Howard J. Shatz

Hello @saulkavonic. I think, perhaps, you are a bit of a mischievous troublemaker? Yes, I would be happy to respond. First, thanks to @saulkavonic for raising the issue and @citrinowicz for taking the time to read and comment. This is social media and @X at its best. Now on to a response. Most important, @citrinowicz argues against what we have written but does not deliver what is most needed: a suggested course of action taking account of current facts, pros, and cons. We are in the middle of an economic blockade and Operation Economic Outcast. Do we tighten the blockade? Ease the blockade? Remove the blockade and sanctions? We provide a specific policy: “Maintain the blockade and economic pressure campaign, respond with force when Iran or its proxies strike U.S. or partner targets, and push for negotiations that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and end the Iranian nuclear program.” We also note that it is flawed, but so are all the others. So, we would expect anyone considering it to find flaws. @citrinowicz says that Washington should develop “a realistic diplomatic path that acknowledges Iran's red lines.” This does not appear to contradict what we say, unless he believes that the end points of reopening the Strait and ending the Iranian nuclear program are unrealistic. More on this later. Now let me go through each of his points. He starts by saying “there is little reason to believe that Iran’s leadership will eventually surrender to economic pressure.” We acknowledge the flaws in economic pressure campaigns. We even acknowledge that Iran could stabilize its economy, which would then require a different U.S. approach. While we note that an economic pressure campaign helped lead to the Iran nuclear deal, we also say, “the regime seems even less inclined to make concessions, at least judging from its public statements, but the pressure campaign is also more extreme.” So, we have two out-of-sample situations – the current regime and the depth of the current pressure campaign. In these circumstances, predicting what will happen becomes more difficult. @citrinowicz says, the regime “is willing to absorb enormous economic costs rather than make concessions it considers a threat to the regime’s survival.” We say that if the economic pressure campaign continues to work, the regime “will sooner or later need to compromise to avoid collapse.” So, we are both saying the regime will do what it needs to do to survive. The difference seems to be that he believes there is no amount of economic collapse that would lead the regime to compromise. We do. After all, it was the inability to continue the war against Iraq politically or *economically* that led Ayatollah Khomeini to drink the bitter chalice in 1988 and end the war. Economic collapse can matter, but how much economic collapse matters is an open question. And our endpoints are clear: reopening the Strait and ending the nuclear program. If @citrinowicz thinks these will endanger the regime’s survival, then we have a bigger problem: That is tantamount to saying we should just let Iran continue its nuclear program (and create a nuclear weapon). Now let’s move to the idea that President Trump does not have unlimited time or patience. Unless the Republicans suffer deep losses in the House and Senate on November 3, the president has until January 20, 2029. He has enormous freedom of action without Congressional involvement. As for patience, I do have any special insight into the president’s state of mind. President Trump might or might not have patience. One of the hallmarks of this administration has been strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity, and in my opinion the administration had been very firm about sticking to its strategic goals. The president has said Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. I see no reason to think that will change. As for the cost, we know from past oil disruptions that over time, the price elasticity of oil demand is high. Alternate supplies come on, alternate routes get developed, people adjust their energy use, and prices moderate. Already, we see alternate routes being developed. And the U.S. budget can afford the actual cost of maintaining the blockade. Available evidence therefore suggests it can be sustained. Regarding the point about strengthening “the Iranian leadership's determination to acquire a nuclear deterrent,” many actions might strengthen this. The question is always cost relative to benefit. Yes, the action might raise the risk, but what are the benefits of the action? Here it looks like @citrinowicz believes the costs outweigh the benefits. We argue that the benefits outweigh the costs. Neither is provable, but if ours will not prove beneficial, what is the specific alternative? We disagree about how long a blockade can be maintained and what the consequences might be. In our opinion, it can be maintained for quite a long time and has a chance of bringing about negotiations and an outcome favorable to the United States. I do not know what his evidence is that it cannot. However, for all readers of this post, I strongly recommend the following book: Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History since 1750, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Blockades take a long time, but in some cases they do deliver strategic gains. Next, @citrinowicz says our article expresses “the belief that economic pressure will eventually produce the political concessions that military force has failed to achieve. That is wishful thinking, not a strategy.” Not at all. The article admits to the possibility that Iran could stabilize its economy. In addition, we argue not just for economic pressure but judicious military action and pushing for negotiations. If that is not a good strategy, what is better? And that brings us to @citrinowicz’s specific policy: developing “a realistic diplomatic path that acknowledges Iran's red lines.” What is this path? What is the specific, actionable policy that should be delivered to relevant heads of government, what are its pros and cons, what are its alternatives, and what are their pros and cons? One may also ask whether Iran needs to acknowledge U.S. red lines, and if not, why not? To say no implicitly means that neither economic nor military pressure will achieve U.S. goals. Or put differently, the U.S. cannot achieve its goals and should capitulate. That is one of three options we considered and noted how it would be worse than our recommended course of action. Given current facts, there is no better option than to, as we write, “maintain the blockade and economic pressure campaign, respond with force when Iran or its proxies strike U.S. or partner targets, and push for negotiations that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and end the Iranian nuclear program.” #Iran #IranWar‌ cc: @citrinowicz