Journalist i Nettavisen og programleder i Ukrainapodden.
Joined March 2011
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Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Verstka has found out that the Russian Ministry of Defense is postponing the payments of salaries and other supplements for December to its staff that are not taking part in the war to January 2027. This is the first time such a postponement happens in the last 18 years.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
This drone does so much important work across the front line, not only bringing death, but also life to Ukrainian infantry doing it tougher than ever.
Always makes me happy to see them at work.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
The Kursk operation in numbers (DeepState maps, UALosses records)
Ukraine held up to 902 km² of Kursk oblast (Sep 2024), about 430 km² by Feb 2025 and 80 km² by the end of Mar 2025. It cost 9,946 Ukrainian records there: 3,691 KIA, 5,760 MIA and 495 POW.
Losses did not spike at the advance: 651 records in Aug 2024. They rose while Ukraine held shrinking ground, peaking at 1,397 in Dec 2024.
In March 2025 the held area fell from 425 to 80 km². The number of losses stayed within the range of the months before (1,104), but 72% of them are MIA today, against 47–57% for the months before.
Ukrainian losses, update from the @UALosses data.
My own count from their public map files.
Records of Ukrainian soldiers killed (KIA), missing (MIA) and captured (POW), by year of loss:
- 2022: 35.0k
- 2023: 37.3k
- 2024: 54.6k
- 2025: 58.7k
- 2026 (to 16 Oct): 35.8k
221,293 records since 24 Feb 2022: 105.1k KIA, 105.1k MIA, 11.1k POW.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
NEW: Our reporting found the recent Starlink outage in Ukraine could be part of an elaborate upsell.
When U.S. officials asked Musk's company about it, they were told the problem could be fixed by upgrading to a new contract.
@isaacstanbecker @TheAtlantic
theatlantic.com/national-sec…
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
October has become a black month for Russia’s Sukhoi fleet, following an already costly September.
Across the incidents compiled for September 7–October 29, 15 aircraft were destroyed, lost in crashes or damaged. Twelve of them were affected in October alone.
The breakdown: seven Su-34s destroyed and two damaged; three Su-35S fighters lost; and three Su-30-family aircraft lost.
Ukrainian drone and specifically Long Neptune missile strikes accounted for most of the destruction and damage, while crashes and a mid-air collision added further losses.
The accompanying infographic maps these incidents, with dates, locations and brief details of what happened.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Musk's latest display of ignorance gave me a good excuse to revisit my summer trip to a Ukrainian POW camp. Nothing makes a better argument about how Russian soldiers are not poor young conscripts than meeting them face-to-face.
With my photos:
kyivindependent.com/reporter…
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
This is not the first time that @CaolanReports disrespects the work of Ukrainian journalists by using their content without permission. And then tries to make them feel guilty for demanding to respect their work and copyright.
Since a few Kyiv Independent readers have asked, I’d like to explain what happened with Caolan Robertson’s video, out of respect for our supporters.
Our team found that a video on Caolan’s @CaolanReports YouTube channel included a fragment of an earlier Kyiv Independent video, used without permission and without a request for permission. It wasn’t just footage. It was an animated map that takes our team a lot of work to produce.
Importantly, Caolan’s video cropped out our logo from the fragment. Instead of crediting our work, it fully removed the attribution to the Kyiv Independent. That isn’t citation or fair use.
Our team member did what is standard when your content is used this way on YouTube: They filed a copyright report. YouTube reviewed the case and removed the video. We follow the same process whenever our work is used without permission, regardless of who the creator is.
Worth noting that a removal like this doesn’t kill the creator’s work: The video can simply be re-uploaded without the copyrighted material.
So I was surprised that Caolan instead chose to publicly attack the journalists whose work he lifted, and to appeal to journalistic solidarity in a case where he didn’t demonstrate any.
Our team has been reporting on the ground in Ukraine since before the full-scale invasion. We’re independent, funded mostly by our readers, and we earn every dime. We’re very proud of our work, from front-line reporting to war crimes investigations. We respect the work of other journalists and expect the same for ours.
I wish Caolan all the best in telling his audience about Ukraine. If he ever wants to use our work, he’s welcome to ask, like anyone else.
We are all on the same side when it comes to this: We want as many voices as possible telling the world about Ukraine. But being on the same side means respecting and crediting each other’s work. Credit matters because the reporting everyone draws on has to come from somewhere.
