Since the late 1990s, the United States has adopted a position of “strategic altruism” towards India, assuming that a rising democratic India would balance China. Washington paid real diplomatic costs to back New Delhi—most notably, carving out a special exception to global non-proliferation norms. Trump’s second term breaks sharply with that logic: steep tariffs, visa-fee hikes, tighter limits on Indian outsourcing, and consistently disparaging rhetoric towards New Delhi. Many Western observers treat this as a temporary “Trump anomaly”, blame India’s weak capability, or point to a shift in how Trump conceives competition with China (less geopolitics, more economics). These takes miss the structural pattern—both across Trump’s ally policy and in why India is being targeted. The root driver is US anxiety over its declining strength, which now outweighs concern about external geopolitical threats. This decline-anxiety makes Trump more cautious towards hard retaliators like China and Russia—heavy rhetoric, restrained action—to avoid costly conflicts that could drain resources and accelerate US weakening. In this frame, allies become “blood bags” (血包), the US preferring to squeeze partners for immediate gains over paying uncertain costs for long-run strategic contests. India, meanwhile, has enjoyed US indulgence but lacks the industrial/economic heft of Japan, Europe or Korea to make major concessions—and is less willing to bend—so it is cast as “conspicuously ungrateful”. US-India tensions are likely to worsen as service-sector competition hardens and, amid anti-immigration politics, the visibility of the Indian diaspora makes India an easier target for populist pressure. Looking ahead, America’s relative decline alongside India’s rise—and a dominant China—might even allow Beijing’s structural tensions with Washington and New Delhi to mutually unwind, triggering a fundamental geopolitical realignment in China’s favour. sinification.org/p/from-darl…