuilt. This leaves Washington and Jerusalem facing an uncomfortable strategic choice: either accept that Iran will retain significant conventional missile capabilities, or commit themselves to repeated military campaigns every few months or years, with enormous and potentially growing costs. And these costs go far beyond the price of military operations. Every new campaign risks triggering Iranian retaliation against Israel, American military bases, Gulf states, and critical energy infrastructure. In other words, repeated attempts to weaken Iran's military capabilities could ultimately produce greater regional instability rather than lasting security. There comes a point when national security strategy must rely not only on destroying an adversary's capabilities but also on deterring their use. This does not mean abandoning military pressure or accepting every aspect of Iran's military buildup. It means recognizing that airstrikes cannot substitute for a comprehensive strategy combining credible deterrence, multilayered missile defense, intelligence operations, efforts to disrupt critical technology transfers, and diplomacy. Military force can remain an important instrument. But it cannot become the strategy itself. And this is precisely the danger of a strategy built around repeated military campaigns. Tactical successes may create the appearance of progress while leaving the underlying strategic problem unresolved. Worse, they may lock Israel and the United States into an endless cycle of escalation, retaliation, and reconstruction. Ultimately, the goal of a successful strategy should not be to ensure that Iran has no missiles. It should be to ensure that Iran understands the consequences of using them. #Iran #IranWar‌

In my interview @SkyYaldaHakim @SkyNews , I discussed what Israeli foreign policy might look like if Gadi Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government. Eisenkot would certainly bring a welcome change in tone and direction. But his priority would likely be Israel’s urgent domestic challenges, rather than launching another military campaign against Iran. He fully understands the Iranian threat, but he also recognizes something Netanyahu has repeatedly failed to acknowledge: you cannot bring down the Iranian regime through airstrikes alone. On the Palestinian issue, Eisenkot could bring a positive shift. But expectations should remain realistic. His would still be a right-wing government, likely operating with a narrow parliamentary majority. We should not expect dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs or far-reaching peace initiatives, but he will fight against Jewish terrorism in the west Bank and for improving Palestinian life. The change would be positive, but it would not be a revolution in Israeli foreign policy.