Thank you.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Not the first time he does something like this. He also used our Human Safari map without asking for permission and without giving any credits.
The excuse that the cause is so important that intellectual property doesn’t matter is a bonkers argument.
Since a few Kyiv Independent readers have asked, I’d like to explain what happened with Caolan Robertson’s video, out of respect for our supporters.
Our team found that a video on Caolan’s @CaolanReports YouTube channel included a fragment of an earlier Kyiv Independent video, used without permission and without a request for permission. It wasn’t just footage. It was an animated map that takes our team a lot of work to produce.
Importantly, Caolan’s video cropped out our logo from the fragment. Instead of crediting our work, it fully removed the attribution to the Kyiv Independent. That isn’t citation or fair use.
Our team member did what is standard when your content is used this way on YouTube: They filed a copyright report. YouTube reviewed the case and removed the video. We follow the same process whenever our work is used without permission, regardless of who the creator is.
Worth noting that a removal like this doesn’t kill the creator’s work: The video can simply be re-uploaded without the copyrighted material.
So I was surprised that Caolan instead chose to publicly attack the journalists whose work he lifted, and to appeal to journalistic solidarity in a case where he didn’t demonstrate any.
Our team has been reporting on the ground in Ukraine since before the full-scale invasion. We’re independent, funded mostly by our readers, and we earn every dime. We’re very proud of our work, from front-line reporting to war crimes investigations. We respect the work of other journalists and expect the same for ours.
I wish Caolan all the best in telling his audience about Ukraine. If he ever wants to use our work, he’s welcome to ask, like anyone else.
We are all on the same side when it comes to this: We want as many voices as possible telling the world about Ukraine. But being on the same side means respecting and crediting each other’s work. Credit matters because the reporting everyone draws on has to come from somewhere.
Thank you.
Opphavsrett er ganske lett: Ikke bruk materiale du ikke har tillatelse til å bruke.
Hvis du er usikker så spør de som har opphavsretten om det er greit at du bruker det de har lagd.
Since a few Kyiv Independent readers have asked, I’d like to explain what happened with Caolan Robertson’s video, out of respect for our supporters.
Our team found that a video on Caolan’s @CaolanReports YouTube channel included a fragment of an earlier Kyiv Independent video, used without permission and without a request for permission. It wasn’t just footage. It was an animated map that takes our team a lot of work to produce.
Importantly, Caolan’s video cropped out our logo from the fragment. Instead of crediting our work, it fully removed the attribution to the Kyiv Independent. That isn’t citation or fair use.
Our team member did what is standard when your content is used this way on YouTube: They filed a copyright report. YouTube reviewed the case and removed the video. We follow the same process whenever our work is used without permission, regardless of who the creator is.
Worth noting that a removal like this doesn’t kill the creator’s work: The video can simply be re-uploaded without the copyrighted material.
So I was surprised that Caolan instead chose to publicly attack the journalists whose work he lifted, and to appeal to journalistic solidarity in a case where he didn’t demonstrate any.
Our team has been reporting on the ground in Ukraine since before the full-scale invasion. We’re independent, funded mostly by our readers, and we earn every dime. We’re very proud of our work, from front-line reporting to war crimes investigations. We respect the work of other journalists and expect the same for ours.
I wish Caolan all the best in telling his audience about Ukraine. If he ever wants to use our work, he’s welcome to ask, like anyone else.
We are all on the same side when it comes to this: We want as many voices as possible telling the world about Ukraine. But being on the same side means respecting and crediting each other’s work. Credit matters because the reporting everyone draws on has to come from somewhere.
Thank you.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Ukrainian losses, update from the @UALosses data.
My own count from their public map files.
Records of Ukrainian soldiers killed (KIA), missing (MIA) and captured (POW), by year of loss:
- 2022: 35.0k
- 2023: 37.3k
- 2024: 54.6k
- 2025: 58.7k
- 2026 (to 16 Oct): 35.8k
221,293 records since 24 Feb 2022: 105.1k KIA, 105.1k MIA, 11.1k POW.
Ua losses updated their count, methodology and map on Ukrainian 🇺🇦 losses in the war, following KIA, MIA and POW
Ukrainian losses :
🔸29k losses in 2022
🔸31k losses in 2023
🔸47k losses in 2024
🔸51k losses in 2025
🔸30k losses in 2026
The database is very useful : we have multiple units, WIA and POW, a map of losses and the possibility to track key battles of the war. The recent data is much better than the Russian one and includes MIA, which is the main difference with Mediazona's count of Russian losses (it is also less conservative).
🔸 ~2k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kostiantynivka battle, most of which are MIA
🔸~4k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Pokrovsk battle
🔸~1.2k Ukrainian soldiers died in Krinky, Kherson oblast
🔸~6k Ukrainian soldiers died in the Bakhmut battle
🔸~2k soldiers died in the Robotyne counter-offensive and ~1k in the Velika Novosilka counter-offensive
🔸~8k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kursk operation (all lenght of it)
Check @LossesUA for details
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Mediazona data compared to adjusted General Staff reported.
I disagree with this analysis, which contradicts me, so I think it’s necessary to come back to it. The author opens with “all evidence available point to the opposite”, yet he doesn’t cite a single piece of evidence.
🔶Saying that the drop in Russian armored vehicle losses proves Russia is losing fewer men is not only wrong, it’s actually a lie. First, armor has been sidelined since early 2024, which explains the drop. Second, Mediazona’s data (which is nearly complete up to early 2024) shows that losses are lower during periods of mechanized assaults (autumn 2023) than during periods of limited armor use (summer 2024).
Moreover, the author deliberately leaves out that while far fewer armored vehicles are being destroyed (because they’re used less), strikes on unarmored vehicles have exploded. We’re talking about 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles hit per week. These vehicles are barely counted, and they are struck daily 10, 20, 30 or even 50 km from the front. The human losses from these strikes are fairly high, since the vehicles are unprotected and can’t withstand drone attacks. To see this, you’d need to do a minimum of research and actually watch the videos. Strikes on unarmored vehicles also happen very far from the front: mid-range strikes alone have hit more than 2,000 confirmed vehicles since the start of the year, often more than 50 km from the front.
The author will probably bring out his usual line that these strikes have no impact and that vehicles can easily be replaced by buying them on the famous big used-car market in Central Asia. That’s one more thing he deliberately leaves out: the cost of the vehicles hit, the goods, ammunition and soldiers that never reach the front, the wounded and killed in these strikes (judging by the videos, this happens very regularly), and the knock-on effect on Russian logistics, which is far from negligible.
🔶Claiming that Mediazona proves there are fewer losses is also wrong. Mediazona takes time to update its list of losses and holds back part of its data, so as not to reveal weaknesses in the Russian government that would push it to shut down the information channels being used. Mediazona’s data is broadly complete up to the end of 2023, and as we’ve seen, entries are still regularly being added for 2024, two years ago. The chart showing the year each entry was added makes it very clear how much longer it now takes to record losses. As for the claim that no OSINT data shows any change in losses: well, that’s easy to say when you don’t do any OSINT yourself, have no contacts on the ground, and therefore bring no additional data.
🔶The 2026 attrition ratio is not more favorable than 2025’s. That’s false, and there is no “more balanced attrition approach.” This ignores Ukraine’s advantage in drone strikes (the kill zone is deeper) and Russia’s manpower problems, which force it to concentrate the offensive on certain areas. The infiltration strategy itself proves that attrition is not under Russian control. Does Russia have the advantage in artillery? No. It fires more, but at shorter range and with less accuracy, against Ukrainians who move less and stay camouflaged in their positions. Losses from artillery are minimal. The Ukrainians fire less, but further and more accurately, against a larger number of Russian troops. The Russians do have the advantage in airstrikes, but losses are mainly caused by drones, not KABs.
🔶The next point is less problematic. The rest is mostly a change of subject: why bring up deep strikes (which I never disputed) when the topic was first and foremost the front? Fine, it does tie back to attrition, but in doing so the author quietly admits that Russia is failing on the front and is focusing on a deep-strike campaign in the hope of making Ukraine give in.
I struggle to understand the author’s obsession with everything that’s negative for Ukraine and positive for Russia. For a “military theorist”, it’s a shame not to cover the whole picture, especially since he always finds a rational explanation for the Russian plan (“no, actually, if Russia isn’t advancing, it’s because it chose an attrition strategy”. Very funny 😊).
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Hi there. Dima Treschanin of Mediazona here.
1. We don’t consider our 2022–2023 data to be “broadly complete.” We do have non-public data that would add several thousand more people, including about a thousand from Wagner PMC alone. But our methodology is fairly conservative, and we don’t want to change it midstream.
2. According to our data so far, 2025 has been the deadliest year of the war. Although we have identified more than 100,000 people killed with dates of death in 2024, we know for certain that losses in 2025 were significantly higher. Collecting that data will take considerable time, though; it’s simply an enormous amount of work.
3. Thanks to non-public sources, we can see how long it takes the state to register deaths. For example, we’re currently working through a list in which most of the people were likely killed in the summer or early fall of 2025. Today we learned the dates of death for nine of them, and roughly the same number last week. To be clear: these people died last summer. Their obituaries, if they appear at all, will be published some time from now.
4. As for 2026, the situation is even worse: even government agencies (outside the MoD) don’t know how many people have been killed this year. And let’s be real, the MoD itself may not have the full picture either.
5. The more “static” the front line, the harder it is to recover bodies. The harder it is to recover bodies, the larger the share of soldiers listed as missing in action, and the longer and more difficult the identification process becomes. This also leads to more errors in which living people are declared dead; such cases are very rare, but they do happen.
6. Barring any major changes at the front, we expect that for the rest of this year and most of next, the new data we add will mainly concern 2025.
7. For this reason, we can’t say whether 2026 will prove deadlier than 2025. But there is no reason to believe the situation has improved in any way for the Russian army: broadly, the same tactics and strategy are being used as in 2025. That said, any claim of rising losses requires evidence, and we don’t have that evidence yet.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
As there seems to be some confusion.
➡️NO, the @FinancialTimes did NOT report, Russia agreed to withdrawing from all 2022-occupied areas of Ukraine in early 2023.
❗️FT reports, probably based on information from himself, that Putin lobbyist Matthias Warnig #claimed, Russia would withdraw. There is no second source, no independent confirmation, not even from the alleged source and the quoted former Gazprom manager - which might be the same person - itself.
‼️So I would take this with a Mount Everest of salt.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Remember this video from January? A guy from Kenya with an anti-tank mine strapped to his chest, pushed out toward Ukrainian positions.
His name is Francis, he's 35. He came to russia for a construction job. russian soldiers called him "can opener".
ALT CNN article: 'You escape, or you die': African men say Russia duped them into fighting in Ukraine
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
A large, carefully planned Russian propaganda operation appears to be underway. Having starved people in the town of Oleshky for months, Russia, withe US help, will now "liberate" it. Read @ZarinaZabrisky below:
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Aleksandar Vučić announced that his list, "Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia", lost in the extraordinary parliamentary elections held on October 25, 2026.
The winning group is the "Students' List."
Vučić stated that preliminary results indicate his list secured around 105 mandates, while the Student List is projected to gain between 135 and 140 mandates.
As I explained earlier, calling it a stolen election was premature.
Today’s Serbian elections will test whether a Hungarian-style radical shift in the political landscape is possible.
The polls show that both Vucic's coalition and the 'Students list' can be on the winning side.
Vucic's electoral offer includes raising pensions and public-sector salaries and offering subsidies for youth.
'Students' List' runs its campaign on anti-corruption proposals, which strongly resonate within Serbian society.
Stay tuned if you are interested in impartial monitoring of these elections!
Mala Tokmachka hadde rundt 200 innbyggere i 2022. Hvor mange russere som har blitt drept i forsøket på å innta den bittelille landsbyen vet jeg ikke, men vi snakker mange ganger innbyggertallet.
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
About that Melania-brokered “ceasefire”… See below. Trump-friendly American media have apparently been invited, and it’s fair to surmise that’s not because Russia wants them to see the truth.
🔴 A ceasefire in Russian-occupied Oleshky opens the way for a Kremlin-controlled press tour and gaslighting operation designed to shift blame for the humanitarian crisis onto Ukraine.
Here is how it is done:
kyivpost.com/analysis/88041
Tormod Malvin Sæther retweeted
Elon Musk claims that Ukraine allegedly violated Starlink's terms of use and used the system on combat drones.
As someone who was inside the process at the Ministry of Defense, I can say with certainty that this is not true.
In February of this year, whitelists were introduced. Stationary terminals could be registered by both military personnel and civilians.
But for any satellite terminal to work while on the move, it had to be added to a special list and connected to the military Starshield system. Otherwise, no satellite communication terminals in Ukraine would work.
In other words, using civilian Starlink for drone missions was technically impossible. All drone missions that required satellite communication could only be carried out using Starshield.
We are very grateful to the United States and SpaceX for access to critically important satellite communications. Ukraine did not violate the terms of use.
